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STRONGHOLD OF HEGEL: MODERN ENEMIES OF PLATO AND HEGEL
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2013–2014)

Why don’t the moderate liberals state that, if the Government continues their socialism and arbitrary ways, they cannot support them?
Edward VII, 1910¹

Now the Kantian traditions have gained power once more.
Ernst Mach, Vienna, 1912²

The [Russian] Revolution is the greatest service which they have yet made to the cause for which the Allied peoples have been fighting since August 1914 ... this war is at bottom a struggle for popular Government as well as for liberty.
David Lloyd George³

Plato is a noologist: “[Plato] has expressed for all time the perfect exemplar of the rationalistic temper.”⁴ What exactly does modern sophistry, especially in the 20th century, mean by “noologism” and the “rationalistic temper” of Plato with regards to the philosophy of Hegel? “Hegel’s metaphysical doctrine of the State bears a resemblance, which is not accidental, to the Platonic metaphysics of nature.”⁵ In other words, according to the modern sophists, Hegel is a Platonist: “[Hegel’s] doctrine that the State is the product of a timeless process, of which the stages stand to one another in a relation of logical consequence, is a relic of Platonism in his metaphysics.”⁶ According to the modern sophists, the metaphysics of Hegel is a relic of Platonism. What is the crime of Plato and Platonism in the scatology of modern irrationalism?

“The failure of Greek ethics to achieve a notion of will was a necessary consequence of Greek metaphysics. The essence of this metaphysics was the distinction within the universe of an intelligible nature from a sensible nature, the former being the ground, or ratio essendi, of the latter ... [Hegel] makes the distinction between the ‘idea’ and its historical manifestation precisely analogous to the Platonic distinction between the intelligible and the sensible within the world of physical nature.”⁷

Hegel, according to the sophists, is guilty of the charge of Platonism, which is the philosophical crime of dogmatic metaphysics: “The Hegelian doctrine that it [the state] is to be understood only as the product of a logical development appears, and is, uncompromisingly Platonic.”⁸ The evidence of Hegel’s guilt of the crime of Platonic metaphysics is his Platonic logic: “[Hegel] gives to the state as it exists in the world a status in the scale of being which Plato was bound in consistency to reserve for the idea ‘laid up in heaven.’”⁹ The logic of Hegel and Plato are the same: “For Hegel the earthly realization of the state involves no admixture of the idea with an alien element, but is no less than the development of the idea itself, the earthly state possesses undiminished the status of being which Plato assigned to the idea.”¹⁰

What exactly is, according to the modern sophists, the criminal nature of the logic of Hegel and Plato in the arena of politics and economics? “The institutions of parliamentary democracy, of which it is the proper function to be organs (not the enforcement, but) of the creation of the law, can find no place in Hegel’s State.”¹¹ Modern sophists thus accuse Hegel of anti–democracy: “The franchise of the citizen of a parliamentary democracy does not confer a right either to rule or to participate in the activity of ruling; it confers the right to take part in the quite different activity, proper not to the ruler but to a sovereign, of commanding the laws which the ruler has to enforce. This freedom is totally lacking in Hegel’s State.”¹²

The Hegel of the modern sophists is not alone in his political and economic barbarism: “Since indeed he [Hegel] lacks the conception of will as creative, he is bound, like Plato, to regard any exercise of will upon the law as perversive of its nature.”¹³ Thus, according to the modern sophists, Hegel and Plato are the forefathers of 20th century totalitarianism: Sophists, we must conclude, are therefore the progenitors of modern political and economic rationality, while philosophers are the promoters of political and economic unreason. In other words, the philosophers are sophists, while the sophists are philosophers!

Thus, the crime of Hegel, according to the modern sophists, is nothing more than the Hegelian rejection and opposition to modern European raison d’État: “When Hegel elucidates his conception of the State by contrast with Kant or the political theories of modern Empiricism, he refers to the Greek Polis, of which he takes Plato’s Republic to be the ideal representation, as that of all forms of society in which the nature of the State is most closely anticipated.”¹⁴ The modern sophists are indeed correct, the Pure Hegel is the avowed enemy of modern political and economic irrationalism, but they are absolutely incorrect in the identification of Pure Hegelism with sophistry: “Hegel perverts the truth which he purports to be ‘translating into the concept.’”¹⁵ Hegel is therefore guilty of sophistry?

“[Hegel] can conceive of no virtue in practical activity except in so far as it is governed by a concept, so he can conceive no process to be intelligible which is not teleological. If human history is a teleological process, then it is to be rendered intelligible by a conception of its end distinct from the empirical description of the events which are means to its achievement. Thus Hegel is led inevitably to his vicious distinction of Philosophy of History from the empirical science of history, the former having as its object the end, the latter the means of the historical process.”¹⁶

Hegel is led inevitably to his vicious distinction of Philosophy of History from the empirical science of history? Hegel, according to the modern sophists, suffers from the vice of vicious distinction. The empirical science of history is viciously opposed to Hegel’s Philosophy of History, which involves the end and not the means of the historical process:

“The vice of this distinction is now so universally recognized that further exposure of it may be spared. I am indebted specially to Croce’s forceful criticisms of the doctrine. I need hardly add that Hegel’s own practice often enough belies his theory and that there is much great History in what he [Hegel] calls his Philosophy of History.”¹⁷

Pray tell, what exactly does the Pure Hegel call his Philosophy of History? Is there much great History in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History written and published by Eduard Gans? Is there much great History in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy written and published by Carl Ludwig Michelet? Is there much great History in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History written and published by Karl Ritter von Hegel? Is there much great History in Hegel’s philosophy of history found in the originalausgabe? Without the rational argument in favor of the exact distinctions between the empirical and non–empirical science of history found in the works of Hegel, as well as between scientific and pseudo–scientific historiography, the modern sophistical attack against the Pure Hegel falls flat: In other words, Hegel is a sophist, according to British Empiricists like Michael Beresford Foster, because according to Benedetto Croce, Hegel is a sophist!

What exactly does Signor Croce have to say about Hegel? “No one but Hegel has understood Kant … in the History of Philosophy also, Hegel attained to heights never reached previously to him and rarely since … [Hegel] sought to adapt to his dialectic universal history as it appears in the books of the historians; and he deluded himself that he had found in the individual a point of departure which should have the precision of the first term of the dialectic triad … The triadic expedient, and the term Logos, to which Hegel has recourse, show that he is always entangled in dualism; that he struggles valiantly against it, but does not escape from it. This dualism not overcome, in which Hegel’s absolute idealism becomes entangled, owing to the grave logical error he has committed.”¹⁸ Hegel suffered from delusions and committed a grave logical error (Hegel was truly a Kantian), according to Benedetto Croce, the father of Italian Hegelianism, after Augusto Véra.

But which Hegel is this, the Hegel of Benedetto Croce, Michael Beresford Foster and British Empiricism? Why, it is the Hegel of the pseudo–Hegelians and anti–Hegelians: “The State as it is in the present is the product of a teleological process, of which the end was not conceived by any of the human agents whose acts were the means of its achievement.”¹⁹ Wherefore?

“This process is the process of World–history as it has unfolded itself up to the present time. It is a development, in that it is directed towards an end, and it is a natural development, in that the end is that of the ‘Weltgeist’ or World Spirit, which uses the human agents of history as unconscious tools to its achievement, and which thus stands to them in somewhat the same relation as the divine Demiurge to processes of growth in nature. To be used thus by the World Spirit as a means to its end is what constitutes the historical importance of a people or of an event and the greatness of an individual.”²⁰

Where, pray tell, is it exactly in the Pure Hegel that the State as it is in the present is the product of a teleological process, of which the end was not conceived by any of the human agents whose acts are and were the means of its achievement, namely, where is it exactly in the Pure Hegel that the process of world history as it unfolds and has unfolded itself up to the present time, is a development, directed towards an end, a natural development, in that the end is that of the “Weltgeist” or World Spirit, which uses all the human agents of history as unconscious tools to its achievement? The basis of the so–called Hegelian vice of vicious distinction, by which Hegel is classified as a sophist by the modern irrationalists, is extracted from the works of impure Hegelianism:

“This is the famous doctrine of ‘Die List der Vernunft.’ See §298 Zusätze for an illustration of how the selfish and ambitious acts of historical personages are turned to an end of which they had no conception. In §344 the ‘states, peoples, and individuals’ who do the business of the World Spirit are called ‘bewußtlose Werkzeuge,’ and in §348 it is explicitly declared that the work which they do ‘is concealed from them and is not their object or purpose.’”²¹

Hegel is rejected as a sophist by Benedetto Croce and British Empiricists like Michael Beresford Foster in virtue of material culled from the works of impure Hegelianism: Modern irrationalists ignore and neglect the rational distinction between the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism on the one hand, and the pseudo–Hegel of impure Hegelianism on the other. Is it really and truly the case that the selfish and ambitious acts of all historical personages are turned to an end of which they have and had no conception, namely, does the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism teach or “explicitly declare” that the work which all states, nations, and individuals do “is concealed from them and is not their object or purpose”?

“States, nations, and individuals [die Staaten, Völker und Individuen in diesem Geschäfte des Weltgeistes] arise animated by their particular determinate principle which has its interpretation and actuality in their constitutions and in the whole range of their life and condition. While their consciousness is limited to these and they are absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind at work within them. The shapes which they take pass–away, while the absolute mind prepares and works out its transition to its next higher stage.”²²

The Pure Hegel: States, nations, and individuals (die Staaten, Völker und Individuen in diesem Geschäfte des Weltgeistes), namely, civilizations, arise animated by their particular, determinate principle which has its interpretation and actuality in their constitutions and in the whole range of their life and condition. While the consciousness of civilizations is limited to these, and while they are absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: The shapes which they take pass–away, while the absolute mind prepares and works out its transition to its next higher stage.

What does this mean according to the Pure Hegel? While the consciousness of civilizations is limited to these, namely, the particular, determinate principle which has its interpretation and actuality in their constitutions and in the whole range of their life and condition, and while they are not absorbed in their mundane interests, they are not all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind. Thus, some of the shapes which the consciousness of civilizations takes, do not pass–away, and the absolute mind prepares and works out its transition to its next higher stage. What is in question here is the nature of the Dialectic of Hegel:

“The history of a single world–historical nation contains (a) the development of its principle from its latent embryonic stage until it blossoms into the self-conscious freedom of ethical life and presses in upon world history; and (b) the period of its decline and fall, since it is its decline and fall that signalizes the emergence in it of a higher principle as the pure negative of its own. When this happens, mind passes over into the new principle and so marks out another nation for world–historical significance.”²³

The absolute mind prepares and works out its transition to its next higher stage, namely, decline and fall signifies the emergence of a higher principle as the pure negative: While the consciousness of civilizations is absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind. While the consciousness of civilizations is not absorbed in their mundane interests, they are not all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: The history of a single world historical civilization contains the development of its principle from its latent embryonic stage until it blossoms into the self–conscious freedom of ethical life and presses in upon world history. What does this mean?

“All actions, including world–historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, they are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed though it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object.”²⁴

All actions, says the Pure Hegel, including world historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, namely, while the consciousness of civilizations is absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed and it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object.

All actions, says the Pure Hegel, including world historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, namely, while the consciousness of civilizations is not absorbed in their mundane interests, they are not all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed and it is not concealed from them and is their aim and object.

World historical individuals and actions, therefore, are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind, and some of them are therefore directly at one with that deed, and it is not therefore concealed from some of them, and it is their aim and object. Wherefore? The historical development of the principle of Western civilization blossoms into the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind, and some of them are directly at one with that deed, and it is not concealed from them as their aim and object,―as the historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history.

The deed of the world mind is the historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history: The dialectic of universal history is therefore the principle of the historical development of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life, namely, world civilization. World historical individuals and actions are therefore the living instruments of the historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life as world civilization: World historical individuals are the living instruments of the dialectic of world history. The historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life is in substance the deed of the world mind, namely, as individual subjects giving actuality to the substantial, from the embryonic stage until it blossoms: They are not therefore absorbed in their mundane interests, they are therefore all the time the conscious tools and organs of the mind of the world.

The genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism says of those individuals who are directly at one with the deed of the world mind although it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object:

“For the deeds of the world mind, therefore, they receive no honour or thanks either from their contemporaries or from public opinion in later ages. All that is vouchsafed to them by such opinion is undying fame in respect of the subjective form of their acts.”²⁵

World historical actions culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial in respect of the subjective form of their acts as inferior ruling classes, namely, the emergence of a higher principle as the pure negative. For this very reason the deed of the world mind is concealed from them, and is not their aim and object. The morphology of the text proves that §348 continues the thought at the end of both §347 and §347A, which means that Hegel is referring in §348 to the topic directly above, namely, to the distinction between the rise and fall of civilizations in both §347 and §347A, “in the advance of the self–developing self–consciousness of the world mind,” but in the negative dimension, namely, “in contrast with this its absolute right of being the vehicle of this present stage in the world mind’s development.” According to the Pure Hegel:

“World–history, however, is above the point of view [Gesichtspunkten] from which these things matter. Each of its stages is the presence of a necessary moment in the Idea of the world mind, and that moment attains its absolute right in that stage.”²⁶

All the stages present the necessary moments in the idea of the world mind, and all the moments attain their absolute right in all the stages of world history: “The nation whose life embodies this moment secures its good fortune and fame, and its deeds are brought to fruition.”²⁷ The life of world civilization thus embodies all the moments, and is the deed of all, brought to fruition:

“The mind which has thus reverted to the substantiality with which it began is the mind which has returned out of the infinite opposition, and which consequently engenders and knows this its truth as thought and as a world of actual laws.”²⁸

Therefore, out of the dialectic of finitude of Pure Hegelism arises the universal mind of the world, and therefore the historical development of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life is in substance the deed of the world mind, namely, as individual subjects giving actuality to the substantial, from the embryonic stage until it blossoms: They are not therefore absorbed in their mundane interests, they are therefore all the time the conscious tools and organs of the world mind. They are therefore the superior ruling classes.

Thus, the Pure Hegel is the modern philosophical progenitor of the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes. What is the nature of superior ruling classes? All actions, including world historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, namely, when the consciousness of civilizations is not absorbed in mundane interests, they are not all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed and it is not concealed from them and is their aim and object:

“The history of a single world–historical nation [eines welthistorischen Volks] contains (a) the development of its principle from its latent embryonic stage until it blossoms into the self–conscious freedom of ethical life and presses in upon world history.”²⁹

The historical development of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life is in substance the deed of the world mind, namely, as individual subjects giving actuality to the substantial, from the embryonic stage until it blossoms. They are not therefore absorbed in their mundane interests, they are therefore all the time the conscious tools and organs of the world mind: They are the superior ruling classes. What is the world historical nature of these superior ruling classes of rising civilization (eines welthistorischen Volks)?

“Each of its stages is the presence of a necessary moment in the Idea of the world mind, and that moment attains its absolute right in that stage. The nation whose life embodies this moment secures its good fortune and fame, and its deeds are brought to fruition.”³⁰

The superior ruling class is a necessary moment in the Idea of the world mind, and attains its absolute right at that stage in the advancement of Western civilization in universal history:

“The nation to which is ascribed a moment of the Idea in the form of a natural principle is entrusted with giving complete effect to it in the advance of the self–developing self–consciousness of the world mind. The nation is dominant in world history [das Herrschende] during this one epoch, and it is only once that it can make its hour strike.”³¹

The civilization to which is ascribed a moment of the Idea in the form of a natural principle is entrusted with giving complete effect to it, and is dominant in world history during this one epoch, and it is only once that it can make its hour strike: The advancement of the self–developing self–consciousness of the world mind is the work of the superior ruling classes of Western civilization. The dialectic of world history, which is the principle of the historical development of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life, according to the Pure Hegel, is the advancement of the self–developing self–consciousness of the world mind as the superior ruling class of Western civilization:

“The history of mind is its own act. Mind is only what it does, and its act is to make itself the object of its own consciousness. In history its act is to gain consciousness of itself as mind, to apprehend itself in its interpretation of itself to itself. This apprehension is its being and its principle, and the completion of apprehension at one stage is at the same time the rejection of that stage and its transition to a higher. To use abstract phraseology, the mind apprehending this apprehension anew, or in other words returning to itself again out of its rejection of this lower stage of apprehension, is the mind of the stage higher than that on which it stood in its earlier apprehension.”³²

Why do the superior ruling classes affect the work of mind, “returning to itself again out of its rejection of this lower stage of apprehension”? Why do the superior ruling classes affect the work of mind on the “stage higher than that on which it stood in its earlier apprehension”? The work of the superior ruling classes is “mind apprehending this apprehension anew,” as the mortal enemy of all inferior ruling classes:

“But to those who reject this doctrine, mind has remained an empty word, and history a superficial play of casual, so–called ‘merely human,’ strivings and passions. Even in connexion with history, they speak of Providence and the plan of Providence, and express a faith in a higher power, their ideas remain empty because they expressly declare that for them the plan of Providence is inscrutable and incomprehensible.”³³

The superior ruling classes are mortally opposed to the inferior ruling classes because these latter expressly declare that “the plan of Providence is inscrutable and incomprehensible,” namely because their own “ideas remain empty,”―for the inferior ruling classes, “mind has remained an empty word, and history a superficial play of casual, so–called ‘merely human,’ strivings and passions.” Wherefore?

“These principalities, therefore, are secure and happy. But as they are upheld by higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, I will abstain from speaking of them; for being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish man to discuss them ... [Rulers] cannot observe all those things which are considered good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion ... [Rulers] must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of fortune dictate, and, as I said before, not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if necessitated ... It is not unknown to me how many have been and are of opinion that worldly events are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot by their prudence change them, and that on the contrary there is no remedy whatever, and for this they may judge it to be useless to toil much about them, but let things be ruled by chance ... Our freewill may not be altogether extinguished, I think it may be true that fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allows the other half or a little less to be governed by us. I would compare her to an impetuous river that, when turbulent, inundates the plains, ruins trees and buildings, removes earth from this side and places it on the other; every one flies before it, and everything yields to its fury without being able to oppose it; and yet though it is of such a kind, still when it is quiet, men can make provision against it by dams and banks, so that when it rises it will either go into a canal or its rush will not be so wild and dangerous. It happens similarly with fortune, which shows her power where no measures have been taken to resist her, and turns her fury where she knows that no dams or barriers have been made to hold her ... if one could change one’s nature with time and circumstances, fortune would never change ... fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force; and it can be seen that she lets herself be overcome by these rather than by those who proceed coldly. And therefore, like a woman, she is a friend to the young, because they are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with greater audacity ... God will not do everything, in order not to deprive us of freewill.”³⁴

Why are the superior ruling classes mortally opposed to inferior ruling classes in world history? The superior ruling classes do not expressly declare that “the plan of Providence is inscrutable and incomprehensible,” namely, because their own ideas do not remain empty,―for the superior ruling classes, on the other hand, mind is not an empty word, and history is not a superficial play of casual, so–called “merely human,” strivings and passions. Wherefore? World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind, and some of them are directly at one with that deed and it is not concealed from them, as their aim and object,―as the historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history: The superior ruling classes, in contradistinction to the inferior ruling classes, are not therefore absorbed in their mundane interests, and are therefore all the time the conscious tools and organs of the world mind.

What therefore is the world historical nature of the inferior ruling classes, according to the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism? All actions, says the Pure Hegel, including world historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, namely, while the consciousness of civilizations is absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed and it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object. The decline and fall of civilizations signalizes the emergence of a higher principle as the pure negative of its own. When this happens, mind passes over into the new principle and so marks out another civilization for world historical significance.

The historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life is in substance the deed of the world mind, namely, as individual subjects giving actuality to the substantial, from the embryonic stage until it blossoms: While they are absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind. They are the inferior ruling classes. Mind passes over into the new principle and so marks out another civilization for world historical significance:

“The declining nation has lost the interest of the absolute; it may indeed absorb the higher principle positively and begin building its life on it, but the principle is only like an adopted child, not like a relative to whom its ties are immanently vital and vigorous. Perhaps it loses its autonomy, or it may still exist, or drag out its existence, as a particular state or a group of states and involve itself without rhyme or reason in manifold enterprises at home and battles abroad.”³⁵

What is the world historical nature of the inferior ruling classes of declining civilizations? They are “without rights, and they, along with those whose hour has struck already, count no longer in world history.”³⁶ There is no longer any interest between the inferior ruling classes and the absolute in world history, because the collapse of civilization means the loss of “interest” between the absolute and the inferior ruling classes:

“If it is asked why then, since 1850 at any rate, his [Hegel’s] writings have been a good deal neglected, the answer is not difficult to give. It is only by the multitude that they have been laid aside. The principle has penetrated in this country into the attitude and methods of some of the later thinkers who have been amongst us, men like Green, Caird, Bradley and Bosanquet. These have indeed hardly been Hegelians. It was not probable that a system which was given to the world a century since should serve the world sufficiently today. But its broad principle has profoundly moved the English thinkers to whom I have referred, and I might add instances of the same kind from the United States and from other countries, as well as from Germany … We need not be deterred by the feeling that we are no longer interested in the doctrine of the Absolute which engrossed attention in the early part of the last century.”³⁷

The Pure Hegel is therefore the modern Western philosophical progenitor of the life and death struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes in world history:

“If states disagree and their particular wills cannot be harmonized, the matter can only be settled by war ... It is as particular entities that states enter into relations with one another. Hence their relations are on the largest scale a maelstrom of external contingency and the inner particularity of passions, private interests and selfish ends, abilities and virtues, vices, force, and wrong.”³⁸

While the struggle between ruling classes is the arena of external contingency, wherein is found, “the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind,” and although, “the principles of the national minds are wholly restricted on account of their particularity, for it is in this particularity that, as existent individuals, they have their objective actuality and their self–consciousness,” nevertheless:

“Their deeds and destinies in their reciprocal relations to one another are the dialectic of the finitude [die erscheinende Dialektik der Endlichkeit] of these minds, and out of it arises the universal mind, the mind of the world, free from all restriction, producing itself as that which exercises its right―and its right is the highest right of all―over these finite minds in the ‘history of the world which is the world’s court of judgement.’”³⁹

From out of the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, namely the dialectic of finitude, arises the universal mind, the mind of the world, free from all restriction: The dialectic of world history, as the dialectic of finitude, is the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, and is the principle of the historical development of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life, and therefore according to the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism, the advancement of the self–developing self–consciousness of the world mind in the aggrandizement of Western civilization: Globalism is therefore the supremacy of the superior ruling class (das Herrschende).

As the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism has foretold, the grandeur and decadence of Western civilization is the result of the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, as the dialectic of finitude: The aggrandizement of Western civilization is the work of superior ruling classes, while the decline of civilization is the work of inferior ruling classes. The rise of Western civilization in world history is therefore the result of superior ruling classes, whether aristocratic, monarchical or democratic.

Thus, the struggle between ruling classes and the birth of world civilization (Herrlichkeit) is the dialectic of world history in the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism. But which Hegel is the Hegel of the modern sophists?

“The will of the great man performs the essential function of the sovereign will: It brings into being the law which determines the activity of every power within the State, not only that of the government, but that of the legislature and that of the monarch himself. But it is not a sovereign will precisely because it lies outside the State which it constitutes. The task of the great men is ended when the State which they wrought unconsciously to achieve is completely realized. Hegel’s State itself fails to be sovereign in the full and proper sense by lacking an organ to give expression to this will.”⁴⁰

Pray tell, where exactly is it in the Pure Hegel that the will of the great rulers who perform the essential function of the sovereign will, “is ended when the State they wrought unconsciously to achieve is completely realized”? Where is it exactly in the Pure Hegel that the “State itself fails to be sovereign in the full and proper sense by lacking an organ to give expression to this will”? From whence comes the pseudo–Hegel of modern irrationalism? The answer is readily available: In the writings and publications of Ludwig Boumann, Friedrich Christoph Förster, Eduard Gans, Karl Ritter von Hegel, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Philipp Konrad Marheinecke, Carl Ludwig Michelet, Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz and Johannes Karl Hartwig Schulze (Schultze), namely, from the works of impure Hegelianism is found the pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism of modern irrationalism:

“It may indeed be disconcerting that only today do we doubt ― and not everyone does ― that Hegel’s lectures … are actually reproduced authentically in the published edition … that did not become full–blown for more than a hundred and fifty years. We can hardly examine here all the reasons for this circumstance.”⁴¹

In other words, Hegel is rejected as a sophist and anti–democrat by modern irrationalists in virtue of material drawn from the works of impure Hegelianism. Modern sophists ignore and neglect the rational distinction between the genuine Hegel and Pure Hegelism of the originalausgabe on the one hand, and the pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism of their own impure Hegelianism on the other hand:

“Hegel’s own course notes and those of his students should be used with caution to clarify and illustrate the meaning of the texts he published during his lifetime ... In general, the student notes written during or after Hegel’s classes should be used with caution … What has been said about the student notes must also be applied to the so–called Zusatze (additions), added by 'the friends’ to the third edition of the Encyclopedia (1830) and the book on Rechtsphilosophie ... Some commentators, however, seem to prefer the Zusatze over Hegel’s own writings; additions are sometimes even quoted as the only textual evidence for the interpretation of highly controversial issues. For scholarly use, however, we should use them only as applications, confirmations, or concretizations of Hegel’s theory. Only in cases where authentic texts are unavailable may they be accepted as indications of Hegel’s answers to questions that are not treated in his handwritten or published work. If they contradict the explicit theory of the authorized texts, we can presume that the student is wrong, unless we can show that it is plausible that they express a change in the evolution of Hegel’s thought. On issues where Hegel left us without any authorized treatise (as is the case for large parts of the Aesthetics, the History of Philosophy, and the Philosophy of World History) we must, of course, use the surviving course notes as the only possible access to Hegel’s thought; but here, too, the ultimate criteria for their authenticity lie in the principles of his authorized work ... According to Leopold von Henning’s preface (pp. vi–vii) in his edition (1839) of the Encyclopädie of 1830, the editors of the Encyclopedia sometimes changed or completed the sentences in which the students had rendered Hegel’s classes.”⁴²

Thus, modern irrationalism and impure Hegelianism, namely, pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, ignores and neglects the dialectic of finitude (die erscheinende Dialektik der Endlichkeit) as the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, and the rise of world civilization as the supremacy of Global rational political and economic order in universal history:

“The concrete Ideas, the minds of the nations, have their truth and their destiny in the concrete Idea which is absolute universality, i.e., in the world mind. Around its throne they stand as the executors of its actualization and as signs and ornaments of its grandeur [Herrlichkeit]. As mind, it is nothing but its active movement towards absolute knowledge of itself and therefore towards freeing its consciousness from the form of natural immediacy and so coming to itself.”⁴³

Modern irrationalism is therefore the weapon of the inferior ruling class, namely, modern European raison d’État: “The outlook of Kant’s philosophy is a high one … the march of God in the world, that is what the state is.”⁴⁴ The irrationalists therefore mean by the “noologism” and the “rationalistic temper” of Plato and Hegel (namely, the opposition of Western Idealism to modern sophistry), that reason is the weapon of the superior ruling class, albeit rechristened by the sophists as “unreason,” which they wrongly foist upon Western philosophy. In the eyes of modern irrationalism, Western philosophy is sophistry. Hegel is thus sophistically identified with Plato, and both are then made into anti–democrats (totalitarians), as the congenital enemies of what the modern sophists name rational political and economic order.

What exactly the sophists mean by modern democracy or rational political and economic order (so–called liberalism, republicanism, nationalism, socialism and communism) is spelled out in the world of today as criticism, empiricism and even science in the backwards, outdated and corrupt political economy of modernity (in contradistinction to their pejorative usage of such terms as dogmatism, idealism and metaphysics).⁴⁵ Their sophistical political economy is therefore culled from the modern subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism of Locke,⁴⁶ Leibniz, Hume and Kant: As the Machiavellism of the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, which is not the rational conception of right found in the Magna Carta and the Constitution of the United States of America. ⁴⁷

The political and economic doctrine of Locke’s version of so–called constitutional, as opposed to absolute, monarchy is forged in the modern European warfare between Gallicanism and Ultramontanism (unleashed by Luther and the revolt of Protestantism), and especially the revolutionary struggle between William of Orange and King James II: This struggle also involves the late mediaeval theological distinction between Catholicism and Protestantism in the political and economic clash between the old and new world historical forms of Christendom,―as the moment of the modern self–determination of the self–comprehending pure notion, namely, as the rise of Globalism:

“Admirers of Hegel are accustomed to refer to the first edition [Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline], as having most of the author’s freshness and power … in America, no one can look back a few years, without observing that the whole tone of our public men has changed, and that the phrases, ‘progress,’ ‘necessary development,’ and ‘God in history,’ occur with marked frequency.”⁴⁸

In the first editions of the great works of Hegel’s lifetime, the Owl of Minerva is successively released from the coils of modern irrationalism: Pure Hegelianism is the sublation of modernity that ends the mental struggle between reason and unreason in world history. Pure Hegelianism reconciles the strife between Descartes, Spinoza and Berkeley on the one side, and Locke, Leibniz and Hume on the other, in the struggle between Kant and Hegel in 20th century world history: Americanism is therefore the concrete sublation of Pure Hegelianism. ⁴⁹

World civilization is therefore Globalism, the rational foundation of which is therefore the developmental unification of the coaxial integration of the American world.



ENDNOTES

1. Edward VII in Giles St. Aubyn, Edward VII: Prince and King, New York, 1979, 431.

See: “Churchill was never a rational man ... in moments of crisis he [Churchill] sought guidance not by reasoning but by intuition.”
William Manchester, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Alone, 1932–1940, Boston, 1988, 664.

2. Ernst Mach, “Author’s Preface to the Seventh German Edition,” The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of Its Development, Supplement to the Third English Edition Containing the Author’s Additions to the Seventh German Edition, Philip Edward Bertrand Jourdain, translator and annotator, Chicago and London, 1915, xi. [1912]

See: “With regard to the monstrous conceptions of absolute space and absolute time … Newton indeed spoke much about these things, but throughout made no serious application of them.”
Ernst Mach, Ibidem, 1915, xii. See: Ernst Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Enwickelung: Historisch–Kritisch Dargestellt, Siebente verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage, Leipzig, 1912.

3. David Lloyd George in Robert Kinloch Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, New York, 1967, 459.

See: “Nicholas, his arm still around Alexis, began to rise from his chair to protect his wife and son. He had just time to say ‘What ...?’ before Yurovsky pointed his revolver directly at the Tsar’s head and fired. Nicholas died instantly. At this signal, the entire squad of executioners began to shoot. Alexandra had time only to raise her hand and make the sign of the cross before she too was killed by a single bullet. Olga, Tatiana and Marie, standing behind her mother, were hit and died quickly. Botkin, Kharitonnov and Trupp also fell in the hail of bullets. Demidora, the maid, survived the first volley, and rather than reload, the executioners took rifles from the next room and pursued her, stabbing with bayonets. Screaming, running back and forth along the wall like a trapped animal, she tried to fend them off with a cushion. At last she fell, pierced by bayonets more than thirty times. Jimmy the spaniel was killed when his head was crushed by a rifle butt. The room, filled with the smoke and stench of gunpowder, became suddenly quiet. Blood was running in streams from the bodies on the floor. Then there was a movement and a slow groan. Alexis, lying on the floor still in the arms of the Tsar, feebly moved his hand to clutch his father’s coat. Savagely, one of the executioners kicked the Tsarevich in the head with his heavy boot. Yurovsky stepped up and fired two shots into the boy’s ear. Just at that moment, Anastasia, who had only fainted, regained consciousness and screamed. With bayonets and rifle butts, the entire band turned on her. In a moment, she too lay still.”
Robert Kinloch Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, New York, 1967, 517.

See also: “The renovation of Parliamentary government, the transformation of the conditions of the ownership and occupation of land, the relations between the Governments at home and our adventures abroad in contact with inferior races, the limitations on free contract, and the rights of majorities to restrict the private acts of minorities, these are only some of the questions that time and circumstance are pressing upon us.”
John Morley in Kant’s Principles of Politics Including His Essay on Perpetual Peace: A Contribution to Political Science, William Hastie, editor & translator, Edinburgh, 1891, xxxviii–xxxix.

