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Davide Fassio - Are Epistemic Reasons Perspective-Dependent ? (2017)
Are Epistemic Reasons Perspective-Dependent? Davide Fassio From the Philosophy Symposium in
Gordes – 5 November 2016 Draft version – Please do not
cite without permission Introduction In recent years, the notion of reason has attracted
great interest in sev...

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John Skorupski : Normative Spontaneity
Normative Spontaneity John Skorupski I am very grateful to Kurt Sylvan for his insightful
and generous discussion of my book, The
Domain of Reasons (henceforth ‘DR’). [i] The main part of the book is, as
he says, a contribution to what he calls ‘the reasons...

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John Skorupski : Normative Spontaneity
Normative Spontaneity John Skorupski I am very grateful to Kurt Sylvan for his insightful
and generous discussion of my book, The
Domain of Reasons (henceforth ‘DR’). [i] The main part of the book is, as
he says, a contribution to what he calls ‘the reasons...

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Traduction de A. Voltolini, "A suitable metaphysics for fictional entities. Why one has to run syncretistically" (2015), par Kendy Chokeepermal.
[Le
texte d'Alberto Voltolini ,
Professeur de Métaphysique et de Philosophie de l'Esprit à l'Université de
Turin, est le chapitre du livre Fictional
Objects (co-édité par S. Brock & A. Everett) qui a paru chez Oxford
University Press, 2015 : le ch. 5, pp.12...

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Traduction de A. Voltolini, "A suitable metaphysics for fictional entities. Why one has to run syncretistically" (2015), par Kendy Chokeepermal.
[Le
texte d'Alberto Voltolini ,
Professeur de Métaphysique et de Philosophie de l'Esprit à l'Université de
Turin, est le chapitre du livre Fictional
Objects (co-édité par S. Brock & A. Everett) qui a paru chez Oxford
University Press, 2015 : le ch. 5, pp.12...

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Traduction de R. M. Chisholm, Thought and its objects (1986), par Bruno Langlet
La pensée et ses objets   [1] Roderick M. Chisholm Individus Avant 1905,
Brentano soutenait qu’il y a deux types d’entités – les entia realia et les entia
irrealia. Les chiens, les choses rouges, les carrés, les licornes et les
sirènes seraient des entia re...

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Traduction de R. M. Chisholm, Thought and its objects (1986), par Bruno Langlet
La pensée et ses objets   [1] Roderick M. Chisholm Individus Avant 1905,
Brentano soutenait qu’il y a deux types d’entités – les entia realia et les entia
irrealia. Les chiens, les choses rouges, les carrés, les licornes et les
sirènes seraient des entia re...
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