New post continuing from the post about Euthyphro's dilemma. +Travis Wakeman "Secondly, the locus of the good is grounded in God's necessary nature as I explained above"
In this part, I will just debate the "necessary" part. When you say "God's necessary nature", it seems to me as though you mean God couldn't be any other way. This would mean that you think that a being that created the universe must be honest, must care about people, etc, must be this way out of logically necessity. A dishonest god would be a logical impossibility according to this. I think it may have been you and somebody else that I was having this discussion with last time, but I never got a good explanation. How is a dishonest god a logical impossibility? I would like an argument for this, if this is your position, or a clarification if it is not.
If you are going to argue that a god is honest by definition, then I will simply ask what you mean by god. If you mean simply a conscious being that created the universe, then why must this being be honest with the life that arises within it? If you mean something else, then I would ask what you would call a conscious being that created the universe that didn't meet this definition of yours."So something is good insofar as it resembles God. God could no more command that lying be morally good than he could create a square circle."
Well I would argue that this has a few problems. Firstly, it isn't what you said "good" meant in your comment on the last post, unless you are arguing that "that which you ought to do" is synonymous with "that which reflects god's nature", in which case I would argue that this might be true in certain circumstances, but is not definitionally true, which it would need to be for what you have said so far to be consistent. Of course, you might disagree and say that what you ought to do is always what reflects god's nature, in which case I would like an argument for that.
Secondly though, I have already pointed out that this doesn't work as a definition. The moral argument has a premise which essentially says that some things are objectively moral. If by "moral", it means that things "reflect god's nature", then in that premise, it is assuming the conclusion that a god exists. The premise becomes "some things reflect god's nature", which would obviously mean the moral argument is begging the question."You're still conceiving of morality dualistically, and God as a contingent being"
What exactly do you mean by dualistic morality here, and how am I assuming that morality is dualistic? I don't see it as particularly relevant to anything I have said so far, although maybe I am missing something.
As for god being a contingent or necessary being, I understand that you think that God is necessary, but I would both disagree with anything being necessary, but also that god having a particular nature is necessary, even if a god was. Why couldn't there be a possible world where absolutely nothing existed? Why couldn't there be a possible world where a being exactly like your god except one that lied existed?