See also: “The Republican Constitution is, thus, the only one which arises out of the idea of the Original Compact upon which all the rightful legislation of a people is founded ... the Republican Constitution is the only one which perfectly corresponds to the Rights of Man.”
Immanuel Kant in Kant’s Principles of Politics Including His Essay on Perpetual Peace: A Contribution to Political Science, William Hastie, editor & translator, Edinburgh, 1891, 89–116. [Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795]

See also: “The Republican Constitution is not to be confounded with the Democratic Constitution ... of the three forms of the State, a Democracy, in the proper sense of the word, is necessarily a despotism; because it establishes an Executive power in which All resolve about, and, it may be, also against, any One who is not in accord with it; and consequently the All who thus resolve are really not all; which is a contradiction of the Universal Will with itself and with liberty.”
Immanuel Kant, Ibidem, 91–92.

See also: “The conception of a noumenon is problematical ... the conception of a noumenon is therefore not the conception of an object, but merely a problematical conception ... my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition, ‘I think,’ as Descartes maintained.”
Immanuel Kant, “The Critique of Pure Reason,Great Books of the Western World: Kant, John Miller Dow Meiklejohn, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, 1960, 106–106–127.

See finally: “The concept of the noumenon is problematical ... the concept of the noumenon is not therefore the concept of an object, but only a problem ... the so–called syllogism of Cartesius, cogito, ergo sum, is in reality tautological.”
Immanuel Kant, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: A Commemoration of the Centenary of Its First Publication, vol. 2, Friedrich Max Müller, translator, London, 1881, 249–250–308.

4. Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, Plato or Protagoras? Being a Critical Examination of the Protagoras Speech in the Theaetetus with Some Remarks Upon Error, Oxford, 1908, 29.

See: “Has not the time come when Kant’s ‘Copernican change of standpoint’ might at last be put into practice seriously, and when Truth, instead of being offered up to idols and sacrificed to ‘ideals,’ might at length be depicted in her human beauty and simplicity?”
Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, Studies in Humanism, London, 1907, 178.

See finally: “Plato, abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to the understanding, ventured upon the wings of ideas beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect. He [Plato] did not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts; for he met with no resistance which might serve him for support, as it were, whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress ... Plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, but which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding, inasmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experiences ... In his view, they flow from the highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human reason, which, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is obliged with great labour to recall by reminiscence―which is called philosophy―the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher attached to this expression ... I cannot follow him [Plato] in this, and as little can I follow him in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or in his hypostatization of them ... What I have termed an ideal was in Plato’s philosophy an idea of the divine mind―an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal existences ... Aristotle may be regarded as head of the empiricists, and Plato of the noologists.”
Immanuel Kant, “The Critique of Pure Reason,Great Books of the Western World: Kant, John Miller Dow Meiklejohn, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, 1960, 16–113–113–114–173–249.

But which Platonic “ideas” are these, drawn from the Plato of Aldus Pius Manutius and Μάρκος Μουσοῦρος, Marsilius Ficinus, Henricus Stephanus and Joannes Serranus or perhaps even from Daniel Albert Wyttenbach?
Kant: “I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher [Plato] attached to this expression [idea].”
The Kantian distinction between noologism and empiricism in the Kantian history of philosophy is therefore unfounded, otherwise mired in modern subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism. What a pity, indeed ...

5. Michael Beresford Foster, The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel, New York, 1965, 132. [1935]

See: “When the wars and civil wars of the twentieth century had destroyed the old Europe and removed it from the center of the world, the question remained as to what contribution Hegel had made to consideration of the new direction taken by history since 1800. Was Hegel the philosopher who had recognized the emancipatory tendencies of civil society but, faced with the contradictions of development, had sought refuge in once more affirming the positive role of the state? Or had he appealed to the regulatory function of the state in a conservative or rather pro–governmental frame of mind? With his recourse to metaphysical solutions had he helped to pave the way for the most diverse varieties of totalitarianism? Or could not on the contrary the young Hegel at least be ranged on the side of those protesting against the senselessness of the present–day world, or at all events calling for a new experience of history and historicity?”
Otto Pöggeler, “Editorial Introduction,” Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818, With Additions From the Lectures of 1818–1819, J. Michael Stewart & Peter C. Hodgson, translators, Claudia Becker, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Kurt Rainer Meist, Friedrich Hogemann, Hans Josef Schneider, Walter Jaeschke, Christoph Jamme & Hans Christian Lucas, editors, Oxford, 2012, 4. [1983 & 1995]

The twentieth century had destroyed the old Europe and removed it from the center of the world? Otto Pöggeler does not notice that Continental Europe was never at the “center of the world.” The British Empire was at the center of the world, not as “old Europe” but as the Industrial Revolution, precisely because of its profound integration with the New World. Pöggeler and his friends at the Hegel Archiv (Habermas and company), undoubtedly are blinded by the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, and therefore they fail to notice the profound difference between Bonapartism and the rational conception of right found in the Magna Carta. These are hard words and bound to roil the Eurocentrics in the House of Commons, the present–day relics of David Lloyd George. What do we care? The rational conception of right found in the Magna Carta, the political and economic fountainhead of the Industrial Revolution, is uplifted in the Constitution of the United States of America, as the bastion of world civilization. The American Civil War unchained the political and economic Idea of universal freedom from the modern coils of Bonapartism in the arena of world history. Modern European raison d’état is Bonapartism, which follows in the footsteps of Machiavellism, especially in the philosophical sophistry of Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant, and is therefore political and economic irrationalism: “The absolutist doctrines, in their application, lead rulers to the same results as the doctrines of Machiavelli (les doctrines absolutistes, dans leur application, conduisent les princes aux mêmes résultats que les doctrines de Machiavel).” This at least is the inescapable lesson of 20th century world history.

6. Michael Beresford Foster, Ibidem, 164.

7. Foster, Ibidem, 131–133.

8. Foster, Ibidem, 166.

9. Foster, Ibidem, 123.

10. Foster, Ibidem, 123–124.

11. Foster, Ibidem, 193.

12. Foster, Ibidem, 200.

13. Foster, Ibidem,

14. Foster, Ibidem, 91.

15. Foster, Ibidem, 204.

16. Foster, Ibidem, 203.

17. Foster, Ibidem.

18. Benedetto Croce, What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel, 3rd edition, Douglas Ainslie, translator, London, 1915, 50–110–182–201. [1906]

See: “Hegel was the culmination of the movement in German philosophy that started from Kant; although he [Hegel] often criticized Kant, his system could never have arisen if Kant’s had not existed ... The identification of the real and the rational leads unavoidably to some of the complacency inseparable from the belief that ‘whatever is, is right’... All these quotations are from the introduction to The Philosophy of History ... [Hegel’s] is a very superfine brand of freedom. It does not mean that you will be able to keep out of a concentration camp. It does not imply democracy, or a free press, or any of the usual Liberal watchwords, which Hegel rejects with contempt ... I doubt whether, in Hegel’s opinion, a man could be a ‘hero’ without being a military conqueror. Hegel’s emphasis on nations, together with his peculiar conception of ‘freedom,’ explains his glorification of the State― a very important aspect of his political philosophy, to which we must now turn our attention. His philosophy of the State is developed both in his Philosophy of History and in his Philosophy of Law ... Hegel’s doctrine of the State ― [is] a doctrine which, if accepted, justifies every internal tyranny and every external aggression that can possibly be imagined. The strength of his bias appears in the fact that his theory is largely inconsistent with his own metaphysic, and that the inconsistencies are all such as tend to the justification of cruelty and international brigandage. A man may be pardoned if logic compels him regretfully to reach conclusions which he deplores, but not for departing from logic in order to be free to advocate crimes ... Hegel thought that, if enough was known about a thing to distinguish it from all other things, then all its properties could be inferred by logic. This was a mistake, and from this mistake arose the whole imposing edifice of his system.”
Bertrand Arthur William Russell, History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, London, 1947, 757–758–763–764–766–768–772.

See also: “What, then, is the difference between Kant and Hegel? ... Kant opposes the knowledge of phenomena to the knowledge of things in themselves, the latter being knowledge that only pure rational cognition could offer us ... Hegel pushes the critique of representation inaugurated by Immanuel Kant, to its very end. Kant revolutionized philosophy by asserting that thought is not regulated by its object, but rather the opposite is true. Hegel engages in this new path, and affirms that thought is unto itself its very own object. Hegel advances Kant’s Copernican revolution, while at the same time, he smashes it into pieces. What remains, according to Hegel (his greatest discovery) is the tension between the unity of the I think and the unthought multiplicity, or the multiplicity which is not completely unified by thought. Every object (thought) carries within itself this tension, which is why every object carries contradiction within itself, and is contradictory. The rôle of the doctrine of essence, its explosive force within the Hegelian system, is that the philosophy of Hegel reposes upon this tension; the function of which is to unfold its successive forms, without itself ever being surpassed. There is no exact determination of the nature of contradiction in the world, outside of this transition from the nature of being into the nature of essence. This is proved by Hegel’s critique of Heraclitus ... ‘truth or universality is not yet expressed: It is the concept of unity as opposition per se, but it is not the concept of unity reflected into itself.’ (Note 7: Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, §18, p. 337) ... Hegel tries to prove that unity can be known only on the condition of understanding being as the being of thought; unity is, as being, thought which thinks of being as thought (‘unity reflected in itself’) ... Hegel’s distinction between the Hegelian dialectic and the Heraclitean dialectic is essential. It will play a very important rôle in the understanding of the Hegelian logic as a method of thought. Thus, for example, when Karl Marx uses the traditional Hegelian dialectic to combat universal change ... Is Hegel left unscathed when the concept is unfolded across the entire Hegelian system? Probably not ... For the last book of Hegel’s Logic, I have made my own translations.”
Béatrice Longuenesse, Hegel et la critique de la métaphysique: Étude sur la doctrine de l’essence, Paris, 1981, 10–17–51–52–208–209: “Où est, alors, la différence entre Kant et Hegel? … [Kant] oppose à la connaissance des phénomènes une connaissance des choses en soi que seule une pensée purement rationnelle pourrait nous offrir … Hegel pousse à son terme une critique de la représentation que Kant ne fait que amorcer. Kant a révolutionné la philosophie en affirmant que la pensée ne se règle pas sur son objet, mais l’inverse … Hegel s’engouffre dans la voie ouverte, et affirme que la pensée est à elle–même son propre objet. Il prolonge la révolution copernicienne, en même temps qu’il la fait voler en éclats … Ce qui reste, selon lui [Hegel], une découverte inestimable, est la tension entre l’unité du Je pense et la multiplicité non pensée, ou non complètement unifiée par la pensée. Tout objet (pensé) porte en soi cette tension, c’est pourquoi tout objet porte en soi la contradiction … L’intérêt de la Doctrine de l’essence, sa force explosive à l’intérieure du système hégélien, tiennent à ce qu’elle est tout entier bâtie sur cette tension; son objet est d’en exposer les forms successives, sans que jamais elle soit supprimée … Il n’y a pas de détermination rigoureuse de la nature de la contradiction dans les choses, en dehors de cette transposition du registre de l’être dans celui de l’essence. C’est ce que montre la critique formulée par Hegel à l’encontre d’Héraclite … ‘la vérité, l’universalité n’est pas encore exprimée; c’est le concept de l’unité étant dans l’opposition, non de l’unité réfléchie dans soi’ (Note 7: Hegel, Leçons d’histoire de la philosophie, §18, p. 337) … Hegel veut montrer, au contraire, que l’unité ne peut être saisie qu’à condition de comprendre l’être comme être pensée; l’unité est, dans l’être, la pensée pensant l’être (‘l’unité réfléchie dans soi’) … Ce clivage entre dialectique hégélienne et dialectique héraclitéenne est essentiel. Il jouera un rôle très important dans la compréhension de la logique hégélienne comme méthode de pensée. Ainsi par exemple, lorsque Marx revendique l’héritage de la dialectique hégélienne contre le mobilisme universel … [Hegel] échappe–t–il, en particulier, lorsque le concept se déploie dans le système tout entier? Peut–être pas … Pour ce dernier livre de la Logique, j’ai toujours donné ma propre traduction.”
See: Béatrice Longuenesse, éditrice, “Préface,” Vladimir Lénine: Textes philosophiques, Sylvie Pelta & Françoise Sève, traductrices, (Paris: Éditions sociales/Messidor, 1982). [1978]

See finally: “The primary focus of Hegel’s discussion of the state in organic terms is the political constitution of the state. In this context, Hegel talks of the state as an organism not because it is a whole of which its individual citizens are parts, but rather that the elements that make up the constitution of the state depend on one another in the way that the categories that comprise the Concept are dependent on one another: ‘Note 64: While the powers of the state must certainly be distinguished, each must form a whole in itself and contain the other moments within it. When we speak of the distinct activities of these powers, we must not fall into the monumental error of taking this to mean that each power should exist independently and in abstraction; on the contrary, the powers should be distinguished only as moments of the concept,’ (Philosophy of Right, §272 Zusätze). Put very simply, this means that while the monarchy is a manifestation of individuality, the executive is a manifestation of particularity, and the legislature is a manifestation of universality, each also embodies aspects of the other ‘moments’ (so, for example, the monarch acts as an individual, but in his person represents the universal interest, where that interest involves the interest of a state comprising different particular groups). Thus, the conception of the universal that Hegel is using here is concrete in the sense that it cannot be conceived as something separable from the categories of particularity and individuality ... Hegel’s position could be said to have philosophical value in offering a potential solution to certain familiar metaphysical problems (concerning the question of individuation, or the relation between substances and their attributes, for example).”
Robert Stern, “Hegel, British Idealism, and the Curious Case of the Concrete Universal,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 15.1(2007): 141–142.

It goes without saying that the statement by Robert Stern to the effect that, “Hegel’s position could be said to have philosophical value in offering a potential solution to certain familiar metaphysical problems,” does not mean: Hegel’s position is said to have philosophical value in offering a potential solution to certain familiar metaphysical problems. The former statement therefore most certainly does not mean: Hegel’s position has philosophical value in offering a solution to certain familiar metaphysical problems. Wherefore? Modern sophists like Robert Stern ignore and neglect the rational distinction between the genuine Hegel and Pure Hegelism of the originalausgabe on the one hand, and the pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism of their impure Hegelianism on the other hand.

I am reminded of Vladimir Zeman and his Kant Seminar some 20 years ago in Montréal, when he used to praise Kant to high–heaven as the “father of the contemporary scientific spirit,” and who treated the school of Hegel as the bastion of 20th century totalitarianism: Along with Stanley French and his Clique of French phenomenologists, they gave the admirers of Hegel no quarter, unless by Hegelianism one means marxisme.

See: “It must be acknowledged that phenomenology [subjective idealism] is, nevertheless, well represented in Canada, and that there is a present and energetic level of activity, organization, and research ... [phenomenology] shows no signs of fading away and continues to thrive, albeit somewhat quietly ... there are currently a number of centers, institutes, and societies with a focus on phenomenology, or Continental thought in the wider scope ... given the current levels of activity, and the promise of continued interest and involvement on the part of students and younger academics, a solid future for phenomenology in Canada is assured.”
Linda Fisher, “Canada,” Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, Lester Embree, et alia, editors, Dordrecht, 1997, 91–94, 91–91–91–94.

See: “[Phenomenologists] are critical of Hegel’s goal of ‘absolute knowledge,’ the identity of thought and Being, which they regard as spirit’s totalizing comprehension of some first–order truth about what there is. They thus reproach Hegel for what appears to be the organizing principle for his Phänomenologie, viz., his so–called metaphysical monism, because, as phenomenologists, their primary philosophical interest, allegedly unlike Hegel’s, is not the coherence of an intellectual system establishing a supersensible entity (Divine Mind) that both explains and coincides with the sensible or historical world.”
Frank M. Kirkland, “Hegel,” Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, Lester Embree, et alia, editors, Dordrecht, 1997, 292–298, 292–293.

Phenomenologists, according to the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, attack (criticize and reproach) Hegel because his philosophy does not interest them. Undoubtedly these same phenomenologists uphold subjective idealism because modern irrationalism interests them. The modern sophists, namely the schools of Jean–Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir and so forth, in the public universities, the media and politics, especially in Europe and the United States, have long attacked Washington as totalizing, absolutistic, imperialistic, conservative and totalitarian, especially at Lord Russell’s War Crimes Tribunal. They follow in the footsteps of modern subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism:

“Jean–Paul Sartre and myself have always been perfectly clear on this point: It is not because there is a desire to exist that this desire corresponds to reality as such. This is proved beyond doubt in Kant’s intellectual philosophy: The belief in causation is no basis for the belief in a Supreme Cause. Man desires to exist, which does not mean therefore that he could ever reach existence, or even that existence is a possible notion: Of course, we speak of being and existence as reflection. We refer to the synthesis between being and existence which is impossible. Sartre and I, we have always taught this doctrine, which is the very foundation of our philosophy: Out of timber so crooked as that from which man is made nothing entirely straight can be built.”
Simone de Beauvoir in Madeleine Gobeil, “Entrevue avec Simone de Beauvoir,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 16(15).69(août–septembre, 1964): 30–31: “Nous avons toujours dit, Sartre et moi, que ce n’est pas parce qu’il y a désir d’être, que ce désir corresponde à une réalité quelconque. C’est comme Kant le disait, sur le plan intellectuel. Ce n’est pas une raison parce qu’on croit à des causalités pour qu’il y ait une cause suprême. Ce n’est pas parce qu’il y a chez l’homme un désir d’être pour qu’il puisse jamais atteindre l’être, ou même que l’être soit une notion possible, l’être en tout cas qui soit réflexion et en même temps existence. II y a une synthèse existence et être qui est impossible. Nous l’avons répété toute notre vie, Sartre et moi, et c’est le fond de notre pensée, il y a un creux dans l’homme et même ses réalisations ont ce creux en elles.”

Modern sophists have thereby greatly enriched themselves and their backers over the years, the inferior ruling classes. Meanwhile, the defenders of America and the Western democracies in the struggle against world communism are abused as war–mongers and baby–killers.

Phenomenology is about the the re–definition of words such as being, existence, love, jealousy, emotion and so forth, according to what is named the “phenomenological method,” which is modern sophistry. Since the realm of exact historiography and world history is not subjective idealism, phenomenologists create sophistical historical distinctions in order to separate phenomenology from modern unreason:

“[Kant’s] phenomenology was clearly nothing but what he called ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ ... Nevertheless, such a critique of human knowledge has by itself little if any affinity with today’s full–fledged phenomenology ... Husserl found himself increasingly in sympathy and agreement precisely with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, apparently without being aware of the fact that there was even a terminological bridge for his latter–day rapprochement to Kant’s critical philosophy.”
Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, vol. 1, Dordrecht, 1960, 12.

Kant’s critical philosophy is not sophistry? Phenomenologists are not outside of world history and the arena of politics and economics: Phenomenologists thus re–define words for their backers, the inferior ruling classes. Phenomenologists who maintain the contrary, namely that they re–define words for the superior ruling classes, have not learned the inescapable lesson of exact historiography and world history: Subjective idealism in 20th century politics and economics is not absolute idealism. In other words, absolute idealism is not impure Hegelianism, among other things: Reason, in the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism, rises above the limitations of the understanding and resolves them as the true Notion.

See finally: “[Hegel] accepted Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness in ... [his] own thought but, in contrast to Kant ... [Hegel] evaluated it positively ... [Hegel] recognized in it Reason’s special capacity to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding .... with his Logic Hegel seeks to bring the transcendental philosophy initiated by Kant to its conclusion.”
Hans–Georg Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, translated with an introduction by P. Christopher Smith, New Haven, 1976, 5–5–5–5–76. [1971]

The genuine Hegel recognized (1) in Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness, the special capacity of Reason to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding, otherwise Hegel recognized (2) in the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason, the special capacity of Reason to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding, otherwise, Hegel recognized (3) in both Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness and in the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason, the special capacity of Reason to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding. Therefore, Hegel positively evaluated (1) Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness, otherwise Hegel positively evaluated (2) the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason, otherwise, Hegel positively evaluated (3) both Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness and the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason. Therefore Hegel seeks to bring the transcendental philosophy initiated by Kant to its conclusion with the Hegelian Logic? Of course, this is not the place for a rigorous exposition of the Pure Hegelian refutation of the hermeneutical dialectics of Gadamer, which is contained in the Stronghold of Hegel, in the chapter which is entitled “Contre Gadamer,” 436 ff.

If Hegel recognized in Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness, and if he recognized in the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason, the special capacity of Reason to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding, namely, if Hegel positively evaluated Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness as the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason, then Hegel seeks to bring the transcendental philosophy initiated by Kant to its conclusion with the Hegelian Logic? Therefore it is not the case that the genuine Hegel greatly recognized in the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason (beyond the so–called demonstration of Kant), the special capacity of Reason to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding, if Hegel positively evaluated Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness as the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason.

See: “The influence of Greek philosophy on Hegel, particularly of Plato and Aristotle, must not be overlooked ... it is not difficult to defend the thesis that the essentials of Hegel’s philosophy are to be found in Plato and Aristotle and that all that he did was to make a new synthesis of them with such modifications as modern knowledge required. The beginning, for example, of his logic, all that he says about being and nothing, will be found almost in identical terms in Plato’s Parmenides.
Hiralal Haldar, Neo–Hegelianism, London, 1927, 10.

Considering Hans–Georg Gadamer’s place in the Cold War struggle and his place in the strife between Western and Soviet Marxism in East and West Germany, his submission to Hitler and then Stalin, and considering his relations to Heidegger and modern European political and economic irrationalism, his dialectical hermeneutics therefore constitutes part of the beginning of the movement away from modern 20th century German unreason, in the world historical rise of Americanism:

“From the standpoint of the philosophy of finitude, it’s possible for us to acquire historical consciousness again without falling prey to historical relativism, exactly to the extent that we recognize the limits of all knowledge, which is bounded precisely by its own historical situation. This recognition gives us back the possibility of seeing the past from our historical perspective, a possibility that I called the ‘fusion of horizons.’ Yet the meaning of our finitude doesn’t exhaust itself in this alone. What I had already tried to show Heidegger in Marburg and later developed further in the Lisbon lecture and in other essays was, as I have already said, that the genuine meaning of our finitude or our ‘thrownness’ consists in the fact that we become aware, not only of our being historically conditioned, but especially of our being conditioned by the other. Precisely in our ethical relation to the other, it becomes clear to us how difficult it is to do justice to the demands of the other or even simply to become aware of them. The only way not to succumb to our finitude is to open ourselves to the other, to listen to the ‘thou’ who stands before us.”
Hans–Georg Gadamer in Riccardo Dottori, A Century of Philosophy: Hans–Georg Gadamer in Conversation With Riccardo Dottori, Rod Coltman and Sigrid Koepke, translators, New York, Continuum, 2006, 29. [2000]

From the standpoint of the philosophy of finitude? “Hegel brought to its completion the development of traditional logic into a transcendental ‘logic of objectivity’―a development which began with Fichte’s ‘Doctrine of Science.’ But the language–ness of all thought continues to demand that thought, moving in the opposite direction, convert the concept back into the valid word. The more radically objectifying thought reflects upon itself and unfolds the experience of dialectic, the more clearly it points to what it is not. Dialectic must retrieve itself in hermeneutics.”
Hans–Georg Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, translated with an introduction by P. Christopher Smith, New Haven, 1976, 99. [1971]

Dialectic must retrieve itself in hermeneutics because the more radically objectifying thought reflects upon itself and unfolds the experience of dialectic, the more clearly it points to what it is not? Perhaps dialectic retrieves itself in hermeneutics, otherwise perhaps not. Wherefore? Dialectic must retrieve itself in hermeneutics, otherwise not.

The hermeneutical and dialectical conception of rationality is therefore not the fountainhead of Globalism in the world of today: Reason, in the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism, rises above the limitations of the understanding and resolves them as the true Notion.

See: Richard Wolin, “Nazism and the Complicities of Hans–Georg Gadamer: Untruth and Method,” The New Republic, 15 May 2000, 36–45.

See finally: “[Heidegger] rebuked me for traveling to America instead of writing my book on Plato. He later realized that he wasn’t entitled to rebuke me for this, because it was through me that he saw that he had been wrong to think of Plato’s relationship to Aristotle as he did ... That was then the meaning of our [Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s] encounter with Hegel. This is where the essays in Hegel’s Dialectic come from. All of this came out of the time I was holding lectures in Leipzig. I was reading a great deal about Kant and Fichte and Schelling and Heidegger and, most of all, Hegel. All of it emerged during this period, after I had developed my idea about Plato’s dialectic being an ethical thesis.”
Hans–Georg Gadamer in Riccardo Dottori, A Century of Philosophy: Hans–Georg Gadamer in Conversation With Riccardo Dottori, Rod Coltman and Sigrid Koepke, translators, New York, 2006, 29. [2000]

19. Michael Beresford Foster, Ibidem, 195–196.

20. Foster, Ibidem, 196.

21. Foster, Ibidem.

22. Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator, “The Philosophy of Right,Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, 1960, §344, 111.
See: “Die Staaten, Völker und Individuen in diesem Geschäfte des Weltgeistes stehen in ihrem besonderen bestimmten Prinzipe auf, das an ihrer Verfassung und der ganzen Breite ihres Zustandes seine Auslegung und Wirklichkeit hat, deren sie sich bewußt und in deren Interesse vertieft, sie zugleich bewußtlose Werkzeuge und Glieder jenes inneren Geschäfts sind, worin diese Gestalten vergehen, der Geist an und für sich aber sich den Übergang in seine nächste höhere Stufe vorbereitet und erarbeitet.”
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch für seine Vorlesungen, Berlin, 1821, §344, 345–346.
See also: Hegel, Philosophische Bibliothek: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Neu herausgegeben von Georg Lasson, Band 124, Leipzig, 1911, §344, 272.
See finally: “Die Staaten, Völker und Individuen in diesem Geschäfte des Weltgeistes stehen in ihrem besonderen bestimmten Prinzipe auf, das an ihrer Verfassung und der ganzen Breite ihres Zustandes seine Auslegung und Wirklichkeit hat, deren sie sich bewußt und in deren Interesse vertieft, sie zugleich bewußtlose Werkzeuge und Glieder jenes inneren Geschäfts sind, worin diese Gestalten vergehen, der Geist an und für sich aber sich den Übergang in seine nächste höhere Stufe vorbereitet und erarbeitet.”
Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Randbemerkungen in seinem Handexemplar der Rechtsphilosophie, Vierte Auflage, Johannes Hoffmeister, Herausgegeber, Hamburg, 1967, §344, 290. [1955]

23. Thomas Malcolm Knox, Ibidem, §347 Anmerkung, 111.
See: “Die spezielle Geschichte eines welthistorischen Volks enthält teils die Entwickelung seines Prinzips von seinem kindlichen eingehüllten Zustande aus bis zu seiner Blüte, wo es zum freien sittlichen Selbstbewußtsein gekommen, nun in die allgemeine Geschichte eingreift, ― teils auch die Periode des Verfalls und Verderbens; ― denn so bezeichnet sich an ihm das Hervorgehen eines höheren Prinzips als nur des Negativen seines eigenen. Damit wird der Übergang des Geistes in jenes Prinzip und so der Weltgeschichte an ein anderes Volk angedeutet …”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §347 Anmerkung, 347. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §347 Anmerkung, 273.

24. Knox, Ibidem, §348, 111.
See: “An der Spitze aller Handlungen, somit auch der welthistorischen, stehen Individuen als die das Substantielle verwirklichenden Subjektivitäten. Als diesen Lebendigkeiten der substantiellen Tat des Weltgeistes, und so unmittelbar identisch mit derselben, ist sie ihnen selbst verborgen und nicht Objekt und Zweck.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §348, 347–348. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §348, 274.

25. Knox, Ibidem, §348, 111.
See: “Als diesen Lebendigkeiten der substantiellen Tat des Weltgeistes und so unmittelbar identisch mit derselben, ist sie ihnen selbst verborgen und nicht Objekt und Zweck; sie haben auch die Ehre derselben und Dank nicht bei ihrer Mitwelt (ebendas.), noch bei der öffentlichen Meinung der Nachwelt, sondern als formelle Subjektivitäten nur bei dieser Meinung ihren Teil als unsterblichen Ruhm.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §348, 348. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911.

26. Knox, Ibidem, §345, 111.
See: “Die Weltgeschichte fällt außer diesen Gesichtspunkten; in ihr erhält dasjenige notwendige Moment der Idee des Weltgeistes, welches gegenwärtig seine Stufe ist, sein absolutes Recht, und das darin lebende Volk und dessen Taten erhalten ihre Vollführung, und Glück und Ruhm.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §345, 346. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §345, 272–273.

27. Knox, Ibidem.
See: “In ihr erhält dasjenige notwendige Moment der Idee des Weltgeistes, welches gegenwärtig seine Stufe ist, sein absolutes Recht, und das darin lebende Volk und dessen Taten erhalten ihre Vollführung, und Glück und Ruhm.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §345, 346. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §345, 272–273.

28. Knox, Ibidem, §353, 112.
See: “Das Prinzip der vierten Gestaltung ist das Umschlagen dieses Gegensatzes des Geistes, in seiner Innerlichkeit seine Wahrheit und konkretes Wesen zu empfangen und in der Objektivität einheimisch und versöhnt zu sein, und weil dieser zur ersten Substantialität zurückgekommene Geist der aus dem unendlichen Gegensatze zurückgekehrte ist, diese seine Wahrheit als Gedanke und als Welt gesetzlicher Wirklichkeit zu erzeugen und zu wissen.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §353, 350. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §353, 275–276.

29. Knox, Ibidem, §347A 111.
See: “Die spezielle Geschichte eines welthistorischen Volks enthält teils die Entwickelung seines Prinzips von seinem kindlichen eingehüllten Zustande aus bis zu seiner Blüte, wo es zum freien sittlichen Selbstbewußtsein gekommen, nun in die allgemeine Geschichte eingreift.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §347A, 347. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §347A, 273.

30. Knox, Ibidem, §345, 111.
See: “In ihr erhält dasjenige notwendige Moment der Idee des Weltgeistes, welches gegenwärtig seine Stufe ist, sein absolutes Recht, und das darin lebende Volk und dessen Taten erhalten ihre Vollführung, und Glück und Ruhm.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §345, 346. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §345, 272–273.

31. Knox, Ibidem, §347, 111.
See: “Dem Volke, dem solches Moment als natürliches Prinzip zukommt, ist die Vollstreckung desselben in dem Fortgange des sich entwickelnden Selbstbewußtseins des Weltgeistes übertragen. Dieses Volk ist in der Weltgeschichte, für diese Epoche, ― und es kann in ihr nur einmal Epoche machen, ― das Herrschende.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §347, 346–347. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §347, 273.

32. Knox, Ibidem, §343, 110.
See: “Die Geschichte des Geistes ist seine Tat, denn er ist nur, was er tut, und seine Tat ist, sich und zwar hier als Geist sich zum Gegenstande seines Bewußtseins zu machen, sich für sich selbst auslegend zu erfassen. Dies Erfassen ist sein Sein und Prinzip, und die Vollendung eines Erfassens ist zugleich seine Entäußerung und sein Übergang. Der, formell ausgedrückt, von neuem dies Erfassen erfassende, und was dasselbe ist, aus der Entäußerung in sich gehende Geist, ist der Geist der höheren Stufe gegen sich, wie er in jenem ersteren Erfassen stand.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §343, 344–345. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §343, 271–272.

33. Knox, Ibidem, §343A, 111.
See: “Aber denen, welche diesen Gedanken verwerfen, ist der Geist ein leeres Wort geblieben, sowie die Geschichte ein oberflächliches Spiel zufälliger, sogenannter nur menschlicher Bestrebungen und Leidenschaften. Wenn sie dabei auch in den Ausdrücken von Vorsehung und Plan der Vorsehung den Glauben eines höheren Waltens aussprechen, so bleiben dies unerfüllte Vorstellungen, indem sie auch ausdrücklich den Plan der Vorsehung für ein ihnen Unerkennbares und Unbegreifliches ausgeben.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §343A, 345. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §343A, 272.

34. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, Luigi Ricci, translator, Oxford, 1921, 44–71–71–99–100–101–102–105.

