"Police, Paramilitaries, Nationalists and Gangsters: The Processes of State Building in Korea", Porteux 2013; thesis based on interviews with South Korean gangsters, police, and politicians on the historical development of how with the democratization of SK, state violence gets laundered through criminals and private actors to achieve various goals, in a nice demonstration of homo hypocritus.

(A somewhat similar work is "The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime", Milhaut & Haupt 2000 https://pdf.yt/d/aMnvnvsFFZtrqmUK / https://www.dropbox.com/s/mvljflqqkiv0qod/2000-milhaupt.pdf / http://libgen.org/scimag/get.php?doi=10.2307%2F1600326 )

The main problems with this thesis is that he seems to underuse his personal access to many relevant figures (Gang Leader for a Day this is not), and he seems to have a big blind spot where it comes to North Korea: given NK's constant espionage and assassination activities in SK, and its very close links to the Korea left, I refuse to believe that a thesis on organized crime & the state will really mention NK a grand total of 10 times mostly in passing (not to mention it is a one-sided portrait of the politics if you don't know why rightists would be so hostile to anything which sounds like Communism).

Excerpts:

"This dissertation seeks to understand why developed democracies with high state capacity tolerate, and in some cases cooperate with criminal organizations such as paramilitaries, mafia organizations, and vigilantes. The symbiotic relationship between these groups is surprisingly common, but it blurs the lines between legitimate and illegitimate use of violence and allows political actors to circumvent democratic checks on state authority. While previous research has linked illicit violence to weak or failing states, my study is unique in its empirical and theoretical focus on both economically and politically developed governments.

In the face of resource constraints, political actors sub-contract violence in order to extend their reach and expand their forces. Sub-contracting as a result of principally politically driven constraints however, serves two goals beyond an expansion of forces. First, it allows political actors to distance themselves from police actions deemed illiberal-and hence unpopular-by society. Second, because criminal groups are extra-legal organizations, subcontracting allows the state to avoid transparency and accountability constraints. The choice to subcontract is thus conditioned not only by the end goal, but also by social pressures regarding appropriate means to bring about preferred outcomes. Importantly, the political payoffs from subcontracting are high in states with high levels of operational capacity, as they can best manage the potential risk that criminal groups metastasize and challenge state authority directly.
Unbiased, quantifiable data on the linkage between state actors and illicit organizations are-largely by design-impossible to obtain. My primary analysis is based on a year of fieldwork in South Korea, utilizing evidence gleaned from interviews with the police, prosecutors, journalists, mafia members, and victims.

At 2pm on what seemed to be a normal day in Insadong, a historic tourist destination located in central Seoul, South Korea (henceforth, Korea), what seemed to be hundreds of police clad in riot gear suddenly appeared and quickly lined up into formation on either side of the street and in the back alley ways of the district. Ambulances were additionally positioned on opposite ends of the roughly 700 meter long road. 76 Street vendors as well were stationed next to their pushcarts, wearing red protest bands across their foreheads. Not long after the police were in position, did a group of 150 young thugs, both male and female, wearing yellow vests, start marching down the street, going from one vendor stall to the next, destroying them and beating any vendor who challenged them. Guiding the yellow clad thugs were a few intimidating men who seemed to be in their early to mid 40s, screaming their well-followed orders. The process took about one hour-the thugs having moved from one end of the street to the other and back again. The street vendors were selling their wares illegally and were labeled as public nuisances-they didn't pay taxes to the state-they didn't pay rent-and they often sold the same goods as the businesses in the area which had to pay highly to be there. The violence committed against the street vendors however, was also a criminal act, and the services of the thugs were directly and formally contracted out by the Jongno-gu 1district office. This event did not occur in pre-1987 authoritarian Korea. It occurred on May 24th, 2011 in a country which is often characterized and hailed as being a prosperous and consolidated democracy.