35. Knox, Ibidem, §347A, 111.
See: “Eine Periode, von welcher aus jenes Volk das absolute Interesse verloren hat, das höhere Prinzip zwar dann auch positiv in sich aufnimmt und sich hineinbildet, aber darin als in einem Empfangenen nicht mit immanenter Lebendigkeit und Frische sich verhält, ― vielleicht seine Selbständigkeit verliert, vielleicht auch sich als besonderer Staat oder ein Kreis von Staaten fortsetzt oder fortschleppt und in mannigfaltigen inneren Versuchen und äußeren Kämpfen nach Zufall herumschlägt.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §347A, 347. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §347A, 273.

36. Knox, Ibidem, §347, 111.
See: “Gegen dies sein absolutes Recht, Träger der gegenwärtigen Entwickelungsstufe des Weltgeistes zu sein, sind die Geister der anderen Völker rechtlos, und sie, wie die, deren Epoche vorbei ist, zählen nicht mehr in der Weltgeschichte.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §347, 347. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §347, 273.

37. Richard Burdon, Viscount Haldane, “Introductory Preface,” Hegel’s Science of Logic, vol. 1, By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Walter Henry Johnston and Leslie Graham Struthers, translators, London, 1929, 7–9.

See: “Hegel writes as though he were divided from Kant by a mighty gulf …The Absolute as Absolute stands revealed, but not as an object perceived.”
Richard Burdon, Viscount Haldane, “Hegel,” The Contemporary Review, 67(February, 1895): 237–242.

See also: “L’humanité a jusqu’ici vécu sur la réponse à priori qu’elle a dû se faire dans son enfance, alors que manquaient les éléments d’une solution à posteriori.”
George Clemenceau, “Appendice,” Notions d’anatomie et de physiologie: De la Génération des Éléments anatomiques, Charles Robin, Introduction, Paris, 1867, 279. See: George Clemenceau, “Appendice,” De la Génération des Éléments anatomiques, Paris, 1865, 221.

See: “Nous avions livré au Napoléon, après le coup d’État, tout ce qui faisait la force morale de la France dans le monde, ses traditions historiques de pensée, et, avec toutes nos garanties de contrôle, les principes vivants de notre Révolution, du droit, de justice et de liberté ... Fermons les Codes, Français, plus de lois, plus de justice, suivons, les yeux bandés, le chef inepte, au flair d’artilleur, vers les recommencements de Sedan et de Metz!”
Georges Clemenceau, Vers la réparation, Paris, 1899, 94–503.

See also: “L’homme parlant, il est vrai, fait résonner le mot droit, formule magique d’un idéal d’équité dont rien ne fournit le spectacle sur la terre.”
Georges Clemenceau, La France devant l’Allemagne, Paris, 1918, 11.

See also: “I have always regarded Immanuel Kant not only as a very powerful thinker, but as the metaphysical father of the philosophy of positivism ... undoubtedly the greatest and most positive advance that I have made since Kant is the discovery of the evolution of human ideas according to the law of three stages, namely the theological, metaphysical and scientific phases: The Kantian philosophy in my opinion is the very basis of the three stages of positivism.” (xxi)

[ J’avais toujours regardé Kant non–seulement comme une très–forte tête, mais comme le métaphysicien le plus rapproché de la philosophie positive ... le pas le plus positif et le plus distinct que j’ai fait après lui, me semble seulement d’avoir découverte la loi du passage des idées humaines par les trois états théologique, métaphysique, et scientifique, loi qui me semble être la base dont Kant à conseillé l’exécution ]

Auguste Comte (10 December 1824) in Max Friedrich Müller, “Translator’s Preface,” Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: A Commemoration of the Centenary of Its First Publication, vol. 1, London, 1881, v–lxii, xxi: “‘J’ai lu et relu avec un plaisir infini le petit traité de Kant (Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, 1784); il est prodigieux pour I’époque, et même, si je I’avais connu six ou sept ans plus tot, il m’aurait épargné de la peine. Je suis charmé que vous I’ayez traduit, il peut très–efficacement contribuer à préparer les esprits à la philosophie positive. La conception générale ou au moins la méthode y est encore métaphysique, mais les détails montrent à chaque instant I’esprit positif. J’avais toujours regardé Kant non–seulement comme une très–forte tête, mais comme le métaphysicien le plus rapproché de la philosophie positive ... Pour moi, je ne me trouve jusqu’à present, après cette lecture, d’autre valeur que celle d’avoir systématisé et arrêté la conception ébauchée par Kant à mon insu, ce que je dois surtout à I’éducation scientifique; et même le pas le plus positif et le plus distinct que j’ai fait après lui, me semble seulement d’avoir découverte la loi du passage des idées humaines par les trois états théologique, métaphysique, et scientifique, loi qui me semble être la base dont Kant à conseillé l’exécution. Je rends grâce aujourd’hui à mon défaut d’érudition; car si mon travail, tel qu’il est maintenant, avait été précédé chez moi par I’étude du traité de Kant, il aurait, à mes propres yeux, beaucoup perdu de sa valeur.’ See Auguste Comte, par É. Littré, Paris, 1864, p. 154; Lettre de Comte à M. d’Eichthal, 10 Déc. 1824.”

See also: “The positivist philosophy was a reaction to the speculative phase that developed in philosophy after Kant.”
Dagobert David Runes, Vergilius Ferm, Kurt Friedrich Leidecker and John White, editors, “Auguste Comte: Positive Philosophy,” Treasury of Philosophy, New York, 1955, 260–267, 261.

See also: “The absolute [of Hegel] became a stumbling–block to Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach and other members of the ‘Left.’ They rejected as an illegitimate interpolation the eternal subject of development, and, instead of one continuing God as the subject of all the predicates by which in the logic the absolute is defined, assumed only a series of ideas, products of philosophic activity. They denied the theological value of the logical forms ― the development of these forms being in their opinion due to the human thinker, not to a self–revealing absolute. Thus they made man the creator of the absolute. But with this modification on the system another necessarily followed; a mere logical series could not create nature. And thus the material universe became the real starting–point. Thought became only the result of organic conditions ― subjective and human.”
William Wallace 1844–1897, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th edition, vol. 13, New York, 1911, 205.

See also: “[Those] theistic Hegelians who maintain the personality of God in a world beyond our sphere, must, for consistency’s sake, deny that God is cognizable. But how then can they remain in the (Hegelian) school?”
Karl Ludwig Michelet in Anonymous, “Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz: The Life of Hegel,” The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, 20.4(October, 1848): 585.

See also: “[Hegel] was a thoroughly anti–critical, anti–revolutionary philosopher … Hegel’s teaching had been taken up by the Left in a one–sided and abstract way; and the great majority of people always prefer what one can become fanatical about, and this is never anything but what is abstract.”
Johann Eduard Erdmann 1805–1892, A History of Philosophy: German Philosophy Since Hegel, 4th German edition, vol. 3, London, 1899, 66–81.

See also: “The unfolded totality of the Hegelian school may be pictured in a brief compend. With the pseudo–Hegelians (Fichte, jun., Weisse, Branis &c.,) perception under the form of faith or experience, is the sole source of positive religious truth. On the extreme right of the Hegelian school, perception, (as with Hinrichs) is the absolute criterion of the results found by means of logical thinking; while Goschel gives it still a decisive voice in all religious affairs. Schaller, Erdmann, and Gabler, who form the pure right side, allow to religious perception a consultative vote, which however, like a good ruler with his subjects, they never leave unrespected. Rosenkranz, who ushers in the centre, proceeds for the most part in accordance with the voice of perception, but in some cases rejects it. In Marheineke, the perception is the witness, who can only speak respecting the fact, while the question of law or right can only be decided by speculative thinking. On the left of the centre, (that taken by Vatke, Snellmann and Michelet) the perception is a true–hearted servant, who must subject herself obediently to reason as mistress. Strauss, on the left side, makes her a slave, while with Feuerbach and Bauer she appears verily as a paria.
Karl Ludwig Michelet (1842) in John Daniel Morell, Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, 2nd edition, 1 volume edition, New York, 1848, 481. [1846]

See finally: “It is asserted by some, that the three branches above mentioned (usually termed the right hand, the centre, and the left), exhibit the threefold movement of the dialectic process.”
John Daniel Morell, Ibidem, 480–481.

38. Knox, Ibidem, §§334–340, 109–110.
See: “Der Streit der Staaten kann deswegen, insofern die besonderen Willen keine Übereinkunft finden, nur durch Krieg entschieden werden … In das Verhältnis der Staaten gegeneinander, weil sie darin als besondere sind, fällt das höchst bewegte Spiel der inneren Besonderheit der Leidenschaften, Interessen, Zwecke, der Talente und Tugenden, der Gewalt, des Unrechts und der Laster, wie der äußeren Zufälligkeit, in den größten Dimensionen der Erscheinung.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §§334–340, 339–342. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §§334–340, 268–270.

39. Knox, Ibidem, §340, 110.
See: “Die Prinzipien der Volksgeister sind um ihrer Besonderheit willen, in der sie als existierende Individuen ihre objektive Wirklichkeit und ihr Selbstbewußtsein haben, überhaupt beschränkte, und ihre Schicksale und Taten in ihrem Verhältnisse zueinander sind die erscheinende Dialektik der Endlichkeit dieser Geister, aus welcher der allgemeine Geist, der Geist der Welt, als unbeschränkt ebenso sich hervorbringt, als er es ist, der sein Recht, ― und sein Recht ist das allerhöchste, ― an ihnen in der Weltgeschichte, als dem Weltgerichte, ausübt.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §340, 342–343. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §340, 270–271.

40. Michael Beresford Foster, The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel, New York, 1965, 196–197.

See: “Reference 2: §298, quoted p. 193, note 3, supra, and Reference 3: §280, Zusätze, quoted p. 191, note 1, supra.”
Foster, Ibidem, 196.

See finally: “[In The Philosophy of Right] the state so described is unlike any existing state in Hegel’s day. It is a form of limited monarchy, with parliamentary government, trial by jury and toleration for Jews and dissenters. In all these respects it differed from the contemporary Prussia. It has often been said by Hegel’s detractors that his book was written on the ‘dunghill of servility’ and that his ideal state is identified with the monarchy of Friedrich William III. Little historical knowledge and little study of Hegel is required to see that this is nonsense.”
Thomas Malcolm Knox, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 11, Chicago, 1967, 302.

41. Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, “Introduction: The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Robert F. Brown, editor and translator, Oxford, 2014, 32–46.

See also: “The form in which this book [Philosophy of Right] presents itself has given it an air of dogmatism beyond what can properly be laid to the charge of its author. The Philosophy of Right contains the substance of lectures delivered by Hegel as professor. After its publication it served as a compendium on which Hegel lectured in succeeding years. And he thus made many oral additions, notes of which were taken by his pupils, and these notes were, after his death, thrown into the shape of paragraphs, annexed to the sections of the original work. The work, therefore, as we now have it, contains both the paragraphs written by the author, and also those embodying, as nearly as possible in the author’s words, what he said by way of illustration or explanation. This has given it a fragmentary and incomplete character, which is detrimental to its effect and has made many portions wear an appearance of inconclusiveness and precipitate assumption.”
Thomas Collett Sandars, “Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” Oxford Essays, Contributed by Members of the University, London, 1855, 216.

See finally: “Hegel’s works on politics and history merely elaborate part of his system ― that part in which human mind objectifies itself in its endeavor to find an object identical with itself ― and are unintelligible in isolation, they deserve separate treatment because they have become so famous, if not notorious.”
Thomas Malcolm Knox, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 11, Chicago, 1967, 302–303.

42. Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy, Dordrecht, 2001, xvi–27–28–29–29.

See: “That Hegel does not conceive of spirit, soul, or God as separate entities is clear to anyone who has read his Philosophy of Religion ... Only in cases where authentic texts are unavailable may they [Zusatze] be accepted as indications of Hegel’s answers to questions that are not treated in his handwritten or published work. If they contradict the explicit theory of the authorized texts, we can presume that the student is wrong, unless we can show that it is plausible that they express a change in the evolution of Hegel’s thought. On issues where Hegel left us without any authorized treatise (as is the case for large parts of the Aesthetics, the History of Philosophy, and the Philosophy of World History) we must, of course, use the surviving course notes as the only possible access to Hegel’s thought; but here, too, the ultimate criteria for their authenticity lie in the principles of his authorized work ... ‘es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt daß der Staat ist.’ Literally: ‘It is the course of God in the world that the state is’ ... ‘God’ is used by Hegel as a more popular name for the universal and absolute spirit. His system presents the universe as one great movement or course (Gang) in which the spirit (or ‘God’) unfolds all of its possibilities (that is, logical, natural, spiritual, aesthetic, religious, and theoretical) ... ‘It is the course of God [that causes or necessitates the fact] that nature or art or religion or the state exist’ ... a journey with Hegel is certainly rewarding, but it does not quite reach the desired goal. The Good demands a higher ascent and a deeper descent because it exceeds and precedes the noëtic cosmos of ideas.”
Adriaan Peperzak, Ibidem, 12–29 ff.

Genuine Hegelianism, the true Gospel of Hegel which greatly influenced America over the years, especially in the Civil War, unlike impure Hegelianism, suspends judgement on matters where Hegel left us without any authorized treatise, because the speculative logical and dialectical system of the pure Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism comes only from the originalausgabe.

On issues where Hegel left us without any authorized treatise we must use the surviving course notes as the only possible access to Hegel’s thought, while the ultimate criteria for their authenticity lie in the principles of his authorized work (Ad Peperzak): Refutations of Hegel’s philosophy which contain as premises statements from the non–authorized work are not inferentially equivalent with arguments which contain as premises statements from Hegel’s authorized work because the former involve only the “possible access” to Hegel’s thought. The authenticity and “possible access” of such statements as premises lies in their reconciliation to the principles of the originalausgabe. But the interpretative determination, the hermeneutical judgement that entails the semantic reconciliation, that makes these non–authorized statements “authentic,” and therefore acceptable as premises in arguments against Hegel, does not thereby make them inferentially equivalent to the statements from the originalausgabe: They involve only the “possible access” to Hegel’s thought, whereas the latter involve the actual access to Hegel’s thought. In other words, the difference here between interpretative possibility and actuality entails the distinction between weaker and stronger levels of inference in the demonstrability of the refutation: A strong refutation of Hegel’s philosophy therefore contains premises from the originalausgabe, whereas a weak refutation of Hegel’s philosophy contains premises from the originalausgabe and from the non–authorized work, while a sophistical refutation contains no premise from the originalausgabe. Refutation of the Hegelian philosophy is inseparable from Hegel philology: Therefore, dialectical inference is inseparable from dialectical hermeneutics, as the notion of dialectical scientivity,―as the speculative logical and dialectical system of the pure Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism.

See also: Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., “Vorwort des Herausgebers,” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse―Die Logik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Erste Auflage, Sechster (6) Band, Berlin, 1840, v–viii.

See also: Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., “Vorwort des Herausgebers,” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse―Die Logik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Zweite Auflage, Sechster (6) Band, Berlin, 1843, v–viii.

See finally: “Michelet very clearly proves the Straussianism of Hegel, by citations from his lectures.”
Anonymous, “Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz: The Life of Hegel,” The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, 20.4(October, 1848): 585.

43. Knox, Ibidem, §352, 112.
See: “Die konkreten Ideen, die Völkergeister, haben ihre Wahrheit und Bestimmung in der konkreten Idee, wie sie die absolute Allgemeinheit ist, ― dem Weltgeist, um dessen Thron sie als die Vollbringer seiner Verwirklichung, und als Zeugen und Zieraten seiner Herrlichkeit stehen. Indem er als Geist nur die Bewegung seiner Tätigkeit ist, sich absolut zu wissen, hiermit sein Bewußtsein von der Form der natürlichen Unmittelbarkeit zu befreien und zu sich selbst zu kommen, so sind die Prinzipien der Gestaltungen dieses Selbstbewußtseins in dem Gange seiner Befreiung.”
Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch für seine Vorlesungen, Berlin, 1821, §352, 349–350. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §352, 275.

That I have laid out some of the philosophical reasons for this doctrine in the third edition of another writing of mine, an outline of sorts, named Americanism, is of slight importance: That the teaching therein involves the sciences of economics and politics is of some interest, however, and therefore has a bearing upon the subject at hand, namely, as the developmental unification and coaxial integration of the American world. In that work I flatter myself as the first Hegelian philosopher ever to apply the Dialectic of Hegel to the Hegelian Dialectic: “Modern irrationalism, in order to validate pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, squares the Lecture Notes and the great works published by Hegel in his lifetime. Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism thus squares both Kant and Hegel in order to prove the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of Absolute Idealism is flawed. Irrationalism thus perverts the history of philosophy and modern Europe ... Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism is therefore the political and economic mask of modern European Raison d’État. One drawback will never be remedied in Hegel philology: The Lecture Notes are not authoritative and are therefore useless in the exact determination of the ultimate worth of genuine Hegelianism ... In the 20th century upwards of 500 million human beings were slaughtered in the contagion of modern political and economic satanism, more than in all the periods of history combined: Many hundreds of millions more were utterly ruined and destroyed by the most barbaric slavery ever recorded in the world. This is the ultimate verdict of exact historiography and universal history. From whence comes the disease of modern unreason?
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Americanism: The New Hegelian Orthodoxy, Third Edition, Archive.org, 2016, 6–9.

44. Eduard Gans, “Additions to The Philosophy of Right,Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, 1960, Addition 86 = §135,129–Addition 152 = §258, 141.

See: Eduard Gans, “Zusätze aus Hegels Vorlesungen, zusammengestellt,” Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Eduard Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, neu hrsg., von Georg Lasson, Herausgegeber, Leipzig, 1911, Zusätze 86 = §135, 318–Zusätze 152 = §258, 349: “Den Standpunkt der Kantischen Philosophie hervorhoben ... Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, daß der Staat ist.”

45. The following list of satanic ideas in which modern unreason, especially in 20th century world history, is served up on a new platter by inferior ruling classes is not exhaustive: Darwinism, phenomenology, positivism, phenomenalism, pragmatism, behaviorism, dialectical materialism, existentialism, analysis, physicalism, materialism, naturalism, realism, psycho–analysis and so forth, oftentimes set in stark contradistinction to Western philosophy pejoratively comprehended as Platonism, metaphysics, idealism, noologism, rationalism, spiritualism, dialectics, ideology, historicism, essentialism, theology, absolutism and so on …

46. See: “All things that exist being particulars … every man’s reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own mind.”
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, New Edition, 2 vols., New York, 1824, 381/I–203/II.

Thus, the world does not exist, according to John Locke, while the universe is appearance and delusion.

See finally: “Locke was heavily involved in the slave trade, both through his investments and through his administrative supervision of England’s burgeoning colonial activities … The attempt to reconcile Locke’s involvement in the slave trade with his reputation as a philosopher of liberal freedom has a long history, beginning shortly after the abolition of the slave trade … Locke’s readers are faced with the problem of how he could have been so intimately involved in promoting an activity that he apparently knew to be unjustified … We are disturbed by the ease with which some commentators excuse Locke of racism or minimize its significance … to advocate, administer, and profit from a specifically racialized form of slavery is clear evidence of [Locke’s] racism, if the word is to have any meaning at all.”
Robert Bernasconi and Anika Maaza Mann, “The Contradictions of Racism: Locke, Slavery, and the Two Treatises,” Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, Andrew Valls, editor, Ithaca/London, 2005, 89–89–90–91–91.

47. See: “Such were the leading principles of the Roman law as to the effect of sale in passing title, and such was the law of the continent of Europe wherever based on the civil law, till the adoption and spread of the Code Napoléon, first among the Latin races, and more recently among the nations of central and northern Europe. The French Code says in a few emphatic words, ‘La vente de la chose d’autrui est nulle,’ Art. 1599, and would thus seem to have swept away at once the entire doctrine dependent upon the Roman system, which was based on a principle exactly the reverse.”
Judah Philip Benjamin, A Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property: With References to the American Decisions and to the French Code and Civil Law, London, 1868, 299.

See: “Napoléon Bonaparte, who uplifted himself, by which means no one has ever determined, to the heights of conceptual power in his knowledge of the greatest problems of jurisprudence and legislation, often participated in the deliberations of the Judicial Council. Napoléon’s great genius, his profound method and penetrating insight, always astonished the members of the judiciary.”
Frédéric Mourlon, Répétitions écrites sur le code civil contenant l’exposé des principes généraux leurs motifs et la solution des questions théoriques, 11e édition, revue et mise au courant par Charles Demangeat, Tome premier, Paris, 1880, 24. [1846] “Napoléon, qui s’est élevé, on ne sait comment, jusqu’à l’intelligence des problèmes les plus ardus du droit et de la législation, pris souvent part aux discussions du Conseil. Il y déploya toujours une clarté, une méthode, et quelquefois une profondeur de vues, qui furent pour tout le monde un sujet d’étonnement.”

See also: “It is the soldier who founds a republic and it is the soldier who maintains it.”
Napoléon Bonaparte in Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher, Bonapartism: Six Lectures Delivered in the University of London, Oxford, 1908, 21. See: “There is no mystery about the origins of Bonapartism. It is the child of Napoléon Bonaparte and the French Revolution ... the strong executive founded upon the plebiscite which was to be the pillar of Bonapartism; and [Napoléon] had come to the conclusion that legislative assemblies should be merely supervisory, that they should have no power to change the constitution or to interfere with the executive ... This is not the place for a detailed examination of the principles of Napoléonic law. It is well, however, to notice that the civil code alone was drawn up during the Consulate, that it is nearer both in time and spirit to the revolutionary law than are the codes which were compiled in a more perfunctory manner under the darker shadows of imperial despotism ... in the codes, in the common system of administration, the foundations of a modern Italy were laid. And here the memory of Napoléon was not easily forgotten ... The French nation, being consulted for the third time, for the third time by an overwhelming majority ratified its belief in Bonapartism ... The guiding principle of Bonapartism was autocracy founded on popular consent, safeguarding social order and social equality.”
Fisher, Ibidem, 7–22–39–55–87–120.

See also: “We propose a comparison between the doctrine of Machiavelli, as it emerges from the Prince, and the doctrine of absolutism, which we shall endeavor to discern, not from one or another of the theorists who were its champions, but from all of them ... the absolutist doctrines, in their application, lead rulers to the same results as the doctrines of Machiavelli ... Machiavellism and absolutism are derived from analogous historical situations. This is the first essential point of our parallel. The historical situation inspires Machiavelli with the idea of ​​the legitimacy of every means aimed at the achievement of public interest and the salvation of the State ... those who were able to study Napoléon Bonaparte very closely tell us that he was a very powerful ruler who saw the spilling of blood [sang des hommes répandu] as perhaps the greatest remedy of political medicine ... The Prince of Machiavelli and the doctrines of absolutism were born of the same sentiment of profound patriotism, at times and in countries where a powerful sovereign was necessary to put an end to the disorder and turmoil of the day, the causes of national distress ... Machiavelli reveals himself as an immoral patriot who wants to save the State, even though his conception of government appears as a policy that is respectful of political freedoms and that is aimed at the happiness of the people.”
Louis Couzinet, “Le Prince” de Machiavel et la théorie de l’absolutisme, Paris, 1910, xix–xxi–xxvii–136–349–352: “Nous nous proposons un rapprochement, une comparaison, entre la doctrine de Machiavel, telle qu’elle ressort du Prince, et la doctrine de l’absolutisme, que nous essayerons de dégager, non pas de tel ou tel des théoriciens qui en furent les champions; mais de l’ensemble de ces théoriciens ... les doctrines absolutistes, dans leur application, conduisent les princes aux mêmes résultats que les doctrines de Machiavel ... Machiavélisme et absolutisme sont issus de situations historiques analogues. C’est là un premier point essentiel de notre parallèle. Cette situation inspire à Machiavel l’idée de la légitimité de tous les moyens destinés à atteindre un but d’intérêt public et à réaliser le salut de l’État ... Tous ceux qui ont pu étudier Napoléon l de près, nous disent qu’il y avait en lui le Napoléon homme d’État, qui voyait dans le sang des hommes répandu un des grands remèdes de la médecine politique ... Le Prince de Machiavel et les doctrines de l’absolutisme sont nés d’un même sentiment profond de patriotisme, à des époques et dans des pays où un souverain puissant était nécessaire pour faire cesser, sous sa domination, les désordres et la désunion, causes de la détresse nationale ... Machiavel nous apparaît comme un patriote sans scrupule lorsqu’il s’agit de sauver l’État. Dans sa conception du gouvernement il se révèle à nous comme un politique soucieux du bonheur du peuple et respectueux de sa liberté.”

See finally: Abbé Aimé Guillon de Montléon (1758–1842), Machiavel commenté par Napoléon Bonaparte, manuscrit trouvé dans la carrosse de Bonaparte, après la bataille de Mont–Saint–Jean, le 15 février 1815, Paris,1816.

48. Anonymous, “Karl Rosenkranz: The Life of Hegel,” The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, 20.4(October, 1848): 575–586.

See: “What Luther initiated as faith in feeling and in the witness of the spirit, is precisely what spirit, since become more mature, has striven to apprehend in the concept in order to free and so to find itself in the world as it exists today … Mind is here pressed back upon itself in the extreme of its absolute negativity. This is the absolute turning point; mind rises out of this situation and grasps the infinite positivity of this its inward character, i.e., it grasps the principle of the unity of the divine nature and the human, the reconciliation of objective truth and freedom as the truth and freedom appearing within self–consciousness and subjectivity, a reconciliation with the fulfilment of which the principle of the north, the principle of the Germanic peoples, has been entrusted.”
Hegel, Great Books of the Western World, vol. 46, Chicago, 1960, Preface–§358, 7–113.

See also: “Was Luther als Glauben im Gefühl und im Zeugnis des Geistes begonnen, es ist dasselbe, was der weiterhin gereifte Geist im Begriffe zu fassen, und so in der Gegenwart sich zu befreien, und dadurch in ihr sich zu finden bestrebt ist … erfaßt der in sich zurückgedrängte Geist in dem Extreme seiner absoluten Negativität, dem an und für sich seienden Wendepunkt, die unendliche Positivität dieses seines Innern, das Prinzip der Einheit der göttlichen und menschlichen Natur, die Versöhnung als der innerhalb des Selbstbewußtseins und der Subjektivität erschienenen objektiven Wahrheit und Freiheit, welche dem nordischen Prinzip der germanischen Völker zu vollführen übertragen wird.”
Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch für seine Vorlesungen, Berlin, 1821, Vorrede–§358, xxiii–353. See finally: Hegel, Philosophische Bibliothek: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Band 124, Leipzig, 1911, Vorrede–§358, 16–278.

See finally: “The persistence of the idealist tradition in Germany long after Hegel’s death ... was continued not only by minor figures in very obscure places, but by major figures in very prominent ones ... the idealistic tradition in Germany came to an end not with cholera in 1832 but with a cold in 1881 ...[German Idealism] went back to Leibniz and Kant, and ... was carried forward by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel ... with further research and reflection the classification could be refined in all kinds of ways ... one of the least appealing aspects of the idealist tradition from Kant down to Hegel is its notorious obscurity, which derives not least from its esoteric vocabulary and technical jargon. To understand idealist texts, it seems, one needs to be gifted with intellectual intuitions, or one has to cultivate a special technique of reasoning (the dialectic).”
Frederick C. Beiser, The Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg & Lotze, Oxford, 2014, 1–4. [2013]

Modern irrationalists in Britain like Frederick Beiser place Kant and Hegel together as German Idealists in their so–called histories of philosophy without drawing the rational distinction between sophistical and philosophical idealism,―which is also the division between the rise of Globalism and decline of modernity in world history:

“The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for intellectual indolence which soothes itself with the conviction that everything is already proved and settled.”
Hegel, “Introduction: General Division of Logic,” Hegel’s Science of Logic, Arnold Vincent Miller, translator & Forward by John Niemeyer Findlay, New York, 1976, 62. [1969] See: Hegel, “Einleitung: Allgemeine Eintheilung der Logik,” Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, Zweite Ausgabe, Stuttgart und Tübingen, 1832, 30. [1812] See also: Hegel, “Einleitung,” Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, Nürnberg, 1812, i–xxvii.

Modern sophists are corrupt (impure) Hegelians and their historiography is therefore defective. As such they aim to downplay the rise of world civilization and the collapse of European modernity, and thereby create political and economic resistance to Globalism among the British intelligentsia, as a breathing space for the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of their masters, the inferior ruling classes. Sophists like Frederick Beiser will deny that they are the same old pseudo–Hegelians and anti–Hegelians of yesterday precisely because they are not what they name “idealists.” Modern sophists thus use what they term the “idealist tradition” as a mask, to hide their own irrationalism, especially in the arena of politics and economics: What is this but the modern technique of the imbecile ruling classes and their flabby minds? They follow in the footsteps of the Great Sophist himself:

“The United States … imposes intolerable regimes on Asian, Latin American, and Middle East countries, and economically exploits the great majority of mankind who live at below–subsistence level to support American profit … The American government pursues a policy of genocide.”
Bertrand Russell (1963) in Harvey Arthur DeWeerd, Lord Russell’s War Crimes Tribunal, Santa Monica, 1967, 4.

These same sophists wish (or pretend to wish) to bring back Eurocentricism and make the European Union into the 21st century bastion of the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right. Philosophers of today, whose minds are liberated by the rise of Global freedom of thought, will notice that while our present day pseudo–Hegelians and anti–Hegelians are not “idealists” (according to their own esoteric terminology) they are nevertheless modern irrationalists all the same: Their subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism comes from the same old delusion of Kant albeit served up on a new platter. For this reason the phantasms of the modern sophists evaporate before the corrosive onslaught of Americanism: The superior ruling classes of Europe have been profoundly influenced by Washington and American political and economic rationality in the world of today.

See: “[Frederick Beiser] claims that, beginning with Schelling and Hegel, German philosophy reverted to the sort of ‘speculative metaphysics’ that Kant’s Critical Philosophy had attempted to put aside once and for all.”
David A. Duquette, editor, Hegel’s History of Philosophy: New Interpretations, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2003, 212.

See: “One of the most striking and characteristic features of Hegel’s thought is that it historicizes [relativizes] philosophy ... [Hegel] accepts Kant’s critical teaching that metaphysics is not possible as speculation about a realm of transcendent entities, and that it is possible only if it does not transcend the limits of possible experience ... [Hegel] explains the existence of evil by showing it to be necessary for the realization of the end of history ... [the] self–critical dimension of Hegel’s historicism was his completion of Kant’s project for a critique of pure reason. Like Kant, Hegel believed that philosophy should become self–critical ... Hegel’s historicism is perhaps most explicit in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy.
Frederick C. Beiser, editor, “Hegel’s Historicism,” The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge, 1993, 270–271–271–272–273.

Hegel explains the existence of evil by showing it to be necessary for the realization of the end of history? But which Hegel is this, the genuine Hegel of the Pure Hegelianism of the Originalausgabe or the Hegel of impure Hegelianism, the bastion of pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism? The rational conception of the necessity and realization of the end of existence in the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism is mortally opposed to the Kantio–Hegelian phantasms of Frederick Beiser and the modern irrationalists:

Reflective understanding took possession of philosophy ... this turn taken by cognition, which appears as a loss and retrograde step, is based on something more profound on which rests the elevation of reason into the loftier spirit of modern philosophy. The basis of that universally held conception is, namely, to be sought in the insight into the necessary conflict of the determinations of the understanding with themselves. The reflection already referred to is this, to transcend the concrete immediate object and to determine it and separate it. But equally it must transcend these its separating determinations and straightway connect them. It is at the stage of this connecting of the determinations that their conflict emerges. This connecting activity of reflection belongs in itself to reason and the rising above those determinations which attains to an insight into their conflict is the great negative step towards the true Notion of reason. But the insight, when not thorough–going, commits the mistake of thinking that it is reason which is in contradiction with itself; it does not recognize that the contradiction is precisely the rising of reason above the limitations of the understanding and the resolving of them. Cognition, instead of taking from this stage the final step into the heights, has fled from the unsatisfactoriness of the categories of the understanding to sensuous existence, imagining that in this it possesses what is solid and self–consistent. But on the other hand, since this knowledge is self–confessedly knowledge only of appearances, the unsatisfactoriness of the latter is admitted, but at the same time presupposed: As much as to say that admittedly, we have no proper knowledge of things–in–themselves but we do have a proper knowledge of them within the sphere of appearances, as if, so to speak, only the kind of objects were different, and one kind, namely things–in–themselves, did not fall within the scope of our knowledge but the other kind did, phenomena did.”
Hegel, “Introduction: General Notion of Logic,” Hegel’s Science of Logic, Arnold Vincent Miller, translator & Forward by John Niemeyer Findlay, New York, 1976, 46–46. [1969] See: Hegel, “Einleitung,” Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, Nürnberg, 1812, v–vii.

As the general notion of logic, cognition transcends the concrete immediate object and determines and separates it, and equally transcends its separating determinations and straightway connects them. At the stage of this connecting of the determinations conflict emerges. This connecting activity of reflection belongs in itself to reason, while the rising above those determinations is the insight into their conflict, which is the great negative step towards the true Notion of reason. The insight when not thorough–going commits the mistake of thinking that it is reason which is in contradiction with itself; it does not recognize that the contradiction is precisely the rising of reason above the limitations of the understanding and the resolving of them. Because of his Kantio–Hegelianism, Frederick Beiser does not therefore understand that the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism does not explain the existence of evil by showing it to be necessary for the realization of the end of history. Reason, in the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism, rises above the limitations of the understanding and resolves them as the true Notion, within the general conception of logic. Shall we therefore hold that the realm of philosophy and world history is beyond the self–determination of reason and the general conception of logic in the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism? We most certainly shall not espouse the lost cause of Kantio–Hegelianism: We shall meticulously avoid the camp of pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, which is condemned to rot upon the dunghill of history.

See: “Perhaps some commentators think that the non– or anti– or a–metaphysical character of Hegel’s ‘absolute idealism’ (as he himself calls it) can be proven by consistently translating it into twentieth–century language that they deem free from metaphysical assumptions. If such a transposition succeeded without losing essential elements of Hegel’s texts, their account would perhaps corroborate their thesis. If, on the contrary, Hegel’s thought cannot be captured in this transposition, their commentaries are obviously partial or unilateral. Hegel himself would call them untrue. If a partial reading is presented as equivalent to the whole, it is even false. But if the logic, as the heart of Hegel’s thinking, is metaphysical, why are certain commentators so attracted to it that they spend considerable energy reshaping it into their own image?”
Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, “Introduction,” Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, Dordrecht, 2001, 1–52, 6.

The mortal opposition of Pure Hegelianism to modern irrationalism is found in the American Idealism of Washington and the rise of Global political and economic rationality in the world of today.

49. In the last decade of his life, the old Hegel published nothing really new, apart from increasing the size of the Encyclopedia, and he made no departure from the system of Pure Hegelianism. Hegel’s intellectual powers waned in the political and theological strife of Berlin:

“The writer must content himself with what he has been allowed to achieve under the pressure of circumstances, the unavoidable waste caused by the extent and many–sidedness of the interests of the time, and the haunting doubt whether, amid the loud clamor of the day and the deafening babble of opinion … there is left any room for sympathy with the passionless stillness of a science of pure thought.”
Hegel (1831) in Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, “Biographical Note: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1770–1831,” Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator, vol. 46, Chicago, 1960, v–vi.

Old Hegel complains that “he must content himself with what he has been allowed to achieve under the pressure of circumstances, the unavoidable waste caused by the extent and many–sidedness of the interests of the time,” and he is haunted by the “doubt whether, amid the loud clamor of the day and the deafening babble of opinion … there is left any room for sympathy with the passionless stillness of a science of pure thought.”

The “deafening babble of opinion” is the work of the sophists, the Kantian school at Berlin, the followers of Fichte. The “loud clamor of the day” is the religious and political strife resultant from the French revolution and Napoléon. The “pressure of circumstances” is Hegel’s political and administrative work at the university, while the “unavoidable waste caused by the extent and many–sidedness of the interests of the time” is Hegel’s neglect of intense intellectual work under the burdens of academic lectures. The “haunting doubt whether … there is left any room for sympathy with the passionless stillness of a science of pure thought,” are the words of an intellectual leader whose school is beginning to exhibit the first symptoms of the coming upheaval.

These words of the old Hegel at the height of his academic and political power, exhausted and haunted by doubt in the twilight of his intellectual life, are lifted from the 1831 preface to the second edition of the Great Logic (Zweite Ausgabe, Stuttgart & Tübingen, Cotta, 1832), which was published in the very influential Berlin editions of 1833 and 1841, after the death of Hegel, so that the true significance of their meaning is obscured by the many modifications, additions and notes of Hegel’s students and editors: The genuine Hegelian philosophy of the Originalausgabe contains the diamond purity of Hegelianism,―the rational germ of Hegel’s “freshness and power.”

See: “One man has understood me, and even he has not.”
Hegel in William Wallace, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th edition, vol. 13, New York, 1911, 200–207, 204.

See: “It is a mistake to regard his [Hegel’s] philosophy as nothing more than the logical outcome of Kant’s system. The influence of Greek philosophy on Hegel, particularly of Plato and Aristotle, must not be overlooked. Indeed, it is not difficult to defend the thesis that the essentials of Hegel’s philosophy are to be found in Plato and Aristotle and that all that he did was to make a new synthesis of them with such modifications as modern knowledge required. The beginning, for example, of his logic, all that he says about being and nothing, will be found almost in identical terms in Plato’s Parmenides.
Hiralal Haldar, Neo–Hegelianism, London, 1927, 10.

See also: “It is the Transcendental Deduction that has played the most important part in the arguments of the English Kantio–Hegelians.”
Andrew Seth Pringle–Pattison in Hiralal Haldar, Essays in Philosophy, Calcutta, 1920, 6.

See also: “The problem as to whether or not and to what extent Hegel succeeded in overcoming Kant’s ‘thing–in–itself’ is a separate question. At any rate, this was his aim. In a metaphysics of the Absolute Spirit, realities beyond the realm of knowledge, in so far as the ‘thing–in–itself’ represents such realities, cannot exist.”

Richard Hoenigswald, “Philosophy of Hegelianism,” Twentieth Century Philosophy: Living Schools of Thought, Dagobert David Runes, editor, New York, 1947, 267–291, 270.

See finally: “Hegel’s presence in twentieth–century philosophy is overwhelming ... Was Hegel too complicated, or too much of a Janus, to be understood in a non–unilateral, dialectical, rational way?”
Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, “Introduction,” Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, Dordrecht, 2001, 1–49.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED

Anonymous, “Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz: The Life of Hegel,” The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, 20.4(October, 1848): 561–591.

Beiser, Frederick C., editor, “Hegel’s Historicism,” The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 270–300.

Benjamin, Judah Philip, A Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property: With References to the American Decisions and to the French Code and Civil Law, (London: Henry Sweet, 1868).

Clemenceau, George, “Appendice,” De la Génération des Éléments anatomiques, (Paris: Chez J.–B. Baillière et Fils, Libraires de l’Académie Impériale de Médecine, 1865), 185–222.

Clemenceau, George, “Appendice,” Notions d’anatomie et de physiologie: De la Génération des Éléments anatomiques, Charles Robin, Introduction, (Paris: Librairie Germer Baillière, 1867), 227–281.

Clemenceau, Georges, Vers la réparation, (Paris: P.–V. Stock, Éditeur, 1899).

Clemenceau, Georges, La France devant l’Allemagne, (Paris: Librairie Payot & Cie, 1918).

Couzinet, Louis, “Le Prince” de Machiavel et la théorie de l’absolutisme, (Paris: Librairie Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Arthur Rousseau, Éditeur, 1910).

Croce, Benedetto, What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel, 3rd edition, Douglas Ainslie, translator, (London: Macmillan, 1915). [1906]

Dettling, Christopher Richard Wade, Americanism: The New Hegelian Orthodoxy, Third Edition, Archive.org, 2016.

Dettling, Christopher Richard Wade, Americanism: Stronghold of Hegel, Holograph Manuscript, Montreal/Vancouver, 2013.

DeWeerd, Harvey Arthur, Lord Russell’s War Crimes Tribunal, (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1967).

Dottori, Riccardo, A Century of Philosophy: Hans–Georg Gadamer in Conversation With Riccardo Dottori, Rod Coltman and Sigrid Koepke, translators, (New York: Continuum, 2006). [2000]

Erdmann, Johann Eduard, A History of Philosophy: German Philosophy Since Hegel, 4th German edition, vol. 3, Williston Samuel Hough, editor, (London: Swann Sonnenschein & Company,1899).

Fisher, Herbert Albert Laurens, Bonapartism: Six Lectures Delivered in the University of London, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1908).

Foster, Michael Beresford, The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965). [1935]

Gadamer, Hans–Georg, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, translated with an introduction by P. Christopher Smith, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). [1971]

Gans, Eduard, “Additions to The Philosophy of Right,Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1960), Addition 1–Addition 194, 115–150. [Lasson, 2nd edition, 1921]

Gans, Eduard, “Zusätze aus Hegels Vorlesungen, zusammengestellt,” Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Eduard Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, neu hrsg., von Georg Lasson, Herausgegeber, [=Hegels sämtliche Werke, Band VI], (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1911), Zusätze 1–Zusätze 194, 281–371.

Gethmann–Siefert, Annemarie, “Introduction: The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Robert F. Brown, editor and translator, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2014).

Gobeil, Madeleine, “Entrevue avec Simone de Beauvoir,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 16(15).69(août–septembre, 1964): 30–31.

Guillon de Montléon, Aimé, Machiavel commenté par Napoléon Bonaparte, manuscrit trouvé dans la carrosse de Bonaparte, après la bataille de Mont–Saint–Jean, le 15 février 1815, (Paris: Nicolle, 1816).

Haldane, Richard Burdon, Viscount, “Introductory Preface,” Hegel’s Science of Logic, vol. 1, By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Walter Henry Johnston and Leslie Graham Struthers, translators, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1929), 7–15.

Haldane, Richard Burdon, Viscount, “Hegel,” The Contemporary Review, 67(February, 1895): 232–245.

Haldar, Hiralal, Neo–Hegelianism, (London: Heath Cranton, Ltd., 1927).

Haldar, Hiralal, Essays in Philosophy, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1920).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich and Eduard Gans, “The Philosophy of Right,Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1960), vii–150. [Lasson, 2nd edition, 1921]

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, “The Philosophy of Right,Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1960), vii–114. [Lasson, 2nd edition, 1921]

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, “Introduction: General Notion of Logic,” Hegel’s Science of Logic, Arnold Vincent Miller, translator & Forward by John Niemeyer Findlay, (New York: The Humanities Press, 1976), 43–59. [1969]

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, “Introduction: General Division of Logic,” Hegel’s Science of Logic, Arnold Vincent Miller, translator & Forward by John Niemeyer Findlay, (New York: The Humanities Press, 1976), 59–64. [1969]

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, “Einleitung,” Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objective Logik, Erster Band, (Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1812), i–xxvii.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch für seine Vorlesungen, (Berlin: Nicolaische Buchhandlung, 1821).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, “Einleitung: Allgemeine Eintheilung der Logik,” Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, Zweite Ausgabe, (Stuttgart und Tübingen: J.F. Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, 1832), 26–34. [1812]

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Philosophische Bibliothek: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Neu herausgegeben von Georg Lasson, Band 124, (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1911).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Philosophische Bibliothek: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Randbemerkungen in seinem Handexemplar der Rechtsphilosophie, Vierte Auflage, Band 124a, Johannes Hoffmeister, Herausgegeber, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1967). [1955]

Hoenigswald, Richard, “Philosophy of Hegelianism,” Twentieth Century Philosophy: Living Schools of Thought, Dagobert David Runes, editor, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), 267–291.

Kant, Immanuel, “The Critique of Pure Reason,Great Books of the Western World: Kant, John Miller Dow Meiklejohn, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1960), vii–250.

Kant, Immanuel, Kant’s Principles of Politics Including His Essay on Perpetual Peace: A Contribution to Political Science, William Hastie, translator & editor, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1891).

Kant, Immanuel, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: A Commemoration of the Centenary of Its First Publication, 2 vols., Friedrich Max Müller, translator, (London: Macmillan, 1881).

Knox, Thomas Malcolm, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 11, (Chicago: William Benton, 1967), 298–303.

Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, New Edition, 2 vols., (New York: Valentine Seaman, 1824). [1690]

Longuenesse, Béatrice, Hegel et la critique de la métaphysique: Étude sur la doctrine de l’essence, (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1981).

Mach, Ernst, “Author’s Preface to the Seventh German Edition,” The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of Its Development, Supplement to the Third English Edition Containing the Author’s Additions to the Seventh German Edition, Philip Edward Bertrand Jourdain, translator and annotator, (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1915), ix–xii. [1912]

Mach, Ernst, Die Mechanik in ihrer Enwickelung: Historisch–Kritisch Dargestellt, Siebente verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage, (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1912).

Machiavelli, Niccolò di Bernardo dei, The Prince, Luigi Ricci, translator, (Oxford: Humphrey Milford, 1921).

Manchester, William, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Alone, 1932–1940, vol. 2, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1988).

Massie, Robert Kinloch, Nicholas and Alexandra, (New York: Atheneum, 1967).

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Mourlon, Frédéric, Répétitions écrites sur le code civil contenant l’exposé des principes généraux leurs motifs et la solution des questions théoriques, 11e édition, revue et mise au courant par Charles Demangeat, Tome premier, (Paris: Garniers Frères, Libraires–Éditeurs, 1880). [1846]

Peperzak, Adriaan Theodoor Basilius, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, B.V., 2001).

Peperzak, Adriaan Theodoor Basilius, “Introduction,” Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, B.V., 2001), 1–52.

Otto Pöggeler, “Editorial Introduction,” Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818, With Additions From the Lectures of 1818–1819, G.W.F. Hegel & Peter Wannenmann, J. Michael Stewart & Peter C. Hodgson, editors and translators, Claudia Becker, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Friedrich Hogemann, Walter Jaeschke, Christoph Jamme, Hans Christian Lucas, Kurt Rainer Meist & Hans Josef Schneider, Staff of the Hegel Archives editors, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1–43. [1983 & 1995]

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Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott, Studies in Humanism, (London: Macmillan, 1907).

Spiegelberg, Herbert, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, 2 vols., (Dordrecht: Springer, 1960).

St. Aubyn, Giles, Edward VII: Prince and King, (New York: Atheneum, 1979).

Stern, Robert, “Hegel, British Idealism, and the Curious Case of the Concrete Universal,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 15.1(2007): 115–153.

Wallace, William, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th edition, vol. 13, (New York: Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 1911), 200–207.

Wallace, William, Kant, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1911).

HEGEL’S ORIGINALAUSGABE 1807–1821

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, System der Wissenschaft: Phänomenologie des Geistes, Erster Theil, (Bamberg und Würzburg: Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 1807).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, (Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1812).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik―Die Lehre vom Wesen, Erster Band, Zweites Buch, (Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1813).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik: Die subjektive Logik―oder Lehre vom Begriff, Zweiter Band, (Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1816).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen, (Heidelberg: August Osswald’s Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1817).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, zum Gebrauch fur seine Vorlesungen, (Berlin: Nicolaischen Buchhandlung, 1821).

HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY: ORIGINALAUSGABE 1827–1832 (ZWEITE & DRITTE AUSGABE)

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen, Zweite Ausgabe, (Heidelberg: Druck und Verlag von August Osswald, 1827). [1817]

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen, Dritte Ausgabe, (Heidelberg: Verwaltung des Oswald’schen Verlags (C.F. Winter), 1830). [1817 & 1827]

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, Zweite Ausgabe, (Stuttgart und Tübingen: J.F. Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, 1832). [1812]

HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY: 1832–1845 BERLIN WERKE (ERSTE AUFLAGE)

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Philosophische Abhandlungen: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Auflage, Erster (1) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1832).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Auflage, Zweiter (2) Band, Johann Schulze, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1832).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik―Die objektive Logik―Die Lehre vom Seyn: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Erste Abtheilung, Erste Auflage, Dritter (3) Band, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1833).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik―Die objektive Logik―Die Lehre vom Wesen: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Zweite Abtheilung, Erste Auflage, Vierter (4) Band, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1834).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik―Die subjektive Logik―Die Lehre vom Begriff: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Zweiter Theil, Erste Auflage, Fünfter (5) Band, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1834).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse―Die Logik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Erste Auflage, Sechster (6) Band, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1840).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse―Vorlesungen über die Naturphilosophie: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Zweiter Theil, Erste Auflage, Siebenter (7) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1842).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse―Die Philosophie des Geistes: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Dritter Theil, Erste Auflage, Siebenter (7) Band, Ludwig Boumann, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1845).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Auflage, Achter (8) Band, Eduard Gans, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1833).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Auflage, Neunter (9) Band, Eduard Gans, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1837).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Theil, Erste Abtheilung, (Erster Band), Erste Auflage, Zehnter (10) Band, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1835).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Zweiter Theil, Zweite Abtheilung, (Zweiter Band), Erste Auflage, Zehnter (10) Band, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1838).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Dritter Theil, Dritte Abtheilung, (Dritter Band), Erste Auflage, Zehnter (10) Band, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1838).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Erster Band), Erste Auflage, Elfter (11) Band, Philipp Konrad Marheinecke, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1832).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, nebst einer Schrift uber die Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Zweiter Band), Erste Auflage, Zwolfter (12) Band, Philipp Konrad Marheinecke, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1832).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Erster Band), Erste Auflage, Driezehnter (13) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1833).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Zweiter Band), Erste Auflage, Vierzehnter (14) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1833).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Dritter Band), Erste Auflage, Fünfzehnter (15) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1836).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vermischte Schriften: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Erster Band), Erste Auflage, Sechzehnter (16) Band, Friedrich Förster & Ludwig Boumann, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1834).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vermischte Schriften: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Zweiter Band), Erste Auflage, Siebenzehnter (17) Band, Friedrich Förster & Ludwig Boumann, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1835).

HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY: VORLESUNGEN AUSGEWÄHLTE NACHSCHRIFTEN UND MANUSKRIPTE 1983–2007

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (1): Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft Heidelberg 1817–1818, Mit Nachträgen aus der Vorlesung 1818–1819,  ―Nachgeschrieben von Peter Wannenmann, Claudia Becker, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Kurt Rainer Meist, Friedrich Hogemann, Hans Josef Schneider, Walter Jaeschke, Christoph Jamme & Hans Christian Lucas, Herausgegeben, Mit einer Einleitung von Otto Pöggeler, Band 1, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (2): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst, Berlin 1823,―Nachgeschrieben von Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Hrsg., Band 2, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (3): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, Einleitung, Der Begriff der Religion, Walter Jaeschke, Hrsg., Band 3, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (4): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 2, Die bestimmte Religion, in zwei Bänden: Textband (a), Anhang (b), Mit einem Begriffs– Realien– und Personenverzeichnis zum Gesamtwerk, Walter Jaeschke, Hrsg., Band 4, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (5): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, Die vollendete Religion, Walter Jaeschke, Hrsg., Band 5, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1984).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (6): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 1, Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie, Orientalische Philosophie, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 6, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (7): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 2, Griechische Philosophie, I, Thales bis Kyniker, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 7, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1989).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (8): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 3, Griechische Philosophie, II, Plato bis Proklos, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 8, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (9): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 4, Philosophie des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 9, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (10): Vorlesungen über die Logik, Berlin 1831,―Nachgeschrieben von Karl Hegel, Udo Rameil, Hrsg., Herausgegeben unter Mitarbeit von Hans–Christian Lucas, Band 10, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (11): Vorlesungen über Logik und Metaphysik, Heidelberg 1817,―Mitgeschrieben von Franz Anton Good, Karen Gloy, Hrsg., Band 11, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1992).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (12): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Berlin 1822–1823,―Nachschriften von Karl Gustav Julius von Griesheim, Heinrich Gustav Hotho & Friedrich Carl Hermann Victor von Kehler, Karl Brehmer, Karl–Heinz Ilting & Hoo Nam Seelmann, Herausgegeben, Band 12, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (13): Vorlesung über die Philosophie des Geistes, Berlin 1827–1828,―Nachgeschrieben von Johann Eduard Erdmann & Ferdinand Walter, Franz Hespe & Burkhard Tuschling, Herausgegeben, Band 13, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (14): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Rechts, Berlin 1819–1820,―Nachgeschrieben von Johann Rudolf Ringier, Emil Angehrn, Martin Bondeli & Hoo Nam Seelmann, Herausgegeben, Band 14, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (15): Vorlesungen über philosophische Enzyklopädie, Nürnberg 1812–1813,―Nachschriften von Christian Samuel Meinel & Julius Friedrich Heinrich Abegg, Udo Rameil, Hrsg., Band 15, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (16): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur, Berlin 1819–1820,―Nachgeschrieben von Johann Rudolf Ringier, Martin Bondeli & Hoo Nam Seelmann, Herausgegeben, Band 16, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (17): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur, Berlin 1825–1826,―Nachgeschrieben von Heinrich Wilhelm Dove, Karol Bal, Gilles Marmasse, Thomas Posch & Klaus Vieweg, Herausgegeben, Band 17, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2007).

HEGEL’S RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 1821–2013

1. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch für seine Vorlesungen, [=Originalausgabe] (Berlin: Nicolaische Buchhandlung, 1821).

2. Eduard Gans, Herausgegeber, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, Hrsg., von Eduard Gans, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Werke, Vollstandige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten, Band 8], (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1833). [Zweite Auflage, Berlin 1840; Dritte Auflage, Berlin 1854]

3. Gerardus Johannes Petrus Josephus Bolland, Herausgegeber, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts mit einer Einleitung, (Leiden: A.H. Adriani, 1902).

4. Georg Lasson, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Mit den von Eduard Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Neu hrsg., von Georg Lasson, [=Hegels sämtliche Werke, Band VI], (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1911). [Zweite Auflage, Leipzig 1921; Dritte Auflage, Leipzig 1930]

5. Alfred Baeumler, Herausgegeber, Hegels Schriften zur Gesellschaftsphilosophie: Teil I, Philosophie des Geists und Rechtsphilosophie, [=Die Herdflamme, Sammlung der gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Grundwerke aller Zeiten und Volker, Band 11], (Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1927).

6. Hermann Glockner, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschat im Grundrisse, Mit einem Vorwort von Eduard Gans, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Jubiläumsausgabe in zwanzig Bänden, Auf Grund des von Ludwig Boumann, Friedrich Förster, Eduard Gans, Karl Hegel, Leopold von Henning, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Philipp Marheineke, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Karl Rosenkranz und Johannes Karl Hartwig Schultze besorgten Originaldruckes im Faksimileverfahren, Siebenter Band], (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Fromann, 1928).

7. Johannes Hoffmeister, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Randbemerkungen in seinem handexemplar der Rechtsphilosophie, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Sämtliche Werke, Neu kritische Ausgabe, Band XII], (Hamburg: Verlag Felix Meiner, 1955).

8. Karl Löwith & Manfred Riedel, Herausgegeben, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Studienausgabe in 3 Bänden, Ausgewählt und eingeleitet von Karl Löwith und Manfred Riedel, Band 2] (Frankfurt und Hamburg: Fischer Verlag, 1968).

9. Berhard Lakebrink, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, mit einer Einleitung hrsg., von Berhard Lakebrink, (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1970).

10. Eva Moldenhauer & Karl Markus Michel, Herausgegeben, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Notizen und den mündlichen Zusätzen, [=G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Band 7], (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970).

11. Helmut Reichelt, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Notizen in seinem Handexemplar und den Mündlichen Zusätzen, (Frankfurt–Berlin–Wien: Ullstein, 1972).

12. Karl–Heinz Ilting, Herausgegeber, Die “Rechtsphilosophie” von 1820 mit Hegels Vorlesungnotizen 1821–1825, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen uber Rechtsphilosophie, 1818–1831: Edition und Kommentar in sechs Banden von Karl–Heinz Ilting, Zweiter Band], (Stuttgard–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann–Holzboog, 1974).

13. Hermann Klenner, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, nach der Ausgabe von Eduard Gans herausgegeben und mit einer Einleitung versehen von Hermann Klenner, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1981).

14. Klaus Grotsch, Elisabeth Weisser–Lohmann & Hermann Klenner, Herausgegeben, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Verfasser des Anhangs Hermann Klenner, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, Band 14, 1-3], (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009–2011).

15. Horst D. Brandt, Herausgegeber, Philosophische Bibliothek: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Band 638, [Auf der Grundlage der Edition des Textes in den Gesammelten Werken, Band 14], (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2013).

©2016–2017 Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Stronghold of Hegel: Modern Enemies of Plato and Hegel, (2013–2014). All rights reserved. This work is only for GOOGLE+ and the GOOGLE CORPORATION and its users: Users are not permitted to mount this writing on any network servers. No part of this writing may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the author, except for reading and browsing via the World Wide Web.

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LA PHILOSOPHIE DE HEGEL
Albert Weber (1914)

George–Guillaume–Frédéric Hegel, né à Stuttgart en 1770, mort professeur à l'université de Berlin en 1831, avait passé comme Schelling, son ami, par le séminaire théologique de Tubingue.¹ Jéna, où se resserra, puis se rompit, le lien spirituel qui l'unissait à son compatriote, Nuremberg, dont il dirigea le collège, Heidelberg et la capitale prussienne furent les étapes successives de sa carrière académique. Nous avons de lui: (1) la Phénoménologie de L'Esprit, 1807, (2) la Logique, en 3 volumes 1812-1816, (3) L'Encyclopédie des sciences philosopliiques, 1817, (4) les Éléments de la philosophie du droit, 1821, sans compter ses Cours sur la philosophie [455] (le la religion, V Histoire de la philosophie, VEsthétique,
etc., publiés après sa morte. Selon Fichte, la chose en soi de Kant (l'absolu), c'est le moi lui–même produisant le monde phénoménal par une création inconsciente et involontaire, pour le vaincre ensuite par un effort conscient et libre. Selon Schelling; l'absolu n'est ni le moi ni le non–moi, mais leur racine commune, où l'opposition d'un sujet pensant et d'un objet pensé disparaît dans une parfaite indillerence, c'est le neutre antérieur et supérieur à tous les contrastes, l'identité des contraires. L'absolu de Fichte est l'un des termes de l'opposition, celui de Schelling est la source transcendante, mystérieuse, impénétrable de cette opposition. La conception de Fichte pèche en ce qu'elle réduit l'absolu à ce qui n'est qu'une de ses faces: l'absolu de Fichte est le moi limité par un non-moi théoriquement inexplicable: c'est un prisonnier, ce n'est pas réellement l'absolu. L'absolu de Schelling est une entité transcendante et qui, en déhnitive, n'explique rien, puisqu'on ne sait ni comment ni pourquoi en déduire le monde réel. L'indifférence absolue, loin d'être la réalité concrète par excellence, n'est au fond qu'une abstraction. Suivant Hegel, la source commune du moi et de la nature n'est pas transcendante à la réalité; elle lui est immanente. L'esprit et la nature ne sont pas les faces de l'absolu, sorte d'écran derrière lequel se cache un Dieu indifférent: c'en sont au contraire les modes successifs. L'absolu n'est pas

RÉFÉRENCES

1. Albert Weber, “Hegel,” Histoire de la philosophie européenne, augmentée d’un appendice bibliographique et d’une table alphabétique des noms propres, 8e édition, (Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1914), 454–490. []
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SELECT UNIVERSAL GERMAN HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY: SECONDARY SOURCES
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2017)

C. Varrentrapp, Johannes Schulze und das höhere preußische Unterrichtswesen in seiner Zeit, (Leipzig, 1889).

J.E. Erdmann, Philosophische Vorleslungen uber den Staat, (1851).

C. Rossler, System der Staatslehre, (1857).

Adolph Lasson, System der Rechtsphilosophie, (1882).

Albrecht, Reinhart, Hegel und die Demokratie, Bonn: Bouvier, 1978.

Angehrn, Emil. Freiheit /md System bei Hegel. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1976.

Barion, Jakob. Hegel lllld die marxistische Staatslehre, 2nd ed. Bonn: Bouvier,
1970.

Bitsch, Brigitte. Sollensbegriff lind Moralitiitskritik bei Hegel. Bonn: Bouvier, 1977.

Bloch, Ernst. SlIbjekt-Objekt: Erliilltenmgen ZII Hegel (1951).

Bloch, WerkallSgabe. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985. Volume VIII.

Bülow, Friedrich. Die Etltwickillng der Hegelschen Sozialphilosophie. Leipzig: Meiner, 1920.

Rüdiger Bubner, “Zur Struktur dialektischer Logik,” Hegel–Jahrbuch (1974): ?

Rüdiger Bubner, “Zur Struktur dialektischer Logik.” Wilhelm R. Beyer, editor, (Cologne: Pahl–Rugenstein, 1974).

Bernd Burkhardt, Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik” im Spannungsfeld der Kritik, (New York: Olms, 1993).

P. Damerow & W. Lefèvre, “Die wissenschaftliche Problemlage für Hegels ‘Logik,” Hegel–Jahrbuch, 1979.

P. Damerow & W. Lefèvre, “Die wissenschaftliche Problemlage für Hegels ‘Logik,” W.R. Beyer, editor, (Cologne: Pahl–Rugenstein, 1980).

Ludovicus De Vos, Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik: Die absolute Idee: Einleitung und Kommentar, (Bonn: Bouvier, 1983).

Klaus Düsing, Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik, (Bonn: Bouvier, 1976).

Lothar Eley, Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. Leitfaden und Kommentar, (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1976).

Johann Eduard Erdmann, Grundriß der Logik und der Metaphysik, 4th edition, (Halle: Schmid, 1864).

Hans–Peter Falk, Das Wissen in Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik.” Symposium no. 83. (Freiburg: Alber, 1983).

Fink–Eitel, H., “Hegels phänomenologische Erkenntnistheorie als Begründung dialektischer Logik.” Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 85.2(1978): 242–258.

Flach, Werner, “Zum ‘Vorbegriff ’ der kleinen Logik Hegels.” In Der Idealismus und seine Gegenwart. Festschrift f¨ur Werner Marx zum 65. Geburtstag.

Flach, Werner, “Zum ‘Vorbegriff ’ der kleinen Logik Hegels.” Edited by Ute Guzzoni, Bernhard Rang, and Ludwig Siep. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1976).

Luca Fonnesu & Lucia Ziglioli, Hrsg., System und Logik bei Hegel, (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2016).

Luca Fonnesu, “Einleitung: Zwischen Kant und Hegel,” System und Logik bei Hegel, Luca Fonnesu & Lucia Ziglioli, Hrsg., (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2016), 13–25.

Horst Friedrich, Hegel’s “Wissenschaft der Logik”: Ein Marxistischer Kommentar, 2 Banden, (Berlin: Karl Dietz, 2000, 2006).

Hans Friedrich Fulda, Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik, (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1965).

Hans Friedrich Fulda, Das Recht der Philosophie in Hegels Philosophie des Rechts, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1968).

Hans Friedrich Fulda, “Unzulängliche Bemerkungen zur Dialektik,” Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels, Rolf–Peter Horstmann, editor, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978).

Hans Friedrich Fulda, Rolf–Peter Horstmann, and Michael Theunissen, Kritische Darstellung der Metaphysik: Eine Diskussion über Hegels Logik. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980).

Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843), Neue oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft, (2nd ed., 1828–1831)

Eduard Gans, Naturrecht und Universalrechtsgechichte, Manfred
Riedel, Hrsg., (Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 1981),

Graeser, Andreas, “Bemerkungen zur Beschreibung des Anfangenden in Hegels Logik.” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 32(1985): 439–454.

Günther, Gotthard, Grundzüge einer neuen Theorie des Denkens in Hegels Logik, 2nd edition, (Hamburg: Meiner, 1978).

Ute Guzzoni, Werden zu sich: Eine Untersuchung zu Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik,” (Freiburg i. Br: Alber, 1978).

Karl Heinz Haag, Philosophischer Idealismus: Untersuchungen zur Hegelschen Dialektik mit Beispielen aus der “Wissenschaft der Logik,” (Frankfurt: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1967).

Christa Hackenesch, Die Logik der Andersheit: Eine Untersuchung zu Hegels Begriff der Reflexion, (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1987).

Erwin Hasselberg & Frank Radtke, Hrsg., Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik: Eine internationale Bibliographie ihrer Rezeption im XX Jahrhundert, (Vienna: Passagen, 1993).

Rudolf Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit, (Berlin: Gaertner, 1857).

Dieter Henrich, “Anfang und Methode der Logik.” Hegel–Studien, 1(1964): 19–35.

Dieter Henrich, Hegel im Kontext, (Frankfurt am Main: Surhkamp, 1971).

Henrich, Dieter and Horstmann, Rolf–Peter, Hrsg., Hegels Philosophie des Rechts: Die Theorie der Rechtsformen und ihre Logik, (Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 1983).

Dieter Henrich, Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik: Formation und Rekonstruktion, (Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 1986).

Dieter Henrich, Hrsg., Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der Reflexion, (Hegel–Tage Chantilly 1971).

Dieter Henrich, ed., Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der Reflexion, (Bonn: Bouvier, 1978).

F. Hogemann, “Die Idee des Guten in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik,” Hegel–Studien, 29(1994): 79–102.

Holz, Harald, “Anfang, Identität und Widerspruch: Strukturen von Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik, gezeigt an dem Abschnitt: ‘Womit der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht werden muss’ sowie der ‘Logik des Seins.’” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 36(1974): 707–761.

Rolf–Peter Horstmann, “Hegel über Unendlichkeit, Substanz, Subjekt: Eine Fallstudie zur Rolle der Logik in Hegels System,” Internationales Jahrbuch
des Deutschen Idealismus: Konzepte der Rationalität (International Yearbook of German Idealism: Concepts of Rationality), vol. 1, Karl Ameriks, editor, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003).

V. Hösle, Hegels System: Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und des Problems der Intersubjektivität: Systementwicklung und Logik, vol. 1, (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987).

Christian Iber, Metaphysik absoluter Relationalität: Eine Studie zu den beiden ersten Kapiteln von Hegels Wesenslogik, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990).

Peter Kemper, Dialektik und Darstellung: Eine Untersuchung zur spekulativen Methode in Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik,” (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1980).

Hubert Kiesewetter, Von Hegel zu Hitler: Eine Analyse der Hegelschen Machtstaatsideologie und der politischen Wirkungsgeschichte des Rechts–Hegelianismus, (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1974).

Heinz Kimmerle, “Die allgemeine Struktur der dialektischen Methode.” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 33(April–June 1979): 184–209.

Heinz Kimmerle, Hegel–Studien: Das Problem der Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens, Beiheft 8, (Bonn: Bouvier, 1970).

Anton Friedrich Koch, “Die Selbstbeziehung der Negation in Hegels Logik,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 53.1(January–March 1999): 1–29.

Bernhard Lakebrink, “Aus Hegels Logik: Sein und Existenz.” Der Idealismus und seine Gegenwart: Festschrift für Werner Marx zum 65. Geburtstag,

Bernhard Lakebrink, “Aus Hegels Logik: Sein und Existenz.” Ute Guzzoni, Bernhard Rang and Ludwig Siep, editors, (Hamburg: Meiner, 1976).

Bernhard Lakebrink, _Kommentar zur Hegels “Logik” in seiner “Encyclopädie” von 1830, 2 vols., (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1985). [1979]

Chong–Fuk Lau, “Voraussetzungs– und Bestimmungslosigkeit: Bemerkungen
zum Problem des Anfangs in Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik,’” Perspektiven der Philosophie: Neues Jahrbuch, 26(2000): 287–323.

George Lukacs, “Die Frage der Besonderheit in der klassischen deutschen Philosophie: Das Problem von Allgemeinheit, Besonderheit und Einzelheit in
der Logik und Kategorienlehre bei Kant, Schelling und Hegel,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 2.4(1954): 764–807.

Wolfgang Marx, Hegels Theorie logischer Vermittlung: Kritik der dialektischen
Begriffskonstruktion in der “Wissenschaft der Logik,” (Stuttgart: Fromann Holzboog, 1972).

Kurt Reiner Meist, “‘Sich vollbringende Skeptizismus’: G.E. Schulzes Replik auf Hegel und Schelling,” Transzendentalphilosophie und Spekulation: Der Streit um die Gestalt einer ersten Philosophie (1799–1807),

Kurt Reiner Meist, “‘Sich vollbringende Skeptizismus’: G.E. Schulzes Replik auf Hegel und Schelling,” Walter Jaeschke, editor, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1993).

Carl Ludolf Menzzer (1816–1893), Die Naturphilosophie und der Hegelianismus: Antwort auf die Angriffe des Herrn Julius Schaller in der Allg. Lit. Zeitung October 1847; zugleich als Anhang zum ersten Bande der Naturphilosophie, (Halberstadt: Verlag von Robert Frantz, 1847).

Thomas Miskell, Hegels Lehre vom abstrakten Recht, Freiburg i.B.: Albert Ludwigs–Universitiit, 1972.

Nicolin, Friedheim, Hegels Bildungstheorie. Bonn: Bouvier, 1955.

Nicolin, Friedheim, 'Hegel iiber konstitutionelle Monarchie', Hegel-Studien 10 (1975).

Karl–Heinz Nusser, Hegels Dialektik und das Prinzip der Revolution, (Munich: Pustet, 1973).

Ottmann, Henning, Individuum und Gemeinschaft bei Hegel: Hegel im Spiegel der Interpretationen, Band 1, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1977).

Rebecca Paimann, “Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Glauben und Wissen in Bezug auf den Anfang der Hegelschen ‘Wissenschaft der Logik,’” Glauben und Wissen, Zweiter Teil (Hegel–Jahrbuch 2004).

Rebecca Paimann, “Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Glauben und Wissen in Bezug auf den Anfang der Hegelschen ‘Wissenschaft der Logik,’” Andreas Arndt et al., editors, (Berlin: Akademie, 2004).

Terry Pinkard, “Hegel’s Idealism and Hegel’s Logic.” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 33(April–June, 1979): 210–226.

Otto Pöggeler, Hegels Kritik der Romantik, (Bonn: Bouvier, 1956).

Otto Pöggeler, “Fragmente aus einer Hegelschen Logik mit einem Nachwort zur Entwicklungsgeschichte von Hegels Logik,” Hegel–Studien, 2(1963): 19–70.

Otto Pöggeler, Hrsg., Hegel: Einführung in seine Philosophie, (Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 1977).

Manfred Riedel, Hrsg., Materialien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975).

Giacomo Rinaldi, “Die Aktualität von Hegels Logik,” Jahrbuch für Hegelforschung, 2(1996): 27–54.

Karl Rosenkranz, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Leben: Supplement zu Hegel’s Werke, (Berlin, 1844).

Karl Rosenkranz, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Leben: Supplement zu Hegel’s Werke, Reprint, (Darmstadt, 1967).

Birgit Sandkaulen, “Das ‘leidige Ding an sich’: Kant–Jacobi–Fichte,” Kant und der Frühidealismus, Jürgen Stolzenberg, editor, (Hamburg: Meiner,
2007).

Georg Sans, “Hegels Idee des individuellen Lebens,” Theologie und Philosophie: Vierteljahresschrift, 77.1(2002): 54–72.

Georg Sans, Die Realisierung des Begriffs: Eine Untersuchung zu Hegels Schlusslehre, (Berlin: Akademie, 2004).

Alfred Schäfer, Der Nihilismus in Hegels Logik: Kommentar und Kritik zu Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik,” (Berlin: Arno Spitz, 1992).

Schäfer, Rainer. Die Dialektik und ihre besonderen Formen in Hegel’s Logik. (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001).

Schick, Friedrike. Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik–metaphysische Letztbegrundung oder Theorie logischer Formen? (Freiburg: Alber, 1994).

Schmid, Aloys. Entwicklungsgeschichte der Hegel’schen Logik. Regensberg: Joseph Mai, 1858. Reprint, (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1976).

Schmidt, Josef. Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik und ihre Kritik durch Adolf Trendelenburg. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1977).

Ulrich Johannes Schneider, Hrsg., Der französische Hegel, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007).

Alexander Schubert, Der Strukturgedanke in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik, (Königsstein: Anton Hain, 1985).

Schulze, G.E. (anonymous), Ænesidemus, oder über der vom Herrn Prof. Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementarphilosophie, nebst einer Verteidigung gegen die Anmassungen der Venunftkritik, (1792).

Schulze, G.E. (anonymous), “Ænesidemus (excerpt),” Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post–Kantian Idealism, George di Giovanni and Henry Silton Harris, translators, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 2000), ? [1792]

Schulze, G.E. (anonymous), “Aphorismen über das Absolute, als das alleinige Prinzip der wahren Philosophie, über die einzige mögliche Art es zu erkennen, wie auch über das Verhältnis aller Dinge in der Welt zu demselben,” Neues Museum der Philosophie und Litteratur, Friedrich Bouterwek, editor, 1.2(1803): 110–148.

Schulze, G.E. (anonymous), “Aphorismen über das Absolute, als das alleinige Prinzip der wahren Philosophie, über die einzige mögliche Art es zu erkennen, wie auch über das Verhältnis aller Dinge in der Welt zu demselben,” Transzendentalphilosophie und Spekulation: Der Streit um die Gestalt einer Ersten Philosophie (1799–1807), Quellenband, Edited by Walter Jaeschke. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1993).

Schulze, G.E. (anonymous), Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie, 2 vols., (Hamburg, 1801).

Staats, Reinhart. “Der theologischgeschichtliche Hintergrund des Begriffs ‘Tatsache.’” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 70(1973): 316–345.

Michael Theunissen, Sein und Schein: Der kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978).

Trendelenburg, F.A. Logische Untersuchungen, 2 vols., (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1862).

Dieter Wandschneider, “Absolutes Wissen? Zu Hegels Projekt der Selbst–begründung einer absoluten Logik.” In Glauben und Wissen, Zweiter Teil (Hegel–Jahrbuch 2004).

Dieter Wandschneider, “Absolutes Wissen? Zu Hegels Projekt der Selbst–begründung einer absoluten Logik,” Andreas Arndt et al., editors, (Berlin: Akademie, 2004).

Kurt Weisshaupt, “Zur Dialektik des Sollens in Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik.’” Hegel–Jahrbuch, 1975.

Kurt Weisshaupt, “Zur Dialektik des Sollens in Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik,’” Wilhelm R. Beyer, editor, (Cologne: Pahl–Rugenstein, 1976).

M. Wetzel, Reflexion und Bestimmtheit in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik, (Hamburg: Fundament, 1971).

Andreas Wildt, Autonomie und Anerkennung, (Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 1982).

Günther Wohlfahrt, “Das unendliche Urteil. Zur Interpretation eines Kapitels aus Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik,’” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 39.1(January–March, 1985): 85–100.

Gerhard Martin Wölfle, Die Wesenslogik in Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik”: Versuch einer Rekonstruktion und Kritik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der philosophischen Tradition, (Stuttgart: Frommann–Holzboog, 1994).

Tomoyaki Yamane, Wirklichkeit: Interpretation eines Kapitels aus Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik,” (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1983).

Lucia Ziglioli & Luca Fonnesu, Hrsg., System und Logik bei Hegel, (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2016).

Walter Zimmerli, “Die Wahrheit des ‘impliziten Denkers’: Zur Logikbegründungsproblematik in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik,” Studia Philosophica: Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Philosophischen Gesellschaft, 41(1982): 139–160.
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9/11 AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2017)

The United States owes the American people a thorough investigation of the allegations of what went on.
William Jefferson Clinton¹

We have taken a great many actions to restore the effectiveness and credibility of the DO.
John Mark Deutch²

The trouble with the CIA over the past 16 years has been that they have not been able to understand that there are rules that this country wants followed because they are fundamental to our way of life. Admiral Stansfield Turner³

In Washington top Reagan and Bush era Central Intelligence Agency officials were purged from the CIA in 1996 by political fervor against the War on Communism in Central America: A handful of years later, terrorists attacked Washington and Wall Street resulting in great damage to America and the Western world. Coincidence? This is the legacy of the “Guatemala Scandal” that rocked Washington, coming on the heels of the Iran Contra Affair, and leading to the Report on Guatemala Review, 28 June 1996, by Anthony S. Harrington, General Lew Allen, Jr., Ann Z. Caracristi and Harold W. Pote. Yet the myth that blowback from the War on Communism (Afghanistan) somehow greatly contributed to 9/11 still persists in various quarters. America won the Cold War thanks in large part to the Central Intelligence Agency. America is winning the War on Terrorism, thanks in large part to the Central Intelligence Agency.

American public opinion is not a rational basis for Central Intelligence Agency policy because freedom of speech is used by anti–Americanism to debase American sovereignty, as in the case of the modern European irrationalism of Noam Chomsky and the New York intellectuals. Obviously there are rules that America wants followed because they are fundamental to the American way of life: With regards to the formulation of policies within the Central Intelligence Agency, crafted to protect American sovereignty, at the behest of the President of the United States, will the professionals or public opinion decide? The Cold War is over and the Western democracies are victorious: The verdict of world history is the best judgement in matters of world historical significance.

WORKS CITED

1. President William Jefferson Clinton in Louis J. Darrow, Jeff Goldberg, Nancy LeBrun, Alan Levin, Marc Levin and Mary Manhardt, CIA: America’s Secret Warriors, www.youtube.com/watch?v=-W6WmL28vsc, 1997, 2:12:54–2:13:03.

2. John Mark Deutch (CIA Director 1995–1996) in Ibidem, 2:13:17–2:13:22.

See: Michael J. Sniffen, “Ex–CIA Head [John Mark Deutch] Planned Guilty Plea,” Washington Post, 24 January 2001.

3. Admiral Stansfield Turner (CIA Director 1977–1981) in Ibidem, 2:14:25–2:14:45.

See: “A few months before I got to the CIA, when Noriega was on the CIA’s payroll, I felt this was not a man the United States should be associated with, and during the entire Carter years he was not on the US payroll, not once. As soon as we left he went back on the payroll [Stansfield Turner smirks].”

Admiral Stansfield Turner in Ibidem, 2:21:06–2:21:28.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED

Louis J. Darrow, Jeff Goldberg, Nancy LeBrun, Alan Levin, Marc Levin and Mary Manhardt, CIA: America’s Secret Warriors, www.youtube.com/watch?v=-W6WmL28vsc, 1997, 2:32:37.

©2017 Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, 9/11 and the Central Intelligence Agency. All rights reserved. This work is only for GOOGLE+ and its users: Users are not permitted to mount this writing on any network servers. No part of this writing may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the author, except for reading and browsing via the World Wide Web.
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21ST CENTURY SELECT ENGLISH HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2017)

Claudia Becker, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Friedrich Hogemann, Walter Jaeschke, Christoph Jamme, Hans Christian Lucas, Kurt Rainer Meist & Hans Josef Schneider, Staff of the Hegel Archives editors, “Description of the Manuscript: The Editors,” Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818, With Additions From the Lectures of 1818–1819, G.W.F. Hegel & Peter Wannenmann; J. Michael Stewart & Peter C. Hodgson, editors and translators; Otto Pöggeler, editorial introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 45–47. [1983 & 1995]

Frederick C. Beiser, editor, The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth–Century Philosophy, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Brady Bowman and Allen Speight, editors and translators, “Introduction,” Heidelberg Writings: Journal Publications, G.W.F. Hegel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), vii–xxiv.

Brady Bowman, Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Brady Bowman and Allen Speight, editors and translators, “Translators’ Note,” Heidelberg Writings: Journal Publications, G.W.F. Hegel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xxv–xxix.

Thom Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right, 2nd edition, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). [2007]

Robert F. Brown and Peter C. Hodgson, editors and translators, “Editorial Introduction: The Lectures on the Philosophy of World History,” Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Manuscript of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822–1823, G.W.F. Hegel, Karl Hegel, Karl Gustav Julius von Griesheim, Heinrich Gustav Hotho and Friedrich Carl Hermann Victor von Kehler, William G. Geuss, assistant, Walter Jaeschke, Hoo Nam Seelmann, Karl–Heinz Ilting, Karl Brehmer, German editors, vol. 1, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011), 1–63.

John W. Burbidge, The Logic of Hegel’s Logic: An Introduction, (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006).

Clark Butler, “Translator’s Introduction,” Lectures on Logic: Berlin 1831, G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Hegel, transcribed by Karl Hegel, Clark Butler, translator, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2008), vii–xxiii. [2001]

Clark Butler, The Dialectical Method: A Treatise Hegel Never Wrote, (Humanity Books, 2012).

William E. Conklin, Hegel’s Laws, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008).

Youri Courmier, War As Paradox: Clausewitz and Hegel on Fighting Doctrines and Ethics, (Montreal/Kingston: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 2016).

Fred Reinhard Dallmayr, G.W.F. Hegel: Modernity and Politics, new edition, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002). [1993]

Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Americanism: The New Hegelian Orthodoxy, Third Edition, Archive.org, 2016.

Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Americanism: Stronghold of Hegel, Holograph Manuscript, (Montreal/Vancouver, 2013).

Ido Geiger, The Founding Act of Modern Ethical Life: Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007).

Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, “Introduction: The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Robert F. Brown, editor and translator, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2014).

George Di Giovanni, editor and translator, “Introduction,” The Science of Logic, G.W.F. Hegel, Michael Baur, General editor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), xi–lxii.

George Di Giovanni, editor and translator, “Translator’s Note,” The Science of Logic, G.W.F. Hegel, Michael Baur, General editor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), lxiii–lxxiv.

Georgio Di Giovanni and Henry Silton Harris (1926–2007), editors and translators, Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post–Kantian Idealism, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1985). [2nd edition, Indianapolis, 2001]

Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).

Stephen Houlgate, editor, “Introduction,” Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, G.W.F. Hegel, Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), vii–xxxiii.

Yitzhak Y. Melamed and Peter Thielke, “Hegelianism,” New Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Game Theory to Lysenkoism, vol. 3, Maryanne Cline Horowitz, editor in chief, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2005), 975–977.

Dalia Nassar, The Romantic Absolute, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).

Frederick Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000).

Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, “Introduction,” Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, B.V., 2001), 1–52.

Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, B.V., 2001).

Otto Pöggeler, “Editorial Introduction,” Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818, With Additions From the Lectures of 1818–1819, G.W.F. Hegel & Peter Wannenmann, J. Michael Stewart & Peter C. Hodgson, editors and translators, Claudia Becker, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Friedrich Hogemann, Walter Jaeschke, Christoph Jamme, Hans Christian Lucas, Kurt Rainer Meist & Hans Josef Schneider, Staff of the Hegel Archives editors, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1–43. [1983 & 1995]

David Rose, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, (London: Continuum Books, 2007).

Stanley Rosen, The Idea of Hegel’s “Science of Logic,” (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

Carl Schmitt, “Hegel and Marx: German Radio Broadcast of 13 November 1931,” Historical Materialism, 22.3–4(December, 2014): 388–393.

Ludwig Siep, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Daniel Smyth, translator, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

Robert Stern, “Hegel, British Idealism, and the Curious Case of the Concrete Universal,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 15.1(2007): 115–153.

Peter Thielke and Yitzhak Y. Melamed, “Hegelianism,” New Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Game Theory to Lysenkoism, vol. 3, Maryanne Cline Horowitz, editor in chief, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2005), 975–977.

Colin Tyler, Idealist Political Philosophy: Pluralism and Conflict in the Absolute Idealist Tradition, (London/New York: Continuum Books, 2008). [2006]

Yirmiyahu Yovel, translator and commentator, “Introduction,” Hegel’s Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), 1–62.


SELECT ENGLISH HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY: PRIMARY SOURCES
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2017)


1/ THE YOUNG HEGEL: EARLY WRITINGS

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Political Writings, Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegels erstes System, Hans Ehrenberg & Herbert Link, Hrsg., (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1915).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie, Georg Lasson, Hrsg., (Leipzig, 1923).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Jenaer Systementwürfe II: Logik, Metaphysik, Naturphilosophie (Gesammelte Werke), Rolf–Peter Horstmann & Johann Heinrich Trede, Hrsg., Band 7, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1971).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, Henry Silton Harris & Walter Cerf, editors and translators (introductions), (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1977).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, System of Ethical Life (1802–1803) and the First Philosophy of Spirit (Part 3 of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803–1804), Henry Silton Harris (introduction) & Thomas Malcolm Knox, editors and translators, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1979).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, On Christianity: Early Theological Writings, Thomas Malcolm Knox, editor and translator & Richard Kroner, introduction, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961). [1948]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, Henry Silton Harris and Walter Cerf, editors and translators, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1977).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Jena System, 1804–1805: Logic and Metaphysics, John W. Burbidge, Lorraine Code, William Carruthers, André Dekker, Martin Donogho, Henry Silton Harris (introduction), Helga Hunter, George Di Giovanni, Kem Luther, Lee Manchester, Jeff Mitscherling, David Pfohl, Peter Preuss, Kenneth Schmitz and Donald Stewart, editors and translators; Hans Ehrenberg, Rolf–Peter Horstmann, Georg Lasson, Herbert Link and Johann Heinrich Trede, German editors, (Kingston/Montréal: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 1986), xii–xxiii. [1915–1923–1971]

2/ THE MATURE HEGEL: ORIGINALAUSGABE

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Yirmiyahu Yovel, translator and commentator, introduction, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Arnold Vincent Miller, translator and John Niemeyer Findlay, forward, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). [1977]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Self–Consciousness: Text and Commentary, David Sherman, editor, introduction and Leo Rauch, translator and commentator, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1999).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic, George Di Giovanni, editor and translator, introduction, Michael Baur, General editor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817) and Critical Writings, E. Behler, editor, (New York: Continuum Books, 1990).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline: Science of Logic: Part 1, Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom, editors and translators, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic with the Zusätze: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences With the Zusätze, Theodore F. Geraets, Wallis Arthur Suchting & Henry Silton Harris, editors and translators, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1991).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesung von 1819/1820 in einer Nachschrift, Dieter Henrich, Hrsg., (Frankfurt–am–Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Thomas Malcolm Knox, editor and translator, forward, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). [1952]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Allen W. Wood and Hugh Barr Nisbet, editors and translators, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). [1991]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, Thomas Malcolm Knox, editor and translator & Stephen Houlgate, editor, introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

3/ TWILIGHT OF MATURITY: HEIDELBERG & BERLIN LECTURES

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Peter Wannenmann, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818, With Additions From the Lectures of 1818–1819, J. Michael Stewart & Peter C. Hodgson, editors and translators; Claudia Becker, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Friedrich Hogemann, Walter Jaeschke, Christoph Jamme, Hans Christian Lucas, Kurt Rainer Meist & Hans Josef Schneider, Staff of the Hegel Archives editors; Otto Pöggeler, editorial introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). [1983 & 1995]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Heidelberg Writings: Journal Publications, Brady Bowman and Allen Speight, editors and translators, introduction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

4/ THE OLD HEGEL: LECTURES & OTHER WRITINGS

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Manuscript of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822–1823, Robert F. Brown and Peter C. Hodgson, editors and translators, editorial introduction; Karl Gustav Julius von Griesheim, Heinrich Gustav Hotho and Friedrich Carl Hermann Victor von Kehler, William G. Geuss, assistant, Walter Jaeschke, Hoo Nam Seelmann, Karl–Heinz Ilting, Karl Brehmer, German editors, vol. 1, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011). [1840]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Hegel, Lectures on Logic: Berlin 1831, transcribed by Karl Hegel; Clark Butler, translator, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2008). [2001]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in World History, Duncan Forbes, editor, introduction, Hans Reiss, assistant and Hugh Barr Nisbet, editor and translator; Johannes Hoffmeister, German editor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). [1840–1955–1975]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Robert F. Brown, editor and translator and Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, introduction, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2014).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, With Selections From the Philosophy of Right, Leo Rauch, editor and translator, translator’s introduction, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, vol. 1, Michael John Petry, editor and translator, introduction and explanatory notes; Karl Ludwig Michelet, German editor, forward, (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1970). [1842–1965]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, vol. 2, Michael John Petry, editor and translator, introduction and explanatory notes; Karl Ludwig Michelet, German editor, forward, (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1970). [1842–1965]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, vol. 3, Michael John Petry, editor and translator, introduction and explanatory notes; Karl Ludwig Michelet, German editor, forward, (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1970). [1842–1965]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Johann Erdmann and Ferdinand Walter, Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit: 1827–1828, Robert R. Williams, editor and translator, introduction; Pierre Garniron, Franz Hespe, Walter Jaeschke and Burkhard Tuschling, German and French editors, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007). [1989–1994–1996]

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel: The Letters, Clark Butler and Christiana Seiler, commentary by Clark Butler, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984).

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Political Writings, Laurence Dickey, editor, general introduction and Hugh Barr Nisbet, translator; Raymond Geuss and Quentin Skinner, series editors, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), vii–xli. [1999]
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MODERN EUROPEAN FREEDOM: DAVID HUME VERSUS THE NEGRO AS AN INFERIOR HUMAN RACE

“I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites.” (108)

David Hume (1711–1776) in Christopher J. Berry, Hume, Hegel and Human Nature, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).

The sophistical mind of David Hume, his inveterate mental weakness and conceptual perversity, is the victim of modern European political and economic irrationalism: For this reason Hume espouses the modern European sophism of superior and inferior human races. The Scottish Enlightenment is also inscribed within the world historical collapse of European modernity and the rise of Globalism, as evidenced by the contagion of pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism in Scotland, Great Britain and the British Empire. Modern freedom is not Global freedom: The disintegrating hordes of modernity, the flabby minds of the earth, in the name of inexact historiography, follow the one–way road of Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant into oblivion, and therefore cannot perceive that their self–destruction is the result of their own decadence, under the hammer blows of Americanism.

Duncan Forbes (1922–1994) and company downplay Hume’s modern unreason, in order to justify as natural their own masters’ mortal corruption, “Europe’s Machiavellian relativism and selfishness” (Kissinger), especially at Whitehall, but also at Cambridge, and a lesser degree at Oxford. Duncan Forbes and the modern sophists, in the name of Humean philosophy, follow in the footsteps of Immanuel Kant, the Great Sophister of modernity:

“Hume’s science of politics included economics.”
Duncan Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics, 1975, vii.

Modern Sophists thus obscure the rational distinction between mere corruption and decadence (appearance and reality versus appearance and delusion) in world history: As the victims of their own self–estrangement, the inferior ruling classes of the earth are therefore the flesh and blood that greases the cogwheels of historicity:

Duncan Forbes: “[Hegel’s dialectical] conclusions cannot be proved or disproved ... [Hegel’s philosophy] is in danger of being destroyed or distorted if it is written down ... The present edition of the introductory lectures on the philosophy of history has the advantage of bringing home the fact that so much of Hegel’s philosophy was talked.” (xiii–xiv–xiv)

Duncan Forbes, editor, “Introduction,” Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in World History, G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Hegel; Hans Reiss (assistant) & Hugh Barr Nisbet, editor and translator; Johannes Hoffmeister, German editor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), vii–xxxv. [1840–1955–1975]

See: “[Duncan Forbes] is perhaps best remembered by his students for the exhilarating lectures on Hegel and Marx which he gave at the University of Cambridge during the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s ... [Forbes] perhaps played down rather too much the importance to Hegel of logical strictness and rigour ... Forbes was deeply committed to [the impure] Hegel’s vision of political and social life.” (112)

Anonymous, “Obituary: Duncan Forbes, 1922–1994,” Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, (1994): 112–113.

See: “Hegel wants as much liberty as possible, and so does Marx. Hegel wants as little authority as is absolutely necessary, and so does Marx. And both want the maximum development of the individual. Marx’s tragedy, and the tragedy of not only Marx, was his failure to realize this.” (xxxv)

Duncan Forbes, editor, “Introduction,” Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in World History, G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Hegel; Hans Reiss (assistant) & Hugh Barr Nisbet, editor and translator; Johannes Hoffmeister, German editor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), vii–xxxv. [1840–1955–1975]

American Idealism is the fountainhead of Global civilization. The teaching of the concept is the inescapable lesson of history: As the historical unfolding of the conceptual rationality of the notion of universal freedom, Americanism is rising upwards in the world of today.

©2017 Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Modern European Freedom: David Hume Versus the Negro As An Inferior Human Race. All rights reserved. This work is only for GOOGLE+ and the GOOGLE CORPORATION and its users: Users are not permitted to mount this writing on any network servers. No part of this writing may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the author, except for reading and browsing via the World Wide Web.
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GEORGE MAXIMILIAN ANTHONY GRUBE (1899-1982): PLATO AND PLATONISM

“Plato’s mind was synthetic rather than analytic. He never treats subjects separately ... [Plato] would have understood what was meant by the theory of Ideas (the core of his metaphysics), by the problem of pleasure (the root of all ethics) and the nature of the soul (the basis of all psychology) ... The theory of ‘ideas’ is the belief in eternal, unchanging, universal absolutes, independent of the world of phenomena; in, for example, absolute beauty, absolute justice, absolute goodness, from which whatever we call beautiful, just or good derives any reality it may have. Its meaning and scope―for there are Ideas of much more than ethical concepts―will become clear as we proceed, but a warning is necessary at the outset: It is well known, but cannot be too often repeated, that the word Idea in this connexion is a very misleading transliteration, and in no way a translation, of the Greek word idea which, with its synonym eidos, Plato frequently applies to these supreme realities. The nearest translation is ‘form’ or ‘appearance,’ that is, the ‘look’ of a person or thing. We shall see how the meaning of the word probably developed. Suffice it for the moment to say that ‘theory of forms’ is much nearer the Greek, though the expression ‘theory of ideas’ is so firmly established that it is all but impossible, and perhaps undesirable, to avoid it altogether. But it must be quite clear that we are not speaking of ideas in any sense which the word can carry in ordinary English. In the sequel, to avoid misunderstanding, the words Idea and Form are printed with a capital when they refer to Platonic eide ... in the intelligible world there is no place for progress or evolution: The pattern is the same though the copy―the world of sense―may reflect it more or less closely at different times ... the Ideas are spaceless and immaterial. That is perfectly clear from the Phaedo on, and to press poetical expressions used in certain myths which would seem to assert the contrary, is childish and ridiculous.” (viii-viii-1-49)

George Maximilian Anthony Grube, “The Theory of Ideas,” Plato’s Thought, (London: Methuen and Company Ltd., 1935), 1-50.

See: “Grube was also very active in Canadian politics. A leading member of the provincial Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (forerunner of the New Democratic Party), he was president of the provincial party in the 1940s. He served on the Toronto Board of Education and ran unsuccessfully for Parliament a number of times.” (vi)
George Maximilian Anthony Grube, Plato’s Thought, Donald J. Zeyl, introduction, bibliographic essay and bibliography, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 1980).

See finally: “[Platonic] Ideas are spaceless and immaterial ... to assert the contrary, is childish and ridiculous.” (49)
George Maximilian Anthony Grube, “The Theory of Ideas,” Plato’s Thought, (London: Methuen and Company Ltd., 1935), 1-50.

Plato’s theory of ideas is a belief, a conviction, an opinion―as opposed to the truth of mind?

A concept cannot by definition exist until the mind has conceived it.” George Maximilian Anthony Grube, 1935, 49.
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DAGOBERT DAVID RUNES (1902–1982): HEGEL AND THE HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY

“Philosophy is the search for the indefinable ... Hegel regarded the human mind as one of the manifestations of the cosmic spirit, and when he wrote the history of the human [336] mind, he believed that he had recognized and defined the essence of mind ... Long before Hegel lost his once immense authority, many of his intellectual formulas continued to attract the philosophers of various schools in various countries. Hegel’s philosophy is often regarded as typically German, and certainly some of its main features represent the very characteristics of the German way of reacting to reality. Numerous great philosophers in England and America, in Italy and France, and in other countries have testified that they owed to Hegel not only an increase of knowledge but the fundamental principles of their own thinking. Outstanding Hegelians in England were T.H. Green, Edward and John Caird, F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet, and in America, W.T. Harris, Royce, [James Edwin] Creighton and [475] [Marcy Whiton] Calkins. John Dewey said that ‘acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking.’

Hegel’s philosophy has often been despised as abstract speculation. Yet soon after his death it became evident that his thoughts could offer an ideological basis to political parties which were radically opposed to each other. Bismarck and the Prussian Junkers adopted Hegel’s view on the state. So did Fascism and National Socialism, while Marx, and after him, Lenin, adapted Hegel’s dialectical method to give reasons for the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And even staunch defenders of liberalism and democracy have appealed to Hegel’s philosophy of history.

In a similar way, the champions of religious orthodoxy and liberalism have used Hegel’s ideas to justify their respective positions. King Frederick William III of Prussia and his minister of public education favoured Hegelianism as the firmest bulwark of Christianity, while King Frederick William IV of Prussia and his minister of public education persecuted the Hegelians whom they accused of undermining the Christian faith.

Hegel has been glorified and vilified as the protector of reactionary conservatism and as the prophet of revolutionary change because his system tries to synthesize antagonistic tendencies. On the one hand, he put becoming above being, and conceived of the world as an eternally evolutionary process; on the other hand, he claimed to have laid the groundwork for definite knowledge and for the understanding of timeless perfection.

In a lecture on the history of philosophy, Hegel, from his chair at the University of Berlin, called to his audience: ‘Man cannot over–estimate the greatness and power of his mind.’ For he [Hegel] regarded human mind as one of the manifestations of the Absolute which he defined as spirit. The world, Hegel stated, is penetrable to thought which is, on its part, a description of the Absolute. Cosmic reason operates within the soul of man, whose consciousness is the area of the subjective spirit, while the objective spirit becomes manifest in cultural and social institutions like law and morality, and the absolute spirit can be grasped in the arts, in religion and philosophy. Human history and social life, culminating in the state, represent the highest level of a gradation that rises from inorganic nature to human genius, from ‘mere existence’ to consciousness, knowledge of truth and action in accordance with recognized duties. The history of the world means the progressive realization of freedom which can be demonstrated by purely logical development. For Hegel does not acknowledge any other cause of historical change than the movement of thought by integrating a thesis and antithesis which, on its part, provokes [476] a new antithesis with which it becomes integrated into a new synthesis. These succeeding syntheses will bring the world to reason. Hegel thought that he had found the pattern for both human and cosmic reason in this conflict of thesis and antithesis which he called the dialectics. For becoming was regarded by Hegel as the modification of a being by factors which he defined as the negation of the being to be modified. In this way, evolution was conceived by Hegel as a purely logical procedure for which he claimed the acknowledgement of real necessity ... [Kant] became not only Germany’s greatest philosopher, but one of the greatest philosophers of all times ... all modern philosophy must orient itself to Kant.” (xxiii–335–336–474–475–476–642–643)
Dagobert David Runes (1902–1982), Vergilius Ferm, Kurt Friedrich Leidecker and John White, editors, Treasury of Philosophy, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955).

See: Dagobert David Runes, editor, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: On the Nature of Spirit,” Treasury of Philosophy, Vergilius Ferm, Kurt Friedrich Leidecker and John White, editors, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), 474–483.

See: “Dagobert D. Runes received his Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Vienna.” (Back Cover Jacket)

Dagobert David Runes, editor, Treasury of Philosophy, New York, 1955.
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HEGEL: MACHIAVELLISM, IDEALISM AND HISTORICISM
Friedrich Meinecke (1924)

There is, as we have already had frequent occasion to observe in individual instances, a thread of profound conflict running right through the political thought of Western Man since the time of the Renaissance: Namely, the conflict between the basic idea of a system of Natural Law governing all thought in general, on the one hand, and the inescapable facts of historical and political life, on the other.¹ The system of Natural Law, created by the Stoa, absorbed and adapted to itself by Christianity, and then secularized once again by the Enlightenment, started out from the assumption that the Laws of Reason and the Laws of Nature were, in the last resort, in harmony with each other, and both proceeded from an all–embracing divine unity of the universe.² And moreover that human reason, implanted by God, was capable of comprehending this unity and harmony as a whole, and of determining the content of such laws as would have to be authoritative in human life. It is true that these norms―when faced with the task of governing and ennobling the activity of the baser impulses―were forced into making a number of concessions and compromises with reality; but, as regards their essential and ideal form, they were quite unaffected by this, and continued to remain eternal, unchangeable and homogeneous, as the supreme guiding–light over the whole of life. It was, however, the individual man who consciously had to bear and interpret this divine reason which shaped the soul of Nature; and the perfecting of the individual man was the whole aim and purpose of the precepts laid down by the Laws of Nature and of Reason. Then in the process it happened that the intellectual elements in Nature, in history and in the universe (on the basis of which these precepts had acquired the character of absolute validity) tended, in a naive fashion, to be assessed exclusively in accordance with the requirements of the individual man; and hence these requirements were projected into the world [344] and made absolute. World–reason was basically (although no one was clearly aware of the fact) individual reason and a means to the fulfilment and perfecting of the individual. Moreover (it was further assumed) this individual reason was identical in all men; it was for this very reason that it was possible to believe in the absolute validity of their utterances, and to feel that one had hold of something firm and certain. For this reason the intellectual content also of the supra–individual human associations was measured against the same yard–stick, which was not by any means one that had developed out of their own nature and been read off from them. States, corporations, etc., have subsequently therefore acquired the aim of making man, i.e., the individual, better or happier, and of keeping his baser impulses within bounds, to serve as a scourge of evil (as Luther called the State). It was for this purpose that men formed themselves into States, and this idea contains the roots of the doctrine that the State originated in a contract made between men. But political thought has the task of ascertaining which is the best form of the State. Since, here too, it is impossible to avoid making concessions to reality, so also the really existent conditions of State life (conditions which are nothing else but ideal) are on the whole capable of being borne by Christian sentiment as having been willed or permitted by God, as a punishment or a corrective.

But the undeniable facts of historical life signified more than a mere restriction or watering–down of the ideal of reason, due to the imperfection of human nature; nor was it always altogether easy to re–interpret these facts as a form of punishment or correction willed by God. The original and special nature of the State withstood from the very outset any conception of it that looked upon it merely as a mode of organizing men for their own good. It is certainly true that “the general welfare” became the aim and task of every State that had progressed beyond the crudest stages of State power. But this “general welfare” not only embraced the welfare of the separate individuals united in the nation; it also embraced the welfare of the collective whole, which signified more than the mere sum of the individuals, and which represented a collective personality. And not only was the people a collective personality, but also the State itself which led them was another such collective personality; indeed it was a much more active one than the mere people, because it was organized and could make its will effective at any instant. The law of this will was raison d’état; this was the great discovery that was made by Machiavelli and the school of ragione di stato. But this discovery did in fact, without anyone noticing it, shatter the framework of the predominant mode of thought along the lines of the Law of Nature and of Reason. For this latter mode of thought, in accordance with its basically individualistic character, could only interpret the “general welfare” which the State had to serve, as the [345] welfare of the individuals united together in it. We were able to establish this particularly in the case of Hobbes and Spinoza. Thus it was recognized and generally held to be known that for the most part the real State did not always serve the general welfare, but that very often it principally served the welfare of the rulers. Consequently, the seventeenth–century theory of raison d’état made a distinction, as we have seen, between the good kind of raison d’état which contributed to the general welfare and at the same time also to the welfare of the rulers (this being in harmony with the general welfare), and on the other hand the bad kind of raison d’état which contributed solely to the welfare of the rulers. And accordingly Conring, in his dissertation on politics which he delivered in 1661 (Examen rerum publicarum potiorum totius orbis, Opera IV), demanded of every State whose constitution and situation he was discussing, whether and in what degree it devoted itself to the welfare of the collective whole or to the welfare of the rulers. Both types of welfare were, in the process, conceived individualistically, from the standpoint of Natural Law. The welfare and vital interest of the personified State did of course rise far above the merely individual welfare either of the united individuals or of the ruling individuals; and though, if one dealt unswervingly in terms of Natural Law, it could certainly be made valid in practice, it could not be carried through with any consistency.³

It is indeed a very instructive and remarkable fact about the history of the idea of raison d’état and of the doctrine of State interest that, from the sixteenth until the eighteenth century, it forced its way in like a foreign body, and succeeded in breaking into a predominant mode of thought which was entirely opposed to it. Whatever was said on the subject of raison d’état and State interest sprang straight from the vital source of life itself, from the practical needs of States and statesmen. But whatever was said on the subject of the State in general sprang as a rule from the traditions of Natural Law. In the former case it was the individual State, the real State, that was under discussion; in the latter case it was the best form of the State. Thus practical empiricism and the rationalism of Natural Law lived on side by side, often separated like oil and water, often shaken up together in a confused and unorganized manner in the minds of the men who were reflecting on the nature of the State. And, as if competing for the same goal, now one mode of thought was in the lead, and now the other. Empiricism began its career with a great bound of energy, starting with Machiavelli; in him the rationalistic element of Natural Law was confined to certain traditional ideas concerning the framework of the theory, and the rational character of his intellect was entirely subservient to his highly gifted sense for life and for reality. However, the Counter–Reformation [346] once more restored the Christian conception of Natural Law to a place of honour; and it produced the compromise doctrine (deriving from Botero) of ragione di stato, which clung chiefly to the idea of the best form of the State, but also gave some consideration (though, reluctantly, and with a sense of resignation) to the subject of the real State as it existed. The new wave of empiricism, which became noticeable at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and which coincided in France with the forceful ascendancy of the power–policy of Richelieu, now produced the doctrine of the interests of the various States; this doctrine, since it served purposes that were purely practical, remained free from the rationalistic elements of Natural Law―which was not to say by any means, however, that the men who nursed this doctrine also freed themselves inwardly from this rational mode of thinking in terms of Natural Law. Indeed this latter doctrine, after it had begun to be secularized in the seventeenth century and to take on a new form during the Enlightenment, made a completely new advance, and during the course of the eighteenth century (in view of a freshly–strengthened belief in a world–reason that manifested itself in the individual) it became increasingly bold in its efforts to subdue and adapt the State according to its own conceptions. At the same time however (and particularly also during the later seventeenth century) political empiricism continued to remain strong; and thus it was possible for Pufendorf to present a view of the State which was at the same time generalizing and individualizing in its approach, both rationalistic and empirical, and yet remained pure and therefore stylistically good. The stylistic unity of his view of the State, which was not disturbed by the dualism of his methods, was based on the fact that he really looked at the State more from above, from the standpoint of the rulers, than from below, from the point of view of the needs and aims of the individuals. For he was under the influence of triumphant absolutism.

The great event of the eighteenth century, then, was the fact that, under cover of the ruling absolutism, the middle classes gained in strength both intellectually and socially, and began to exploit the riches of Rational and Natural Law for their own class–interest which was also now gradually acquiring a political tinge. Now for the first time the individualistic seed inherent in the interpretation of the State in terms of Natural Law reached its full development. Men began to look at the State purely from beneath, from the point of view of the inborn rights of humanity, and not from above; and it began to be treated, even more decisively than in earlier times, as a purposive institution aiming at the happiness of individuals. Consequently the theme of raison d’état disappeared from the ordinary theoretical discussions, though it continued to remain alive in the practice and tradition of statesmen. At the same time however there was also a further fostering of the doctrine of the [347] special interests of the various States, on account of the practical needs of absolutist power–policy which rose during the eighteenth century to its classic heights. But, in the process, the old tension between the two fundamentally–opposed principles of rationalism and empiricism became prodigious, and, in the case of Frederick the Great’s dualism, the polarity between his humanitarian ideas and his ideas about the power State, it impressed us as being well–nigh shattering.⁴

Things were moving towards an acute crisis. The idea of the State, as looked at from beneath, from the point of view of the individual, began to tear itself apart from the real State, as guided from above; and the compromise that had made the two ideas compatible began to be forgotten. Then the French Revolution occurred. This did indeed attempt to build the State up from below, from the point of view of the goals of individuals; whilst it was felt that the old raison d’état of the cabinet (which had now come to be hated) ought to give place to the rational faculty of the human race. The Revolution had opened up new ground by championing the rights of the individual against the State, a matter which had scarcely even been thought of by the seventeenth–century idea of raison d’état. But the idea of raison d’état itself triumphed over those who despised it by forcing them into its service and making it necessary for them to adopt the same harsh methods―indeed even more frightful methods than such as could be blamed on the immoral cabinet–politics of the eighteenth century. The events of 10th August and the September Massacre of 1792 were the counterpart of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew in 1572. On both occasions there was a furious outburst of human bestiality, guided by a raison d’état that was carried through without any conditions or limitations. For a state of affairs that was hybrid and impossible and highly dangerous to France came to an end with the elimination of the weakened monarchy which had become dangerous to France for the very reason that its only hope of survival lay in a victory for the country’s enemies. But at the same time it also offered the first terrible example of the fact that the power–policy and raison d’état of a modern democratic national State are capable of releasing even more daemonic forces than the State of the old aristocratic community.

But, under these circumstances, was the spirit of the French Revolution capable of solving the problem of how to overcome the violent cleavage between empiricism and rationalism, between the actual [348] existent State and the rational State? By no means. Driven on by the intoxication of power, it continued to advance from one act of brutal raison d’état to another, and dressed them up with rhetorical flourishes taken from the intellectual treasury of the rational State and misused for this purpose. Was England―the great opponent of France and Napoléon―able to solve the problem any better? Here too the inner presuppositions for such a solution were lacking. In that country no one felt any inducement to meditate more profoundly on the conflict between the rational State and the actual existent State, because the actual State which they possessed was felt by the English to be supremely rational; so, with a good conscience, they were enabled also to perceive their real power-interests in a robust manner and without feeling any scruples, and, in order to justify these from an ideal point of view, they could (like the French) make use of humanitarian phrases borrowed from Rational Law, from Christianity and from the Enlightenment. In France and England, it was the actual State, forcefully alive, striding on and upwards from one conflict to another, which so completely dominated thought and feeling that either no one reflected at all about what the verdict of the ideals of Reason on all this was; or else, if one was in opposition against the government, one renewed the never–ending complaint about the sinister spirit of conquest.

But now in Germany it was certainly possible for people to feel an impulse to bring about a more profound reconciliation between the actual existent State and the ideals of Reason. It was more possible for a prostrate and dismembered State, than for a triumphant and growing State, to feel a painful inducement towards making this reconciliation. The Holy Roman Empire, with its easy–going liberty for all classes in the Empire, with the air of ease and venerability which it emanated, collapsed on account of its own powerlessness. In this painful situation there were only two courses left open to the intellectual German: One was to separate finally the destiny of the German intellect from that of the German State and to seek refuge in the quiet sanctity of one’s own mind in order to build up a purely spiritual and intellectual world; the other was to create a sensible and harmonious relationship between this intellectual world and the real world, and then also at the same time go on to seek a bond of unity between the actual existent State and the rational ideal. When this was successful, there had to arise a completely new and hitherto undreamt–of relationship between reason and reality. Then they were no longer interlarded with fictions and compromises in order to present an appearance of unity, as in the Stoic, Christian and worldly doctrine of the Law of Nature which had never been intellectually capable of bridging the gap between the absolute norms of Reason and the actual laws and processes of historical life. On the contrary, they did essentially fuse together, they became identical. This [349] succeeded in achieving what Spinoza had attempted to do with his pantheism, but what he had been prevented from doing by the mechanical and unhistorical modes of thought of his time. A successful attempt was now made to grasp the reason that was inherent in historical reality itself, and to comprehend this as its kernel, its innermost law of existence. Now it was not the mere individual, but rather history itself that came to bear and interpret reason. The unity of the divine nature now made itself manifest in the historical world. But then raison d'etat and power–policy also appeared in an entirely new light.

This was the great and epoch–making achievement of Hegel. According to the final form of his doctrine, the actual and existent State is also at the same time the rational State. “Whatever is rational, is actual and existent; and whatever is actual, is rational.”⁵ In order to be able to say this, he did indeed have to re–interpret the concept of reason and make it fluid; he had to strip away the stable character which its norms had hitherto possessed, and transform the norms themselves into a form of life that was fluid and yet continuously ascending, transform them into the developmental process of historical humanity. Then it was no longer necessary either for the new concept of reason to come to grief among the contradictions and apparently insoluble antitheses; for by means of his dialectic, which for the first time penetrated right deep down into the real process by which historical events grew and happened, he accepted these antitheses as a necessary vehicle for progress and improvement in itself. And this meant that he admitted (to an extent which in earlier times would never have been thought possible) that there was a collective causal connection between history itself and all its more sinister and murky aspects. Everything, absolutely everything serves to promote the progressive self–realization of divine reason; and what is peculiarly subtle and cunning about it is that it forces into its service even what is elemental, indeed even what is actually evil. And if anyone is scared by the inference that this would oblige one to acknowledge the relative justice of evil, then he would refer them to the sublime view of life which he himself achieved at the height of his system―a view that was capable of being at the same time both esoteric and exoteric, because it ventured to assert that everything esoterically beautiful was necessarily bound up with the existence of everything exoterically unbeautiful:

“The chief thing is then to recognize, in the mere appearance of what is temporal and transient, the substance that is immanent there and the eternal element that is present there. For that which is rational (that is to say, ideal) does, by virtue of presenting itself in external existence in all its actuality, therefore present itself in an infinite profusion of forms, shapes and appearances, and encloses its root–kernel in a bright outer covering, which is the immediate dwelling–place of [350] consciousness, and which conceptual thought must first penetrate, in order to detect the inner pulse, and thus feel it beating in the external configurations too.”⁶

But of all the bright and manifold images that formed the outer covering of history, there was none in Hegel’s opinion that came nearer to the root–kernel than the State. It was in the State that his sharp sense of reality discerned the most powerful and efficacious, the all–pervasive factor in the history of the human race. Whatever his empiricism discerned, had to be sanctioned by his idealism. But then the soul of the State ―raison d’état and the seed of Machiavelli’s doctrine―had to be sanctioned also. And so something quite new and extraordinary occurred: Machiavellism came to form an integral part in the complex of an idealist view of the universe, a view which at the same time embraced and confirmed all moral values―whereas in former times Machiavellism had only been able to exist alongside the moral cosmos that had been built up. What happened now was almost like the legitimization of a bastard. Thus, in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Machiavelli began to be received with honour once again.⁷ A specifically German attitude towards the problem of Machiavellism came to develop―a fact which could not indeed be considered to be due solely to the doctrine and influence of Hegel. Hegel himself―who viewed all intellectual phenomena as being merely the manifestation (conditioned by a particular historical situation and stage of development) of a given national spirit, and who considered that all the separate national spirits were in their turn directed by the world–spirit―would have contemptuously refused to accept for himself any such purely personal compliment, and would have referred it to the great architect of the world, who was using him as a mouthpiece. First and foremost it was necessary to assess the historical situation of Germany. Hitherto Germany had always tended to be more passive than active, in the great power–policies of Europe. It was therefore impossible for her to develop a fixed and definite tradition of long usage in power politics, such as existed in France and England. Hence, for any thinking German, power–policy was not something that existed of its own accord; on the contrary, it was to a certain extent an article imported from abroad, whose usefulness or harmfulness could be argued about. Even the seventeenth–century German advocates of the doctrine of raison d’état had the feeling that they were handling a plant that was not native to German soil. Nor did Frederick the Great’s theory of power–policy have any of the character of organic self–evidence born of the whole history of the nation; it suggested rather a conscious effort to master a great art which had sooner or later to be learnt. Then when there came [351] a period of collapse, as after the revolutionary wars and under the rule of Napoléon, it was possible for those living in a Germany that was suffering tribulation (precisely because the country was unarmed and forced to suffer) to hanker after the weapons of power, and hence too after the weapons of Machiavellism, with a certain awe and longing. At first there were only a few who did this. But amongst these few who felt that Germany needed a national armament of power Hegel was perhaps the first, and certainly the one with the most powerful mind. He felt it already at the beginning of the new century and before even he had established his system in its final and definitive form. And, since this too was only the final consolidation of certain original component parts of his thought, the supposition immediately presents itself that his sanctioning of Machiavellism was also connected with those fundamental tendencies in his mind, and that both personality and the historical situation contributed simultaneously to produce it. It so happens that Hegel’s early development has recently been re–edited and presented in a masterly manner; therefore we shall confine ourselves to picking out those mental threads of his that might have led to the recognition of Machiavellism.⁸

Hegel’s early development is a profoundly stirring drama. It shows the old and eternally new process by which a forceful and original mind, still dependent at first on the collective ideas of his time, but then beginning to confront them, painfully and inconsistently with his own obscure needs, step by step overcomes them, recasts them, subordinates and adapts them to his own needs, and thus gradually acquires the strength to build up an entirely new intellectual edifice. It is the story of how a genius discovers itself and learns to speak its own language, in order to satisfy completely the innermost needs that are inherent in him.

What were the ideas he had to face, what did he set up in opposition to them, and what final result did he achieve?

He found himself faced with a type of individualism which judged historical life and the State according to the requirements and the standards of the rational individual striving for intellectual and spiritual freedom; it was an individualism which chiefly demanded of him that he should respect the sacred rights of the individual. This demand, which found expression in the Declaration of the Rights of Men and of Citizens in 1789, was originally accepted even by Hegel: And, as a young teacher at the University of Tübingen, he welcomed the French Revolution.⁹ But, still quite early on, he became conscious of an obscure need for something quite different, of a need to overcome the blank opposition between the State and the individual, of the need for an unbroken unity [352] of life that would embrace them both. Then once again the ancient world would be able to exercise its inexhaustible power on a youthful mind thirsting after an exemplary model. It was in the Greek city–state that he found the realization of this unity. In 1796, with the deepest sympathy, he sketched out the picture of Greek Man at his most flourishing period, the type of man for whom the idea of his State and fatherland constituted the final purpose of the world, and who allowed his own individuality to dwindle away before this idea, because he himself was realizing the idea of his own activity and thus producing the supreme unity of life―the Absolute, which (as he was already expressing it even then)¹⁰ “Reason can never stop looking for.” When Reason was no longer able to find this in the degenerate State of antiquity, it found it in the Christian religion. But (according to his opinion at that time) this was a symptom of decay, of a loss in the unity of life. Christianity could only be accepted by a “corrupt humanity” who had lost their fatherland and their own free State, and now in their misery took up the doctrine of the corruption of human nature as a consolation. “It honoured that which is shameful; it sanctified and perpetuated eternally this incapacity, by actually making it a sin to be capable of believing in the possibility of strength.”

Thus one of Machiavelli’s basic feelings came to life in him. Christianity (the latter had said), by setting men's thoughts on the world to come, made them ineffective and slack in the affairs of this world. He therefore longed to recover the natural virtù of the men of antiquity with all its splendour and, most of all, with the strength it placed at the service of the State. There was even a similarity in the historical situation which evoked such similar moods in these two thinkers separated by three hundred years. Then as now, an epoch of political collapse coincided with an epoch of intellectual and spiritual renewal. Even at this time, and in the following years which brought the collapse of the old Empire, Hegel was already perceiving with increasing distinctness that the old world was going to pieces. His mind, which was becoming ripe for supreme achievements, was already searching amongst the ruins of the old world, trying to find those forces that would be capable of building a new and stronger edifice and restoring the broken connection between individual existence and the universal forces of life. For this was the basic feeling in the young Hegel, out of which everything that followed really grew: namely, the feeling that this indispensable connection between individual life and the universal life of the nation seemed to be destroyed by a process of development which was now being brought to a necessary end by the catastrophes of the revolutionary wars. These catastrophes drove the majority of intellectual Germans straight back into themselves to take shelter within [353] their own personality. The enormous intellectual and spiritual wealth which Germany accumulated during the first decade of the new century was created under the obscure pressure of a hard political fate. It was misfortune that drove us then to the summit of our political existence. This was also true of Hegel himself, who took part quite consciously and clear–sightedly in the life of his period. But that which (in addition to this acute consciousness) distinguished him from most of his contemporaries, was that very early on he felt certain that this situation was unnatural and would not last; that real life and intellectual life could not long remain so rigidly separated from each other without it becoming likely that a new collapse would occur, bringing with it also an intellectual collapse.

“The condition of Man (whom the times have forced to take refuge in an inner world) can either become simply one of perpetual death, that is if he remains in this inner world; or else, if nature impels him to life, his condition can only be one of endeavour, striving to do away with the negative element in the existing world, in order to enjoy himself and find himself there, and in order to be able to live ... The sense that nature is at variance with life as it is, shows the need for Man’s condition to be raised up; and so it will be raised up, once that life, as it is at present, has lost all its power and all its prestige, once it has become a pure negation. All the phenomena of this period show that satisfaction is no longer to be found in life as it was.”

These are words of the greatest weight and historical import. They reflect the whole compressed intellectual power of Germany, thrust back by life, but already preparing itself to hit back at life with all its force. They are taken from the obscure and difficult fragment entitled Freiheit und Schicksal (Freedom and Destiny) which was to form the introduction to his work on the German constitution. This piece (which, though written during the winter of 1801–1802, was not published in its entirety until 1893)¹¹ also provides us with the first decisive comments that Hegel made regarding the problem of Machiavellism.

Let us first review the things that introduced him to it: Dissatisfaction with the simple consolidation of individuality, an increasingly strong perception of the way in which the individual was dependent on the fateful forces of universal life, though this did not lead to a merely passive surrender, but instead to the active ideal of the ancient virtù, to living in and for a State which was worth the sacrifice of one’s whole life. In addition, there was the terrible drama to be witnessed of great fateful forces at work in the French Revolution and in the collapse of the Empire―something that meant more to the Swabian than to any other German, for to him it represented the “State,” which nevertheless was now no longer a real State. “Germany is no longer a State” were the [354] opening words of the book. For it is only by means of power that a State really becomes a State.¹² “For a collection of countries to form a State, it is necessary that they should have a common defence and State authority.”¹³ It is not the tranquillity of peace, but the activity of war, that shows the strength of the connection between all the parts and the whole.¹⁴ During the war with the French Republic, Germany experienced for herself that she was no longer a State. And the peace, to which it had led, would show that, apart from those countries that fell under the dominion of the conqueror, many more States still would lose that which was their most precious possession: Namely, to constitute States on their own.

This was the new―or perhaps, rather, re–acquired―recognition that the most essential attribute of all for a State was power, that is to say the ability to maintain itself against other States. All practical raison d’état and all the theoretical deliberations on the subject during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had been guided by this principle; whilst the parallel mode of viewing the State in terms of Natural Law had for the most part been unaffected by it. But a man like Hegel was absolutely incapable of being satisfied with the merely empirical and realistic recognition that the power–State existed; on the contrary, he felt obliged to incorporate this new knowledge in a unified and rational picture of the world. In order to be able to do this, Hegel had to break an entirely new and original path for himself, a path which led him at first through gloomy and rocky country. He had, as it were, to roll aside the rocks that hindered him, and looking at these even today one can get some idea of the force with which he struggled and searched.¹⁵

At first it was not possible for Hegel to shape his new ideas, which were leading him away from the predominant individualism, without having a certain feeling of reaction and recoil when the passionate subjectivity in him began to struggle violently. One understands this, when one becomes aware that the new guiding lights which he began to follow were at first only capable of shedding on him a cold light that brought little consolation. When corresponding with Hölderlin towards the end of the ’nineties, he acknowledged an idea of destiny that ruled over human life with omnipotence and rigidity. The idea that individuals and nations were dependent on an unknown superhuman power of fate then became insupportable; it even became insupportable for the iron mode of thought of a man like Hegel. The vital unity between the Self, the Nation, the State and the Universe, for which he was seeking, was not to be reached along this path. This harsh and unyielding block had to be hacked up. So his concept of destiny began gradually to change, to move closer to the human and historical spheres, to take advantage [355] of its own particular innermost powers and thereby become filled with intellect and reason―until finally, at the very height of his system, destiny turned into world–spirit, of which reason itself made up the sole content, and which led on to his self–manifestation in the galaxy of nation–spirits, by which in turn world–history was evoked, shaped and guided.

When, in 1801–1802, Hegel wrote down his ideas about the constitution of Germany, his picture of the world had not yet reached this stage; his concept of destiny had certainly already acquired a lively historical content and, most of all, had taken up the State as the essential agent of the force of destiny, but it had not yet assumed the advanced and passionate status of a world–reason that could reconcile everything. But certainly that decisive idea had already been grasped, which was to assume so great a significance in Hegel’s later system and which can be looked upon as his particular magic formula for dealing with all contradictions and discrepancies in the world–picture, for simultaneously acknowledging the irrationality and uncleanliness of historical reality as a whole, enabling one to tolerate these (with a calm sense of the world and universe as a whole) as being mere phenomena of the foreground, as being mere dissonance which is resolved in the harmony, if only one looks at things from the highest summit of existence. Then indeed all the rich and variegated activity of history had to be re–interpreted as being merely the play of marionettes that were being guided by a higher hand. The freedom and individual licence which had previously been accorded to all historical forces to vent themselves freely, thereby became merely an apparent freedom, merely an apparent right. Let us hear what he himself had to say in his work on the constitution.

“The original unsubdued character of the German Nation has been determined by the iron necessity of its destiny. Within the sphere marked out by its destiny, a mighty and apparently order–less game was played out by politics, religion, need, virtue, authority, reason, cunning and all the other forces that move the human race, upon the wide arena that was allowed to them. Each one conducts itself as an absolutely free and independent force, and has no consciousness that they are all tools in the hands of higher forces, of aboriginal destiny and all–conquering time, forces that can smile at this ‘freedom’ and this ‘independence.’”

This marionette theory is the key to an understanding of Hegel’s idea of the power–State. His sense for power in general was certainly not without an elemental root in his own individual nature. He himself had, as has been correctly pointed out,¹⁶ the aptitude to become a man of power. But even stronger than his own individual need for power was his contemplative impulse, leading him to interpret power (and all [356] the other phenomena of life) as being mere appearances emanating from a supreme and invisible authority of existence, whose influence then became felt only as power in the highest sense of the word. It was because (and only because) there did exist such a supreme and all–embracing power, that it was possible also to grant to all the visible and phenomenal forces of historical life a free (though indeed only apparently free) scope, for each of these forces received its mandate and its requisite strength from the hand of the supreme power. Then however it was also necessary to understand the particular mandate and the particular individual strength of each one of them, to comprehend it by means of its own individual dynamic action, and not apply to it standards from any other sphere of life. In order to discern the supreme truth, it was first necessary to recognize the truth that lay in the separate things themselves. It was in this way that, in Hegel’s phrase, “the truth that resided in power”¹⁷ was discovered, and that politics was freed from the precepts of ordinary morality and from the ideal claims of individuals.

Once again, we shall let him speak for himself. He was dealing with the fact that Sweden, after being drawn into the Thirty Years War in order to save the freedom of the German conscience and the German State, became in the process a conquering power in Germany.

“On account of idealistic visions of the altruistic computation of political and religious freedom, men are foolish enough to overlook, in the fervent heat of their enthusiasm, that truth which resides in power; thus they are led on to put a firm faith in an artificial human system of justice and made–up dreams in the face of the higher justice of nature and of truth, although this higher justice makes use of necessity in order to enforce its authority on men, in despite of any conviction of theory or inner fervency.”¹⁸

It was therefore a form of “justice that a foreign power, which is allowed by a weaker State to take part in its domestic affairs, should succeed in acquiring certain possessions in that weaker State.”¹⁹

“It is the philanthropists and the moralists who decry politics as a contest and an artificial skill in trying to get an advantage for oneself at the expense of justice, as a system created by injustice; and it is the impartial beer–swilling public (that is to say, a mere multitude, lacking any genuine interest or fatherland, and whose ideal of virtue is the tranquility of the ale–house) that blames politics for breach of faith or an unjust fickleness; or else this same public at the very least takes some interest in, and is suspicious of, the legal form in which the interests of its State are presented. If these interests are identical with their own, then they will also defend the legal form; but the true inner force that drives them is their own interests and not those of the State.”²⁰

The kind of justice which is dealt with in the relations between States is [357] nothing else but “the advantage, acknowledged and secured by agreements, of one State.”²¹ And “it entirely depends on the circumstances, on the combinations of power (i.e., on political judgment), whether the interest and justice that are endangered should be defended with all the might of power; in that case, however, the other part would also be able to plead a right and a justice on its side, for it also possesses that very opposed interest which is producing the collision, and thus possesses a right too. And the war (or whatever one can call it) now has the task of deciding, not which of the two rights maintained by the different parties is the truly just one―for both sides have a truly just right―but rather which of the rights shall give way to the other.”²²

It is the old doctrine of the interests of States that is being proclaimed here once again. Hegel was familiar with the history and the political literature of the previous century, and made his appeal to it. “It is a generally known and recognized principle that this special interest (of the State) is the most important consideration.”²³ There was however one thing about it that was new and revolutionary. The earlier harsher doctrine of raison d’état had admitted the presence of a conflict between politics, and morality and justice, and had only maintained that politics was supreme and victorious in this conflict. Whereas Hegel was bold enough to deny altogether that this conflict existed, for “it is impossible that this most important consideration should be taken to be in conflict with rights and duties or with morality”²⁴ ; “the State has no higher duty than that of maintaining itself.”²⁵ This meant that Hegel broke with the dualism of standards and Weltanschauung, and went over to a monistic ethic and view of the world which was in the last resort pantheistic. The contrast here was no longer one between moral and immoral, it was rather between a lower and a higher type of morality and duty; and the State’s duty to maintain itself was declared to be the supreme duty of the State, and ethical sanction was thereby given to its own selfish interest and advantage. For in all conflicts of interest and triumphs of power there was revealed a “higher justice of nature and truth.”²⁶ Not all the consecratory pronouncements had yet been made which the later Hegelian philosophy of history was to lavish on the world–spirit’s conduct of empirical history, and the throne for the world–spirit was still, as it were, unoccupied and veiled as yet in the obscure cloud of the concept of destiny; but the throne had already been established, and reverence was already being demanded for it.

Now, too, Machiavelli was called before this throne and released from the “seal of disapproval” which general opinion had set on him, and he was now heaped with the highest honors and praises. His book about the Prince was “the supremely great and true conception of a [358] real political mind, having the most noble and important significance.”²⁷ Amid a general situation of disorganization and blindness, he (as it is expressed in Hegel's early work) “grasped with a cool circumspection the necessary idea that Italy should be saved by being combined into one State.”²⁸ Hegel believed that, in his own later day, “this idea of a State which should constitute a nation”²⁹ was being drowned by a blind yell for freedom; and that all the misery of Germany, and all the experience gathered from the French frenzy after liberty, would perhaps not be sufficient to make the nations believe in this idea. But that did not in any way diminish the “necessity” of this idea. Hegel also used it to justify Machiavelli’s methods which had been considered abominable, and he poured scorn on the trivialities of ordinary morality.

“There can be no question here of any choice of means. A situation, in which poison and assassination have become customary weapons, is not compatible with soft counter–measures. Life, which is nearly in a state of putrefaction, can only be reorganized by the most forceful action.”³⁰

The fact that he recognized both Machiavelli’s aim and his methods, certainly did not mean (as these words already indicate) that Hegel looked upon The Prince as being a sort of compendium applicable to any period. He expressly rejected this. The only part that seemed to him valid for all time was the root–kernel of the doctrine, that the idea of a State, which ought to form one nation, should be brought to realization by means of all the methods necessary for that purpose. The particular methods used by Machiavelli seemed to him transient and of their time, not to be generally imitated, and only understandable in the context of the special situation of Italy at that time. And even these he attempted to justify by means of a somewhat high–handed juridical argument. Namely that Machiavelli, starting from the idea that Italy ought to form one State, was obliged to act as if Italy were already a State. But then the opponents within the State were nothing less than criminals, and if the State annihilated them in no uncertain manner, it was only administering punishment as a judge. “That which would be abominable if it were done by one private person to another, or by one State to another State or to a private person, must in this case be considered a just punishment.”³¹ This shows that Hegel still had a certain hesitation, when faced with the consequences of a limitless Machiavellism. He also admitted thereby that not all methods were permissible in a conflict between States. Thus, a fragment of the old dualistic ethic was projecting here into the new realm of monistic and pantheistic ideas―offering an initial sign that not all the problems of political ethics could be resolved by this means alone. If Hegel had not committed this inconsistency, he would have been obliged to end up with a ruthlessly naturalistic doctrine of power, and with a raison [359] d’état which had its limits only in expediency and advantage, and not in any kind of moral feeling. But his fundamental sense of idealism recoiled before such a prospect.

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This work of Hegel’s, rich in powerful ideas, and forming a counterpart of equal stature to The Prince of Machiavelli, remained unknown to his contemporaries. His desire for a Theseus who would save and unite Germany as a State (something that he modeled on a similar wish of Machiavelli’s) was only half fulfilled. For the great Theseus personalities who arose during the period of the rise and reform of Prussia, though they were certainly capable of saving Germany, were not yet however capable of uniting her as a State. Hegel himself had indeed also expressed the skeptical opinion that the outcry for liberty among his contemporaries would drown the need for forming a national State. Again, this opinion too was half confirmed and half refuted by the development of the political spirit in Germany. For a long time to come the liberal idea still showed itself stronger than the idea of a national State; the wishes of the Germans for liberty in opposition to the absolutist police–State were expressed more forcibly than their wishes for unity. But these wishes too awoke during the period of the Wars of Liberation, and from decade to decade they became more alive and effective. Gradually more and more, however, they came to be linked with the new ideas of power politics which Hegel had been the first in Germany to express. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, after the collapse of the hopes of unity founded on the power of popular opinion, the conviction began to spread that it would have to be the power of the State which was to pave the way to unity―the power of the State, guided by its own special interest, namely raison d’état. Both thought and experience had combined to produce this conviction. Experience embraced all the historical events that had befallen the German people during the nineteenth century. But the thought of the men who led the movement for unity had been brought to fruition to a great extent (which cannot be measured with certainty) by the Hegelian philosophy, which, in its final form, also included the doctrines of power politics contained in his early work; indeed it was now for the first time that these doctrines were elevated to the highest place they could attain to, and were thereby raised to a position of supreme efficacy.

It is not necessary, for the context of our investigations, to follow out stage by stage the development of the Hegelian idea of the power–State separately and in all its connections with his system as a whole. This task has been accomplished, in outline at least, by Heller, even if [360] his work does contain certain exaggerations and distortions; and Rosenzweig’s profound book, which presents Hegel’s whole philosophy, also deals with this matter properly. It is enough for our purposes, if we first of all recapitulate the final formulations which Hegel gave to the idea of raison d’état, and then insert these into the historical context of the problem we are treating.

In the Philosophy of Right of 1821, Hegel gave the following interpretation of the idea of raison d’état in its operation against other States (§§336 and 337):

“Since States are related to one another as autonomous entities and so as particular wills on which the very validity of treaties depends, and since the particular will of the whole is in content a will for its own welfare pure and simple, it follows that welfare is the highest law governing the relation of one State to another. This is all the more the case since the Idea of the State is precisely the supersession of the clash between right (i.e., empty abstract freedom) and welfare (i.e., the particular content which fills that void), and it is
when States become concrete wholes that they first attain recognition. The substantial welfare of the State is its welfare as a particular State in its specific interest and situation and its no less special foreign affairs, including its particular treaty relations. Its government therefore is a matter of particular wisdom, not of universal Providence. Similarly, its aim in relation to other States and its principle for justifying wars and treaties is not a universal thought (the thought of philanthropy) but only its actually injured or threatened welfare as something specific and peculiar to itself.”

With this he linked certain observations on the relationship between politics and morals. The welfare of the State, he remarked, has a quite different justification from that of the welfare of an individual person, “and the ethical substance, the State, has its determinate being, i.e., its right, directly embodied in something existent, something not abstract but concrete, and the principle of its conduct and behavior can only be this concrete existent and not one of the many universal thoughts supposed to be moral commands. When politics is alleged to clash with morals and so to be always wrong, the doctrine propounded rests on superficial ideas about morality, the nature of the State, and the State’s relation to the moral point of view.”³²

In these propositions one can still discern the starting–point of the Hegelian idea of the power–State, his dissatisfaction with the mere structure of personal individuality, and his sense of the supra–individual fateful force of the State (which however constrained individuals into its service)―in short, the primacy of the State over the individual. But, as was properly consistent with the Hegelian dialectic, there now arose, out of the defeat of ordinary individualism, a new and higher individualism―higher because it also recognized the individuality of [361] the supra–individual essence of the State and transferred to this the rights which might have been claimed for the separate individual. At the summit of his philosophy, Hegel now conceived of the State in general as an “individual totality,” which developed in a quite concrete manner in accordance with its own special and peculiar vital laws, and which was thereby both permitted and obliged to set aside ruthlessly even the universal moral commands. By doing so, it did not (as his words show) behave immorally, but rather according to the spirit of a higher morality which was superior to the universal and customary morality. What this consisted in, he made clear in his philosophy of history.

“The morality of the State is not the moral, the reflective element, whereby personal conviction is the ruling element; the latter is more accessible to the modern world, whereas the true and ancient type has its roots in the principle that everyone has his duty.”³³

Thus his youthful ideal, dedicated to antiquity, the ideal of a citizen sacrificing himself to the State, was expressed here once again, and helped to strengthen the doctrine that the State ought to be activated by its own most personal interest, and not by any universal moral commands.

But (though not so much for Hegel as for his contemporaries and successors in Germany) the strongest support for this doctrine lay, both now and ever afterwards, in the new sense of the individuality of the supra–individual powers, that is to say, in German historicism. This extends our horizon beyond Hegel’s intellectual sphere into the general movement of the German mind at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The decisive point was that everywhere now, both in the Classical and the Romantic camps, men broke with the old traditions of a Natural Law that was Stoic and Christian, and then was once more secularized by the Enlightenment; as we remarked earlier on, this conception of Natural Law started out from the reason of the individual, but it looked upon this reason as being identical in all individuals, and consequently granted all its claims and commands an absolute validity. Hence arose the ideal of the best form of the State; and hence arose the demand that this best form of State should also be entirely subordinated to the universal moral law. But now in Germany men freed themselves from believing in the absolute validity and uniformity of reason and of its ideals and commands, and began to comprehend the individual manifoldness of all the forces of life, and also the fact that in each of these there ruled a special individual reason.³⁴ Schleiermacher, in his Monologue of 1800, expressed in the [362] most concise and meaningful manner this sudden swing round which he had experienced in himself.

“For a long time it was sufficient for me, only to have found reason. And I believed in the uniformity of one existence, as honoring what was single and supreme; there could only be one Right for every instance, action would have to be the same in all cases.”³⁵

But now he had been seized by “the idea of the peculiarity of individual existence”³⁶ ; he was now impelled to seek for some higher moral element; now he could no longer rest content with the idea that humanity was solely a uniform mass, which externally appeared to be divided into parts, but in such a way that it was all really the same.

“So there broke upon me something that has since exalted me in the extreme; it became clear to me that each man ought to represent humanity in himself in his own different way, by his own special blending of its elements, so that it should reveal itself in each special manner, and, in the fullness of space and time, should become everything that can emerge as something individual out of the depths of itself.”³⁷

Here Schleiermacher was speaking chiefly about the individuality of separate beings, and of the superior morality of the individual element in them; he had not yet reached the stage of speaking of the State as an “individual totality,”³⁸ or about any superior morality residing in it. But even then (as another famous passage in his Monologue shows) he was casting his eye towards a new, higher concept of the State, which, everlastingly exalted above a mere mechanism, should demand for itself all the innermost powers of men, but should also raise and extend these towards the supreme development of human existence.³⁹ Out of the deepening individualism of the individual being, there henceforth arose on all sides in Germany, now in this way, now in that, a new and more living picture of the State; and there arose, too, a new image of the world which looked upon the world as being filled with individuality, and saw at work in every individuality, both personal and super–personal, a special characteristic vital law, and thus learned to comprehend Nature and History collectively as an “abyss of individuality”⁴⁰ (in Friedrich Schlegel’s phrase). For everything individual proceeded out of the unified womb of the divine nature. Individuality everywhere, and an identity between mind and nature, and by means of this identity an invisible but strong bond cast about all that individual fullness which would otherwise seep away―those were the new and powerful ideas which now burst forth in Germany in this or that form. It was perhaps the greatest revolution in thought that has been experienced in the West. For the belief that had ruled hitherto in a comprehensible unity and uniformity, and hence in an absolute validity of reason and its claims, was now destroyed and dissolved by the recognition that reason revealed itself in endlessly manifold forms, that it laid down [363] individual and not general laws of life, and that its ultimate unity lay only in an invisible metaphysical foundation of the universe. Everything in history now looked different from what it did before: No longer superficially simple and easily viewable, but instead full of perspectives and with immeasurable depths in the distance; and it was no longer composed (as one had thought previously) of an eternal recurrence of something that was the same, but rather of an eternal rebirth of what was peculiar to itself and without comparison. This richer and more profound image of the world, created by the German historicism that was now coming into existence, demanded a more resilient mode of thought, and a more complex and imaginative abstract language, with a tendency to mystical obscurity. Cicero, Thomas Aquinas and Frederick the Great, if they had read each other’s works, would have been able to understand each other, because all three of them spoke the easily intelligible abstract language of Natural Law. In the works of Herder, Goethe, Hegel and the Romantics, they would have found words and ideas which would have bewildered them, and would have seemed to them incomprehensible and odd.

This new sense for what was individual resembled a fire which was capable of consuming (not all at once, but gradually) every sphere of life; to begin with, in many ways, it got a hold only on the flimsiest and most inflammable materials, as it were, the individual personal life, chiefly the world of art and poetry, but then it also caught the heavier materials, most of all the State. And Hegel was the first to pass over deliberately, indeed even in a one–sidedly radical manner, from the cult of personal individualism to the cult of the supra–individual entity of the State. Now for the first time, against the background of this general tendency to view life in an individualizing manner, it is possible to understand completely that act of his by which he re–interpreted the concept of reason, from being the static force it was before, into the fluid developmental process of historical humanity. For this meant to re–interpret it in such a way as to bring out the wealth of the individualities that were unfolding. In each one of them the single divine reason assumed a special and concrete form, and the highest and most influential of these forms seemed to him to be the States. But together with the recognition of the individual character of the States, there was also bound up the recognition of their vital arteries, namely raison d’état and State interest; and its power to constrain everything else, the primacy of its Right over any other Right, was (as we have seen) plainly recognized. The individual State with its special impulses towards power and life, this State which in previous centuries had only been able to lead a life which, though indeed a forceful one, was nevertheless an unholy one, now received all the reverence that the new cult of individuality was capable of giving it. The old dualism between the [364] individual or actual State, and the best or rational State, ceased. The actual State was the rational State.

Thus Hegel shared completely the new sense for what was individual in history, and thereby became one of the most effective pioneers of German historicism. The lasting value, and whatever inner vitality there is in his philosophy of history, is based essentially on this sense of the great historical individualities. But with him it never became the chief thing; he never devoted himself to it with the. profound joy and enthusiasm shown by the Romantics and the founders of the German historical school. To him, both now and ever afterwards, it was only a means to an end, it was the key to the peculiar sanctity of his picture of the world in which the whole individual wealth of the historical world now became assembled and compressed into a single and unique divinity of the world–reason, the world–spirit. This world–reason was certainly interpreted (as we have noted) as being the fluid and increasing life of humanity; but at the same time also, and to an even greater extent, it was interpreted and valued as being the unified and superior leader and controller of this whole bright and varied drama, as being the force that worked the marionettes of history. Everything individual serves to realize the single and unique reason, which has the particular skill of enticing into its service the evil elements as well as the good, the elemental as well as the intellectual and spiritual. Of the two great principal ideas of the time, the idea of identity and the idea of individuality, it was the idea of identity, of the struggle towards the inner unity and apotheosis of nature and mind, which was far and away the stronger in Hegel. But at the same time, in this need to subordinate everything empirical and cause it to proceed from one unique rational idea, there was also at work the whole secular tradition of the Stoa, of Christianity and of the Enlightenment. Even the individual element in history was thereby rationalized once again, and now indeed at the same time (although he acknowledged it in general) it was deprived of its own most individual and original essence. It constituted the most remarkable and intensive synthesis of old and new ideas, of ideas tending towards viewing things in absolute terms or in historical terms. They were confined together as in a prison.

In this prison there was also (as we have seen) the idea of raison d’état. It had a cell to itself in which it could move and operate freely and without hindrance. Indeed it was one of the very biggest cells in the prison. For according to Hegel it was the State, guided by raison d’état, that performed the most important services towards making world–reason a reality. He was obliged to place the State as high as this, because he needed it to authenticate his grand conception that the world–spirit realized itself progressively in and through history. In history he now needed a power like the State which, in a special and manifest [365] degree, would act as the bearer of rational purposes, and would at the same time be a bearer that dominated the whole of human life. “It is solely through the State that Man has any value, or any spiritual and intellectual reality.”⁴¹ He also needs the State to form a bond of union between the two great ideas of his time, the idea of individuality and the idea of identity, between the individual welfare and the general welfare. It was the State that created “the unity of the universal and the subjective Will”⁴² ; and it was in this conjunction between the Will of everything universal and the subjective Will of individuals, that he saw the essence of the State, its living moral quality.⁴³ For the sake of his universal philosophy of history (which orientated everything towards the Whole, and ruthlessly subordinated every individual thing to that Whole), he needed to have inside the empirical world some “universal element,”⁴⁴ some power that dominated individuals. Hence his deification of the State.

And since everything which there was in him of an individualizing and historicizing mode of thought was concentrated principally on the State, he was also able to comprehend in the clearest possible fashion the inner essence of raison d’état, its abysses and its tensions between elemental and intellectual motives, the use it made of the good and its misuse of the evil elements.

“It is as particular entities that States enter into relations with one another. Hence their relations are on the largest scale a maelstrom of external contingency and the inner particularity of passions, private interests and selfish ends, abilities and virtues, vices, force and wrong. All these whirl together, and in their vortex the ethical whole itself, the autonomy of the State, is exposed to contingency”―a contingency, however, which, through the operation and guidance of the world–spirit, is completely smoothed out once again and finally brought to a successful outcome.⁴⁵ From the standpoint of the world–spirit, he gazed down with a macroscopic irony upon all this activity of power. Indeed, in his Philosophy of History one may read the delightful passage about the Romans:

“It is a peculiarity of the Romans that they, who have the greatest system of justice in world history, also avail themselves of the petty justice of manifestos and agreements over small injuries, and defend these almost in a spirit of partisanship. But, in the case of political complications of this kind, it is always possible for anyone to reproach another if he wishes to, and if it is useful to him to make the reproach.”⁴⁶

Thus, in the same breath, he satirized and tolerated the old device of power, of cloaking its interests in the disguise of morality and justice.

In the Philosophy of History, Machiavelli was also given similar [366] praise to that which he received in the early work of 1801–1802.⁴⁷ Then he had been praised, and his methods had been applauded, because he advocated the necessary idea that the Italian people should be saved and united in one State. Now it was stated that the much more limited aim (which was purely one of State) of cleansing the Papal State from the weeds of independent dynasts, was a “just right in the moral sense.”⁴⁸

“With a high sense of the necessity for forming a State, Machiavelli laid down the principles according to which States ought to be formed in those circumstances. The various rulers and ruling houses had to be altogether suppressed; and if (with our concept of liberty) we cannot accept the means, which he tells us are the only possible ones and are completely justified―if we cannot accept them, because they involve the most ruthless exercise of authority, and all kinds of deception, murder, etc.,―then we must at least acknowledge that the dynasts, who had to be overthrown, could only be attacked in this manner, because a total lack of conscience and a complete depravity was altogether part of their being.”⁴⁹

Thus Hegel distinguished between the kernel and the husk of Machiavelli’s doctrines, and extended only a temporal and not an absolute sanction to his crude methods.

In our history of the idea of raison d’état, Machiavelli, Frederick the Great and Hegel stand out as the three most prominent figures. Hegel himself had a definite sense of this connection.⁵⁰ He did not indeed make use of the slogan of raison d’état (as we are obliged to do here) to denote the general substance of the principles of State conduct both inside and outside the State; on the contrary, he looked upon it as a concept which had first been formed by the Enlightenment (with its bias towards Natural Law), the “principle of what was universally best,”⁵¹ which was permitted within the State to set itself above private rights and to carry out the universal objects of the State. But it was precisely from this aspect that Frederick the Great seemed to him to be a “world–historical person. One can call him the ruler who brought the new epoch to reality, wherein the actually–existent State interest attained to universality and its supreme authorization.”⁵²

“He must be singled out particularly, because he grasped intellectually the universal purpose of the State, and because he was the first ruler to cling fast to the universal element in the State, who always considered the ultimate good of his State as the final principle, and never allowed the particular element to have any influence, if it was opposed to the object of the State. He raised the idea to the throne, and gave it a validity in the face of anything that was particular or special.”⁵³

Thus, with good justification, he looked upon Frederick as being the pioneer of his own idea of the State, as the man who ushered in the epoch in which Hegel expected this idea to triumph. [367]

But now what was the final purpose served by Hegel’s raison d’état and his idea of the power–State? Hitherto we have heard that it was the progressive realization of the world–reason. But since this world–reason, because it had to embrace the entire spiritual and intellectual content of world–history, could not be expressed simply, one can quite understand that it is possible for there to be different interpretations of what Hegel looked upon as the supreme value of world history. The researcher who has investigated Hegel’s idea of the power–State more thoroughly than anyone else hitherto came to the conclusion that for Hegel “national power was the supreme aim,”⁵⁴ and that his world–spirit was nothing else but “the expression for the moral authorization of nationalist world–power,”⁵⁵ In this one can only see an absolute debasement of the Hegelian doctrine of the power–State, converting a means into an end–in–itself. Certainly Hegel gave a wide scope both to raison d’état and the power–State, and looked upon the external power of a nation as the correlate of its inner vigor.⁵⁶ But the supreme result which he expected from its development was not national power in itself, but rather the national culture which was to proceed from it, not deliberately aimed at, but blossoming organically out of it.

“The supreme goal that a State can achieve, is that art and science should be developed in it, and a height attained which corresponds to the mind and spirit of the people. This is the highest purpose of the State, but it is a purpose which the State must not attempt to produce as a construction; on the contrary, it must create itself out of itself.”⁵⁷

Nor can the crude aim of power be reconciled with Hegel’s famous assertion that world–history is equivalent to progress in the consciousness of freedom. For him freedom was more than a mere development of State power; it was for him the unity of the mind and its innermost depths with its world:

This is its supreme liberation, because thought is its innermost essence.”⁵⁸

In the last resort, his philosophy of history culminated in a sublime contemplation, as being the supreme value which the human mind was capable of attaining.⁵⁹ Whoever completely comprehended the world and the reason manifest in it, that person was [368] free. But chiefly one had to comprehend the coincidentia oppositorum, of apparent contrasts between nature and mind, of the genuine unity and rationality of all Being and Becoming. “If thought is free in itself, then it can afford to dismiss freely the aspect of appearance”⁶⁰ ; it can “tolerate the fact that what is natural has directly formed in itself what is spiritual and intellectual.”⁶¹ That is to say, convinced of the unity of mind and nature, it can tolerate the drama of this empirical world with all its frightful abysses, and can concede freedom to all the forces at work in it. This freedom granted to the “Appearance”⁶² was indeed still only the apparent freedom of the marionettes. True freedom lay only in the almost mystical union between the observing and thinking mind and the world–spirit.

Thus Hegel showed genius in adopting a combination of ruthless realism in acknowledging reality, and a transcendent attitude to the whole of life from the highest metaphysical level. Thereby he seemed to accomplish the remarkable achievement of managing both to grant all the assertions of a pessimistic view (which doubted the goodness in the world) and yet simultaneously to oppose it with a transcendental optimism, which looked down on this world with a heroic superiority and calm. The filth of reality, which surrounded the philosopher, did not besmirch him. Rather, he gathered it all up with a playful hand, and made it into one of the bricks with which to build his palace. Raison d’état was also one of these bricks.

Hegel’s system, simultaneously authoritative and profound, built up and executed as it was in a grandiose and abstruse manner, could not long maintain itself as a closed doctrine. But an enormous influence resulted from his idea of the cunning of reason, in allowing Good to emerge from Evil. The whole bulk of experience of life and history did in fact confirm that some sinister connection existed between Good and Evil. But Hegel’s unfortunate influence on the ideas of German power politics arose from the fact that it was possible to forget the sinister element in this connection, and that a palliating light was capable of being shed also on the primitive, bestial and nocturnal aspect of raison d’état. The doctrine of reason's cunning was nothing else but the logical consequence of the philosophy of identity, which required this means in order to be able to present the unity and rationality of the whole world–nexus:

“For the rational mind, philosophy transfigures the element of actual reality which seems to be unjust.”⁶³

But this kind of theodicy and of universal optimism, with which the philosophy of identity learnt to look upon reality, had concealed in it the serious danger that moral feeling would become blunted and the excesses of power politics would be taken too lightly. [369]

And this danger also lay concealed in the new doctrine of individuality. It was already capable of leading the morality of individual existence into temptation if the right of individuality to express itself was held to be limitless, and was set up as a higher type of morality in opposition to universal morality. Once applied to the supra–individual individuality of the State, it could be used to justify all its excesses of power–policy, as the unavoidable and organic outcome of its being.

“A State,” Hegel remarked in his Philosophy of Right (§334), “may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns, however minute, and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad.”⁶⁴

Hegel was also, as one knows, very strongly under the influence of Napoléon, and rejected any moralizing in the face of the great conqueror–personalities of world history.⁶⁵ Thereby he certainly paved the way for a freer and more open–minded interpretation of the personalities of world history, but also for a laxer treatment of the problem of political ethics. He did not take the trouble to limit in any way the completeness of the grandiose powers which he granted to the interest–policy of States in their dealings with one another―apart of course from those reservations he made against the uncleanliness of Machiavelli’s methods, which he stated were only permissible in Machiavelli’s contemporary historical situation, and were not to be considered permanent and universally applicable. This only offered a flimsy kind of barrier against the excesses of a modern Machiavellism, which in the future would also be capable of justifying itself with some new and special contemporary situation, when it made use of its new and frightful methods which were basically perhaps just as immoral.

Thus the idea of identity and the idea of individuality―these two supreme and fruitful ideas of the contemporary German mind―showed the inner tragic two–edged quality of all great historical ideas and forces.

ENDNOTES

1. Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, editor, Hegel: Machiavellism, Idealism and Historicism, Friedrich Meinecke, GOOGLE+ 2017.
From: Friedrich Meinecke (1862–1954), “Hegel: Machiavellism, Idealism and Historicism in Recent German History,” Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d’État and Its Place in Modern History, Douglas Scott, translator, Werner Stark (1909–1985), introduction, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962, 343–369. [1957] See: Friedrich Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte, München/Berlin, Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1924.

See: “Empiricism began its career with a great bound of energy, starting with Machiavelli ... In our history of the idea of raison d’état, Machiavelli, Frederick the Great and Hegel stand out as the three most prominent figures … on glancing at Kant, at Fichte’s earlier doctrines and at the Freiherr vom Stein’s ideal of the State, one sees that the really permanent German ideas on the subject of the State had remained thoroughly un–Machiavellian.”
Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d’État and Its Place in Modern History, Douglas Scott, translator, Werner Stark, introduction, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962, 345–366–393. [1957]

See also: “Modern irrationalism, in order to validate pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, squares the Lecture Notes and the great works published by Hegel in his lifetime. Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism thus squares both Kant and Hegel in order to prove the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of Absolute Idealism is flawed. Irrationalism thus perverts the history of philosophy and modern Europe ... Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism is therefore the political and economic mask of modern European Raison d’État. One drawback will never be remedied in Hegel philology: The Lecture Notes are not authoritative and are therefore useless in the exact determination of the ultimate worth of genuine Hegelianism ... In the 20th century upwards of 500 million human beings were slaughtered in the contagion of modern political and economic satanism, more than in all the periods of history combined: Many hundreds of millions more were utterly ruined and destroyed by the most barbaric slavery ever recorded in the world. This is the ultimate verdict of exact historiography and universal history. From whence comes the disease of modern unreason?
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Americanism: The New Hegelian Orthodoxy, Third Edition, Archive.org, 2016, 6–9.

See also: “Rational idealism is profound knowledge of the unknowable.” [Reinster Idealismus deckt sich unbewußt mit tiefster Erkenntnis]
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 851–855 auflage, München, 1943, 328.

See also: “It was precisely the Hegelian method and dialectic that Marx employed … Hegel’s dialectical philosophy of history, if properly employed, provides a powerful means to free the concrete here and now, the hic et nunc, from the sphere of irrational institutions or emotionally guided impressionism, and install man as the master over the irrationality of a fate ordained by God, nature, or providence.”
Carl Schmitt, “Hegel and Marx,” Historical Materialism, 22.3–4(December, 2014): 388–393, 389–391. (German radio broadcast of 13 November 1931)

See also: “The absolute [of Hegel] became a stumbling–block to Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach and other members of the ‘Left.’ They rejected as an illegitimate interpolation the eternal subject of development, and, instead of one continuing God as the subject of all the predicates by which in the logic the absolute is defined, assumed only a series of ideas, products of philosophic activity. They denied the theological value of the logical forms ― the development of these forms being in their opinion due to the human thinker, not to a self–revealing absolute. Thus they made man the creator of the absolute. But with this modification on the system another necessarily followed; a mere logical series could not create nature. And thus the material universe became the real starting–point. Thought became only the result of organic conditions ― subjective and human.”
William Wallace 1844–1897, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th edition, vol. 13, New York, 1911, 205.

See also: “[Those] Hegelians who maintain the personality of God in a world beyond our sphere, must, for consistency’s sake, deny that God is cognizable. But how then can they remain in the (Hegelian) school?”
Karl Ludwig Michelet in Anonymous, “Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz: The Life of Hegel,” The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, 20.4(October, 1848): 585.

See also: “[Hegel] was a thoroughly anti–critical, anti–revolutionary philosopher … Hegel’s teaching had been taken up by the Left in a one–sided and abstract way; and the great majority of people always prefer what one can become fanatical about, and this is never anything but what is abstract.”
Johann Eduard Erdmann (1805–1892), A History of Philosophy: German Philosophy Since Hegel, 4th German edition, vol. 3, London, 1899, 66–81.

See finally: “If it is asked why then, since 1850 at any rate, his [Hegel’s] writings have been a good deal neglected, the answer is not difficult to give. It is only by the multitude that they have been laid aside. The principle has penetrated in this country into the attitude and methods of some of the later thinkers who have been amongst us, men like Green, Caird, Bradley and Bosanquet. These have indeed hardly been Hegelians. It was not probable that a system which was given to the world a century since should serve the world sufficiently today. But its broad principle has profoundly moved the English thinkers to whom I have referred, and I might add instances of the same kind from the United States and from other countries, as well as from Germany … We need not be deterred by the feeling that we are no longer interested in the doctrine of the Absolute which engrossed attention in the early part of the last century.”
Richard Burdon, Viscount Haldane, “Introductory Preface,” Hegel’s Science of Logic, vol. 1, By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Walter Henry Johnston and Leslie Graham Struthers, translators, London, 1929, 7–9. [Editor]

2. The fact that this conception had to come to terms with a dualistic ethic of Christianity, cannot be further demonstrated here, but must simply be noted with reference to what will later be established (see concluding chapter).

3. Cf., Zehrfeld, H. Comings Staatenkunde, 1926, pp. 35 and 101.

4. The attempt made by many historians of the eighteenth century to use the doctrine of the European balance of power for the purpose of reconciling the egoism of raison d’état with the demands of law and morality, was too superficial and pragmatic to acquire any great importance for the history of thought. Cf., regarding this, v. Caemmerer, Rankes Grosse Machte und die Geschichtschreibung des 18. Jahrhunderts in Studien und Versuche zur neueren Geschichte, Max Lenz–Festschrift, 1910, 283.

5. Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts, 1821, xix.

6. Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts, 1821, xx.

7. See: “Whatever his [Hegel’s] empiricism discerned, had to be sanctioned by his idealism. But then the soul of the State ―raison d’état and the seed of Machiavelli’s doctrine―had to be sanctioned also. And so something quite new and extraordinary occurred: Machiavellism came to form an integral part in the complex of an idealist view of the universe, a view which at the same time embraced and confirmed all moral values―whereas in former times Machiavellism had only been able to exist alongside the moral cosmos that had been built up. What happened now was almost like the legitimization of a bastard. Thus, in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Machiavelli began to be received with honour once again.”

Friedrich Meinecke, according to his impure (corrupt) Hegelianism, discovers that “Machiavellism came to form an integral part in the complex of an idealist view of the universe, a view which at the same time embraced and confirmed all moral values.” Alas, the world historical significance of this discovery is hidden from the eyes of Meinecke and his followers in the Weimar Republic, precisely because of their modern European political and economic irrationalism:

“‘All actions, including world–historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, they are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed though it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object.’

All actions, says the Pure Hegel, including world historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, namely, while the consciousness of civilizations is absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed and it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object.

All actions, says the Pure Hegel, including world historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, namely, while the consciousness of civilizations is not absorbed in their mundane interests, they are not all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed and it is not concealed from them and is their aim and object.

World historical individuals and actions, therefore, are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind, and some of them are therefore directly at one with that deed, and it is not therefore concealed from some of them, and it is their aim and object. Wherefore? The historical development of the principle of Western civilization blossoms into the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind, and some of them are directly at one with that deed, and it is not concealed from them as their aim and object,―as the historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history.”
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Stronghold of Hegel: Modern Enemies of Plato and Hegel, (2013–2014), GOOGLE+ 2017. [Editor]

8. I also recollect with gratitude the investigation by Heller: Hegel und der nationale Machtstaatsgedanke in Deutschland, 1921, but I can only partly endorse it.

9. See: “[Schelling and Hegel] both protested against the political and ecclesiastical inertia of their native state, and adopted the doctrines of freedom and reason. The story which tells how the two went out one morning to dance round a tree of liberty in a meadow is an anachronism, though in keeping with their opinions ... On the 14th of October 1806 Napoleon was at Jena. Hegel, like Goethe, felt no patriotic shudder at the national disaster, and in Prussia he saw only a corrupt and conceited bureaucracy. Writing to his friend Friedrich Philipp Immanuel Niethammer (1766–1848) on the day before the battle, he speaks with admiration of the ‘world–soul,’ the emperor, and with satisfaction of the probable overthrow of the Prussians. The scholar’s wish was to see the clouds of war pass away, and leave thinkers to their peaceful work. His manuscripts were his main care; and doubtful of the safety of his last despatch to Bamberg, and disturbed by the French soldiers in his lodgings, he hurried off, with the last pages of the Phänomenologie, to take refuge in the pro–rector’s house. Hegel’s fortunes were now at the lowest ebb. Without means, and obliged to borrow from Niethammer, he had no further hopes from the impoverished university. He had already tried to get away from Jena. In 1805, when several lecturers left in consequence of diminished classes, he had written to Johann Heinrich Voss (1751–1826), suggesting that his philosophy might find more congenial soil in Heidelberg; but the application bore no fruit.”
William Wallace, “Hegel,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th edition, vol. 13, New York, Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 1911, 200–207, 200–202.

See also: “The rationalistic revolt begins with the French philosophers of the Revolution, passes on, somewhat softened, to the philosophical radicals in England.”
Bertrand Arthur William Russell, History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1947, 728–773, 728.

See also: “Since Rousseau and Kant, there have been two schools of liberalism, which may be distinguished as the hard–headed and the soft–hearted. The hard–headed developed, through Bentham, Ricardo, and Marx, by logical stages into Stalin; the soft–hearted, by other logical stages, through Fichte, Byron, Carlyle, and Nietzsche, into Hitler.”
Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, London, 1947, 667.

See also: “[Hegel] was great, on the one hand by his metaphysical results, on the other by his logical method; on the one hand as the crown of dogmatic philosophy, on the other as the founder of the dialectic, with its then revolutionary doctrine of historical development. Both these aspects of Hegel’s work revolutionised thought ... the practical tendency of his metaphysics was, and is, to glorify existing institutions, to see in Church and State the objective embodiment of the Absolute Idea, his dialectic method tended to exhibit no proposition as unqualified truth, no state of things as final perfection ... The validity of this view we need not here examine; it is sufficient to point out that Hegel, in his ‘Philosophy of History,’ endeavoured to exhibit the actual course of the world as following the same necessary chain of development which, as it exists in thought, forms the subject of his logic … the development of the world therefore proceeds by action and reaction, or, in technical language, by thesis and antithesis, and these become reconciled in a higher unity, the synthesis of both ... we might live to see another French Revolution, perhaps even more glorious than the first, leaving Social Democracy to try one of the greatest and most crucial experiments in political history.”
Bertrand Russell, German Social Democracy: Six Lectures, London/New York, 1896, 2–162.

See also: “The identification of the real and the rational leads unavoidably to some of the complacency inseparable from the belief that ‘whatever is, is right’... All these quotations are from the introduction to The Philosophy of History ... [Hegel’s] is a very superfine brand of freedom. It does not mean that you will be able to keep out of a concentration camp. It does not imply democracy, or a free press, or any of the usual Liberal watchwords, which Hegel rejects with contempt ... I doubt whether, in Hegel’s opinion, a man could be a ‘hero’ without being a military conqueror. Hegel’s emphasis on nations, together with his peculiar conception of ‘freedom,’ explains his glorification of the State― a very important aspect of his political philosophy, to which we must now turn our attention. His philosophy of the State is developed both in his Philosophy of History and in his Philosophy of Law ... Hegel’s doctrine of the State ― [is] a doctrine which, if accepted, justifies every internal tyranny and every external aggression that can possibly be imagined. The strength of his bias appears in the fact that his theory is largely inconsistent with his own metaphysic, and that the inconsistencies are all such as tend to the justification of cruelty and international brigandage. A man may be pardoned if logic compels him regretfully to reach conclusions which he deplores, but not for departing from logic in order to be free to advocate crimes ... Hegel thought that, if enough was known about a thing to distinguish it from all other things, then all its properties could be inferred by logic. This was a mistake, and from this mistake arose the whole imposing edifice of his system.”
Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, London, 1947, 758–763–764–766–768–772.

See also: “No logical absurdity results from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere fancy … Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true.”
Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, London, 1912, 34–249.

See finally: “The United States … imposes intolerable regimes on Asian, Latin American, and Middle East countries, and economically exploits the great majority of mankind who live at below–subsistence level to support American profit … The American government pursues a policy of genocide.”
Bertrand Russell (1963) in Harvey Arthur DeWeerd, Lord Russell’s War Crimes Tribunal, Santa Monica, 1967, 4. [Editor]

10. Hegels theolo. Jugendschriften; edited by Nohl, 224.

11. We are quoting here according to the edition arranged by Heller in Reclams Bibliothek.

12. Ibidem, 25.

13. Ibidem, 27.

14. Ibidem, 12.

15. We are following here the profound work by Rosenzweig: Hegel und der Staat, 2 vols., 1920.

16. Heller, loc. cit., 61.

17. No reference available in the text for the citation. [Editor]

18. Ibidem.

19. Ibidem.

20. Ibidem.

21. Ibidem.

22. 110 ff.

23. 118 ff.

24. No reference available in the text for the citation. [Editor]

25. 129 ff.

26. No reference available in the text for the citation. [Editor]

27. Ibidem.

28. Ibidem.

29. Ibidem.

30. Ibidem.

31. Ibidem.

32. Ibidem.

33. Hegel and Eduard Gans, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, edited by Georg Lasson, 1, 94.

See: “In general, the student notes written during or after Hegel’s classes should be used with caution … According to Leopold von Henning’s preface (pp. vi–vii) in his edition (1839) of the Encyclopädie of 1830, the editors of the Encyclopedia sometimes changed or completed the sentences in which the students had rendered Hegel’s classes.”
Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy, Dordrecht, 2001, 27–29.

See: Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., “Vorwort des Herausgebers,” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse―Die Logik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Erste Auflage, Sechster (6) Band, Berlin, 1840, v–viii.

See also: Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., “Vorwort des Herausgebers,” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse―Die Logik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Zweite Auflage, Sechster (6) Band, Berlin, 1843, v–viii.

See also: “The transcripts known today for all the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies … It may indeed be disconcerting that only today do we doubt ― and not everyone does ― that Hegel’s lectures … are actually reproduced authentically in the published [Berlin] edition … that did not become full–blown for more than a hundred and fifty years. We can hardly examine here all the reasons for this circumstance.”
Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, “Introduction: The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Robert F. Brown, editor and translator, Oxford, 2014, 32–46.

See finally: “Modern irrationalism, in order to validate pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, squares the Lecture Notes and the great works published by Hegel in his lifetime. Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism thus squares both Kant and Hegel in order to prove the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of Absolute Idealism is flawed. Irrationalism thus perverts the history of philosophy and modern Europe ... Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism is therefore the political and economic mask of modern European Raison d’État. One drawback will never be remedied in Hegel philology: The Lecture Notes are not authoritative and are therefore useless in the exact determination of the ultimate worth of genuine Hegelianism ... In the 20th century upwards of 500 million human beings were slaughtered in the contagion of modern political and economic satanism, more than in all the periods of history combined: Many hundreds of millions more were utterly ruined and destroyed by the most barbaric slavery ever recorded in the world. This is the ultimate verdict of exact historiography and universal history. From whence comes the disease of modern unreason?
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Americanism: The New Hegelian Orthodoxy, Third Edition, Archive.org, 2016, 6–9.

34. Cf., chiefly Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, 1922; also my review “Ernst Troeltsch und das Problem des Historismus” in the Deutsche Nation, March 1923.

35. No reference available in the text for the citation. [Editor]

36. Ibidem.

37. Ibidem.

38. Ibidem.

39. Cf., Günther Holstein, Die Staatsphilosophie Schleiermachers, 1922.

40. No reference available in the text for the citation. [Editor]

41. Hegel and Eduard Gans, Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, edited by Lasson, 1, 90.

42. No reference available in the text for the citation. [Editor]

43. Loc. cit., 90 ff.

44. No reference available in the text for the citation. [Editor]

45. Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts, §340.

46. Hegel and Eduard Gans, Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, edited by Lasson, 700 ff.

47. Loc. cit., 863 ff.

48. No reference available in the text for the citation. [Editor]

49. Ibidem.

50. Loc. cit., 918 ff.

51. No reference available in the text for the citation. [Editor]

52. Ibidem.

53. Ibidem.

54. Ibidem.

55. Heller, loc. cit., 130.

56. Georg Lasson in the Introduction to Hegel and Eduard Gans: Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, p. 79.

57. Hegel and Eduard Gans, Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, edited by Lasson, p. 628; cf., also p. 871. The fact that culture serves the State is fully reconcilable with the Hegelian dialectic, indeed it is necessarily connected with it. In the Rechtsphilosophie, page 11 of the Preface, it says that “philosophy is principally or solely in the service of the State”―and moreover that without the State culture itself would not be possible. Cf., Giese, Hegels Staatsidee und die Idee der Staatserziehung, Berlin Dissertation, 1923, 134 ff: “For Hegel, art and science are not differentiated from the State; they are actually forces of the intellectual essence of the State, indeed in a certain way they are actually the State itself.”
[And the genuine Hegelian distinction between philosophy and philosophical science?―Editor]

58. Loc. cit., 160.

59. Even Dilthey (Ges. Schriften, 4, 249) looks upon “the return of the spirit to its absolute inwardness” as the “final element” in Hegel.

60. No reference available in the text for the citation. [Editor]

61. Hegel and Eduard Gans, Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, 578.

62. No reference available in the text for the citation. [Editor]

63. Hegel and Eduard Gans, Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, edited by Georg Lasson, 55.

64. No reference available in the text for the citation. [Editor]

65. Meinecke understands in impure (corrupt) Hegelian fashion the historical connexion between Hegel and Napoléon:

“At the summit of his philosophy, Hegel now conceived of the State in general as an ‘individual totality,’ which developed in a quite concrete manner in accordance with its own special and peculiar vital laws, and which was thereby both permitted and obliged to set aside ruthlessly even the universal moral commands. By doing so, it did not (as his words show) behave immorally, but rather according to the spirit of a higher morality which was superior to the universal and customary morality ... ‘The morality of the State is not the moral’ [Hegel and Eduard Gans, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, edited by Georg Lasson, 1, 94] ... ‘It is solely through the State that Man has any value, or any spiritual and intellectual reality’ [Hegel and Eduard Gans, Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, edited by Lasson, 1, 90] ... Hegel was also, as one knows, very strongly under the influence of Napoléon, and rejected any moralizing in the face of the great conqueror–personalities of world history. Thereby he certainly paved the way for a freer and more open–minded interpretation of the personalities of world history, but also for a laxer treatment of the problem of political ethics. He did not take the trouble to limit in any way the completeness of the grandiose powers which he granted to the interest–policy of States in their dealings with one another―apart of course from those reservations he made against the uncleanliness of Machiavelli’s methods, which he stated were only permissible in Machiavelli’s contemporary historical situation, and were not to be considered permanent and universally applicable. This only offered a flimsy kind of barrier against the excesses of a modern Machiavellism, which in the future would also be capable of justifying itself with some new and special contemporary situation, when it made use of its new and frightful methods which were basically perhaps just as immoral.” (361–361–365–369)

“Meinecke also publicly supported the Third Reich, especially its antisemitic laws, although he became unpopular with the Nazis in 1935.”
William E. Conklin, Hegel’s Laws, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 2008, 356.

Friedrich Meinecke, the anti–Semitic German neo–Kantian historiaster, in his Machiavellism (1924), launches his great sophistical attack against Hegel, albeit in impure (corrupt) Hegelian fashion: “Hegel was also, as one knows, very strongly under the influence of Napoléon ... [Hegel] certainly paved the way for a freer and more open–minded interpretation of the personalities of world history, but also for a laxer treatment of the problem of political ethics.”

Meinecke’s political and economic conception of Kant and Hegel (based upon the brand of impure Hegelianism of his time), and therefore the historical distinction he draws between Hegel and Napoléon, is unfolded within the conceptual rationality of the notion of universal freedom as a stage of 20th century world history, in the collapse of European modernity and the rise of Globalism:

“In our history of the idea of raison d’état, Machiavelli, Frederick the Great and Hegel stand out as the three most prominent figures … on glancing at Kant, at Fichte’s earlier doctrines and at the Freiherr vom Stein’s ideal of the State, one sees that the really permanent German ideas on the subject of the State had remained thoroughly un–Machiavellian.” (366–393)

By making Hegel into a Machiavellian, and Kant into an anti–Machiavellian, Friedrich Meinecke promoted a sophistical (outdated) historical distinction between democracy and autocracy founded on popular consent (Bonapartism), and thereby furthered the contagion of modern European unreason, albeit in the guise of rational political and economic order: Meinecke’s sophistical conception of modern democracy therefore assisted Hitler and Nazidom by corrupting the rational political and economic foundations of the Weimar Republic and German democracy, established by Woodrow Wilson and American Idealism.

In his later writings, Meinecke will seek to philosophically exonerate himself and the Vernunftsrepublikaners (Heinrich Brüning and company) from the part their political and economic irrationalism in the 1920s and 1930s played in the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Adolf Hitler. [Editor]

See: “[Heinrich Brüning] found Meinecke’s lectures more stimulating and soon won permission to enter his seminar on Prussian history. Meinecke taught his Strasbourg students that Frederick the Great had developed Prussia into a Great Power by championing religious toleration and the impartial administration of the laws, but that his state could make no further progress because of its reliance on blind obedience. Baron Karl vom Stein [Heinrich Friedrich Karl Reichsfreiherr vom und zum Stein, 1757–1831], who became chancellor in 1807 after Prussia’s catastrophic defeat by Napoléon, was the greatest of Prussian statesmen because he understood that further development required active participation in government by the citizens. To educate the citizenry in the virtues of patriotism, self–discipline, and service to the community, Stein [and the Monarchy] abolished serfdom, created municipal self–government, and opened military careers to talent. He laid the foundation for Prussia’s resurrection by ‘reuniting state, nation, and individual’ in the spirit of Rousseau and the French Revolution, but with greater realism and ‘a more highly developed ethical sense.’ Meinecke praised Stein in particular for understanding that Prussia’s mission did not end with its own borders, that it must teach all of Germany to create a healthy [Kantian] political community, and this was the lesson that Brüning always remembered most vividly. Meinecke acknowledged that Stein had suffered painful defeats by reactionary aristocrats but argued that his work had been vindicated by Prussia’s triumphs in the Wars of Liberation, which revealed a glowing new patriotism in the younger generation. Bismarck and the Reichstag had recently avenged many of Stein’s defeats, Meinecke suggested, and healthy progress was being made toward parliamentary democracy. To understand Brüning’s statements later in life praising Bismarck’s constitution, it is important to note that Meinecke taught his students to adopt a remarkably optimistic view of it. Brüning later echoed Meinecke, for example, when he asserted that the Imperial Reichstag would have gained the same influence as the British House of Commons if only the kaiser had been persuaded before 1918 to recruit his cabinet ministers from its ranks.”
William L. Patch, Jr., Heinrich Brüning and the Dissolution of the Weimar Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 17.

On glancing at Kant, one sees that the really permanent German ideas on the subject of the State had remained thoroughly un–Machiavellian: Frederick the Great had developed Prussia into a Great Power by championing religious toleration and the impartial administration of the laws, but his state could make no further progress because of its reliance on blind obedience. Baron Karl vom Stein, who became chancellor in 1807 after Prussia’s catastrophic defeat by Napoléon, was the greatest of Prussian statesmen because he understood that further development required active participation in government by the citizens. To educate the citizenry in the virtues of patriotism, self–discipline, and service to the community, Stein (and the Royalists) abolished serfdom, created municipal self–government, and opened military careers to talent. Stein, laid the foundation for Prussia’s resurrection by “reuniting state, nation, and individual” in the spirit of Rousseau and the French Revolution, but with greater realism and “a more highly developed ethical sense.” Prussia’s mission did not end with its own borders, that it must teach all of Germany to create a healthy (Kantian) political community. Baron vom Stein had suffered painful defeats by reactionary aristocrats but his work had been vindicated by Prussia’s triumphs in the Wars of Liberation, which revealed a glowing new patriotism in the younger generation. Indeed, Bismarck and the Reichstag had recently avenged many of Baron vom Stein’s defeats, and healthy progress was being made toward parliamentary democracy.

See also: Heinrich Brüning, Zwei Jahre am Steuer des Reichs: Reden aus Brünings Kanzlerzeit, Josef Hofmann, Hrsg., Köln, Kölner Görreshaus, 1932.

Heinrich Brüning, Reden und Aufsätze eines deutschen Stattsmanns, Wilhelm Vernekohl, Hrsg., unter mitwirkung von Rudolf Morsey, Münster, 1968.

Heinrich Brüning, Memoiren: 1918–1934, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags–Anstalt DVA, 1970.

Heinrich Brüning, Briefe und Gespräche: 1934–1945, Claire Nix, Hrsg., Stuttgart, DVA, 1970.

Heinrich Brüning, Briefe: 1946–1960, Claire Nix, Hrsg., Stuttgart, DVA, 1974.

See: Wilhelm Vernekohl, Hrsg., Heinrich Brüning: Ein deutscher Staatsmann im Urteil der Zeit: Reden und Aufsätze, Münster, Verlag Regensberg, 1961.

See finally: "Machiavelli professed republicanism in other writings ... [Machiavelli] served the republican government of Florence, his native city, for fourteen years ... probably he was a republican in principle, but, in the actual situation of Italy at that time, Machiavelli, an ardent Italian patriot, built all his hopes upon a tyrant."
Dagobert David Runes, editor, "Niccolo Machiavelli: Promises and Princes," Treasury of Philosophy, Vergilius Ferm, Kurt Friedrich Leidecker and John White, editors, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), 762-765, 762.

HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY: ORIGINALAUSGABE 1807–1821 (ERSTE AUSGABE) 6 VOLS

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, System der Wissenschaft: Phänomenologie des Geistes, Erster Theil, (Bamberg und Wurzburg: Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 1807).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, (Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1812).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik―Die Lehre vom Wesen, Erster Band, Zweites Buch, (Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1813).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik: Die subjektive Logik―oder Lehre vom Begriff, Zweiter Band, (Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1816).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen, (Heidelberg: August Osswald’s Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1817).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, zum Gebrauch fur seine Vorlesungen, (Berlin: Nicolaischen Buchhandlung, 1821).

HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY: ORIGINALAUSGABE 1827–1832 (ZWEITE & DRITTE AUSGABE) 3 VOLS

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen, Zweite Ausgabe, (Heidelberg: Druck und Verlag von August Osswald, 1827). [1817]

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen, Dritte Ausgabe, (Heidelberg: Verwaltung des Oswald’schen Verlags (C.F. Winter), 1830). [1817 & 1827]

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, Zweite Ausgabe, (Stuttgart und Tübingen: J.F. Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, 1832). [1812]

HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY: 1832–1845 BERLIN WERKE (ERSTE AUFLAGE) 17 VOLS

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Philosophische Abhandlungen: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Auflage, Erster (1) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1832).¹

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Auflage, Zweiter (2) Band, Johann Schulze, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1832).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik―Die objektive Logik―Die Lehre vom Seyn: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Erste Abtheilung, Erste Auflage, Dritter (3) Band, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1833).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik―Die objektive Logik―Die Lehre vom Wesen: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Zweite Abtheilung, Erste Auflage, Vierter (4) Band, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1834).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik―Die subjektive Logik―Die Lehre vom Begriff: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Zweiter Theil, Erste Auflage, Fünfter (5) Band, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1834).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse―Die Logik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Erste Auflage, Sechster (6) Band, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1840).²

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse―Vorlesungen über die Naturphilosophie: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Zweiter Theil, Erste Auflage, Siebenter (7) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1842).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse―Die Philosophie des Geistes: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Dritter Theil, Erste Auflage, Siebenter (7) Band, Ludwig Boumann, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1845).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Auflage, Achter (8) Band, Eduard Gans, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1833).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Auflage, Neunter (9) Band, Eduard Gans, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1837).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Theil, Erste Abtheilung, (Erster Band), Erste Auflage, Zehnter (10) Band, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1835).³

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Zweiter Theil, Zweite Abtheilung, (Zweiter Band), Erste Auflage, Zehnter (10) Band, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1838).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Dritter Theil, Dritte Abtheilung, (Dritter Band), Erste Auflage, Zehnter (10) Band, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1838).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Erster Band), Erste Auflage, Elfter (11) Band, Philipp Konrad Marheinecke, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1832).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, nebst einer Schrift uber die Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Zweiter Band), Erste Auflage, Zwolfter (12) Band, Philipp Konrad Marheinecke, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1832).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Erster Band), Erste Auflage, Driezehnter (13) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1833).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Zweiter Band), Erste Auflage, Vierzehnter (14) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1833).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Dritter Band), Erste Auflage, Fünfzehnter (15) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1836).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vermischte Schriften: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Erster Band), Erste Auflage, Sechzehnter (16) Band, Friedrich Förster & Ludwig Boumann, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1834).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vermischte Schriften: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Zweiter Band), Erste Auflage, Siebenzehnter (17) Band, Friedrich Förster & Ludwig Boumann, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1835).

HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY: VORLESUNGEN AUSGEWÄHLTE NACHSCHRIFTEN UND MANUSKRIPTE (1983–2007) 17 VOLS

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (1): Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft Heidelberg 1817–1818, Mit Nachträgen aus der Vorlesung 1818–1819,  ―Nachgeschrieben von Peter Wannenmann, Claudia Becker, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Kurt Rainer Meist, Friedrich Hogemann, Hans Josef Schneider, Walter Jaeschke, Christoph Jamme & Hans Christian Lucas, Herausgegeben, Mit einer Einleitung von Otto Pöggeler, Band 1, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (2): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst, Berlin 1823,―Nachgeschrieben von Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Hrsg., Band 2, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (3): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, Einleitung, Der Begriff der Religion, Walter Jaeschke, Hrsg., Band 3, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (4): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 2, Die bestimmte Religion, in zwei Bänden: Textband (a), Anhang (b), Mit einem Begriffs– Realien– und Personenverzeichnis zum Gesamtwerk, Walter Jaeschke, Hrsg., Band 4, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (5): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, Die vollendete Religion, Walter Jaeschke, Hrsg., Band 5, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1984).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (6): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 1, Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie, Orientalische Philosophie, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 6, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (7): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 2, Griechische Philosophie, I, Thales bis Kyniker, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 7, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1989).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (8): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 3, Griechische Philosophie, II, Plato bis Proklos, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 8, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (9): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 4, Philosophie des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 9, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (10): Vorlesungen über die Logik, Berlin 1831,―Nachgeschrieben von Karl Hegel, Udo Rameil, Hrsg., Herausgegeben unter Mitarbeit von Hans–Christian Lucas, Band 10, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (11): Vorlesungen über Logik und Metaphysik, Heidelberg 1817,―Mitgeschrieben von Franz Anton Good, Karen Gloy, Hrsg., Band 11, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1992).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (12): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Berlin 1822–1823,―Nachschriften von Karl Gustav Julius von Griesheim, Heinrich Gustav Hotho & Friedrich Carl Hermann Victor von Kehler, Karl Brehmer, Karl–Heinz Ilting & Hoo Nam Seelmann, Herausgegeben, Band 12, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (13): Vorlesung über die Philosophie des Geistes, Berlin 1827–1828,―Nachgeschrieben von Johann Eduard Erdmann & Ferdinand Walter, Franz Hespe & Burkhard Tuschling, Herausgegeben, Band 13, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (14): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Rechts, Berlin 1819–1820,―Nachgeschrieben von Johann Rudolf Ringier, Emil Angehrn, Martin Bondeli & Hoo Nam Seelmann, Herausgegeben, Band 14, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (15): Vorlesungen über philosophische Enzyklopädie,
Nürnberg 1812–1813,―Nachschriften von Christian Samuel Meinel & Julius Friedrich Heinrich Abegg, Udo Rameil, Hrsg., Band 15, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (16): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur, Berlin 1819–1820,―Nachgeschrieben von Johann Rudolf Ringier, Martin Bondeli & Hoo Nam Seelmann, Herausgegeben, Band 16, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (17): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur, Berlin 1825–1826,―Nachgeschrieben von Heinrich Wilhelm Dove, Karol Bal, Gilles Marmasse, Thomas Posch & Klaus Vieweg, Herausgegeben, Band 17, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2007).

G.W.F. HEGEL: SELECT PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE) BIBLIOGRAPHY 1821–2013

1. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch für seine Vorlesungen, [=Originalausgabe] (Berlin: Nicolaische Buchhandlung, 1821).

2. Eduard Gans, Herausgegeber, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, Hrsg., von Eduard Gans, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Werke, Vollstandige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten, Band 8], (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1833). [Zweite Auflage, Berlin 1840; Dritte Auflage, Berlin 1854]

3. Gerardus Johannes Petrus Josephus Bolland, Herausgegeber, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts mit einer Einleitung, (Leiden: A.H. Adriani, 1902).

4. Georg Lasson, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Mit den von Eduard Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Neu hrsg., von Georg Lasson, [=Hegels sämtliche Werke, Band VI], (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1911). [Zweite Auflage, Leipzig 1921; Dritte Auflage, Leipzig 1930]

5. Alfred Baeumler, Herausgegeber, Hegels Schriften zur Gesellschaftsphilosophie: Teil I, Philosophie des Geists und Rechtsphilosophie, [=Die Herdflamme, Sammlung der gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Grundwerke aller Zeiten und Volker, Band 11], (Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1927).

6. Hermann Glockner, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschat im Grundrisse, Mit einem Vorwort von Eduard Gans, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Jubiläumsausgabe in zwanzig Bänden, Auf Grund des von Ludwig Boumann, Friedrich Förster, Eduard Gans, Karl Hegel, Leopold von Henning, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Philipp Marheineke, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Karl Rosenkranz und Johannes Karl Hartwig Schultze besorgten Originaldruckes im Faksimileverfahren, Siebenter Band], (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Fromann, 1928).

7. Johannes Hoffmeister, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Randbemerkungen in seinem handexemplar der Rechtsphilosophie, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Sämtliche Werke, Neu kritische Ausgabe, Band XII], (Hamburg: Verlag Felix Meiner, 1955).

8. Karl Löwith & Manfred Riedel, Herausgegeben, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Studienausgabe in 3 Bänden, Ausgewählt und eingeleitet von Karl Löwith und Manfred Riedel, Band 2] (Frankfurt und Hamburg: Fischer Verlag, 1968).

9. Berhard Lakebrink, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, mit einer Einleitung hrsg., von Berhard Lakebrink, (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1970).

10. Eva Moldenhauer & Karl Markus Michel, Herausgegeben, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Notizen und den mündlichen Zusätzen, [=G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Band 7], (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970).

11. Helmut Reichelt, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Notizen in seinem Handexemplar und den Mündlichen Zusätzen, (Frankfurt–Berlin–Wien: Ullstein, 1972).

12. Karl–Heinz Ilting, Herausgegeber, Die “Rechtsphilosophie” von 1820 mit Hegels Vorlesungnotizen 1821–1825, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen uber Rechtsphilosophie, 1818–1831: Edition und Kommentar in sechs Banden von Karl–Heinz Ilting, Zweiter Band], (Stuttgard–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann–Holzboog, 1974).

13. Hermann Klenner, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, nach der Ausgabe von Eduard Gans herausgegeben und mit einer Einleitung versehen von Hermann Klenner, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1981).

14. Klaus Grotsch, Elisabeth Weisser–Lohmann & Hermann Klenner, Herausgegeben, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Verfasser des Anhangs Hermann Klenner, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, Band 14, 1-3], (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009–2011).

15. Horst D. Brandt, Herausgegeber, Philosophische Bibliothek: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Band 638, [Auf der Grundlage der Edition des Textes in den Gesammelten Werken, Band 14], (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2013).

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NOAM CHOMSKY: PSEUDO–HEGELIANISM AND ANTI–HEGELIANISM

[3] The year 1992 poses a critical moral and cultural challenge for the more privileged sectors of the world–dominant societies. The challenge is heightened by the fact that within these societies, notably the first European colony liberated from imperial rule, popular struggle over many centuries has achieved a large measure of freedom, opening many opportunities for independent thought and committed action. How this challenge is addressed in the years to come will have fateful consequences. October 11, 1992 brings to an end the 500th year of the Old World Order, sometimes called the Colombian era of world history, or the Vasco da Gama era, depending on which adventurers bent on plunder got there first. Or ‘the 500–year Reich,’ to borrow the title of a commemorative volume that compares the methods and ideology of the Nazis with those of the European invaders who subjugated most of the world. The major theme of this Old World Order was a confrontation between the conquerors and the conquered on a global scale. It has taken various forms, and been given different names: Imperialism, neocolonialism, the North–South conflict, core versus periphery, G–7 (the 7 leading state capitalist industrial societies) and their satellites versus the rest. Or, more simply, Europe’s conquest of the world ... [4] ‘Hegel discoursed authoritatively on the same topics in his lectures on philosophy of history, brimming with confidence as we approach the final ‘phase of World–History,’ when Spirit reaches ‘its full maturity and strength’ in ‘the German world.’ Speaking from that lofty peak, he relates that native America was ‘physically and psychically powerless,’ its culture so limited that it ‘must expire as soon as Spirit approached it.’ Hence ‘the aborigines ...gradually vanished at the breath of European activity.’ ‘A mild and passionless disposition, want of spirit, and a crouching submissiveness ... are the chief characteristics of the native Americans,’ so ‘slothful’ that, under the kind ‘authority of the Friars,’ [5] ‘at midnight a bell had to remind them even of their matrimonial duties.’ They were inferior even to the Negro, ‘the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state,’ who is beyond any ‘thought of reverence and morality ―all that we call feeling’; there is ‘nothing harmonious with humanity ... in this type of character.’ ‘Among the Negroes moral sentiments are quite weak, or more strictly speaking non–existent.’ ‘Parents sell their children, and conversely children their parents, as either has the opportunity,’ and ‘The polygamy of the Negroes has frequently for its object the having many children, to be sold, every one of them, into slavery.’ Creatures at the level of ‘a mere Thing ―an object of no value,’ they treat ‘as enemies’ those who seek to abolish slavery, which has ‘been the occasion of the increase of human feeling among the Negroes,’ enabling them to become ‘participant in a higher morality and the culture connected with it’ ... [291] Hegel, Philosophy, 108–9, 81–2, 93–6; ‘the German world’ presumably takes in Northwest Europe ... [313] Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. The Philosophy of History (Dover, 1956; Lectures of 1830–31).” (3–4–5–291–313)

Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues, (Montreal/New York: Black Rose Books, 1993).

“Hegel discoursed authoritatively ... in his lectures on philosophy of history.” (4)

See: Bruni Höfer, Heinz Dieterich & Klaus Meyer, Hrsg., Das Fünfhundertjährige Reich: Emanzipation und lateinamerikanische Identität: 1492–1992, (Frankfurt am Main: Medico International Verlag, 1990).
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