Over the course of a number of years living and studying in Korea, beginning first in 2004, I was able to develop a unique set of contacts with Korean actors from both the formal and informal political, economic and social sectors, which allowed such a study to take place. The fact that I am a conspicuously non-Korean from the San Francisco, Bay Area, who could speak slightly understandable Korean no doubt afforded me opportunities and certain protections that an everyday Korean might not enjoy so easily. Still, a random sample of interviewees willing to provide me information on both past and on-going illegal activities and collusion, at the risk of both legal and extra-legal punishment, was not possible. Thus, a snowball sampling technique was employed in which initial contacts were utilized to provide access and introductions to later contacts. The implementation of a snowball approach proved to be quite effective owing to the ways in which networks work in Korea. Korea's four most important networks include family ties, regional ties, school ties and military ties. Such networks tightly link a tremendously diverse range of people from various social, economic and regional backgrounds. In Korea it seemed that much of the citizens were only two degrees of separation apart from anyone else. In the US, it is highly unlikely that an elementary school teacher for instance, would be in any way connected to a gangster or a national level prosecutor or politician. In Korea, through such networks, such seemingly unlikely relationships are surprisingly common...One of those included a tie to the former Minister of Justice Kim Jung Gil who I had met and extensively interacted with during his one year visiting scholarship at the University of Michigan. Minister Kim, a member of the former President Kim, Dae-jung's regional network and powerful faction then, introduced me to other members of his network within the Ministry of Justice. Again owing to a unique characteristic of Korean culture, one that is hyper-hierarchical in nature, members of Minister Kim's network, even though Minister Kim was no longer in formal power, were obliged to assist me.
...These meetings facilitated my being introduced to the then current head of the violent crime division (of which the organized crime division is subordinate to) of the Korean National Police Agency. These connections in turn led to connections down the chain of command. Again, because of the hierarchical nature of Korean culture (although obviously not a characteristic exclusive to Korea), all connections were made in a top-down manner-I would first meet the highest-level person I could, and then request introductions to actors of the same rank or lower.
...That chance meeting at the gym led to my introduction to the local bosses in the area, of which I was invited to visit them either every week or everyday in their office. I was in fact somewhat viewed by them as a novelty, a fact which was perfectly fine by me. Most of the meetings involved drinking coffee and sitting around either talking directly to them or simply listening to their discussions. Over 70% of my interactions with such figures it should be pointed out, included my simply sitting quietly and observing who was coming in and out of the meetings, their mannerisms, and listening to their (more often than not, benign and inconsequential) conversations.
...I would mostly sit quietly and observe something, after which I would ask a question related to that observation. On that note, much of my early time with these actors was spent learning not only which questions to ask, but how, and importantly when, to ask them. For example, in a meeting which had occurred shortly after I was introduced to the boss of one group, I had mentioned that in Taiwan, it is well known that there were, and continue to be close relationships between politicians, police and gangsters, and if that was the case in Korea. 4 Their answer was emphatically no, and that it was a feature of the past in Korea. This answer however was refuted by a number of sources in other areas but if I had challenged their initial answer it would not have put me in good standing with them. A few months later however, at a gathering at a nightclub, two district-level politicians showed up and acted subservient to the boss as he harangued them, and in one instance, kicked one of them, the reason of which I gathered, was due to their prolonging a public works project of some sort. Two days later (I required a day of recovery from the previous night) I asked the boss about the previous nights instance and he stated "of course we have to have relationships with politicians, we're business people!" He was in fact quite pleased that I had seen how much "power he had." He then went on to boast about how all the politicians throughout the country were afraid of him.
...In one instance I had a meeting with the police in charge of organized crime in one station just outside of Seoul, after which I was picked up by one mid-ranked gangster who lived in the area and driven back.

Korea's long history of brutal repression under various forms of colonialism and authoritarianism affects the ways in which the police and military (and by extension, the state), are able to operate in the present context. Indeed, the ways in which Koreans view violence by specific state actors (e.g. the police or military) is conditioned by years of living under such a set of consecutively repressive regimes of not 11too distant a past. Violence by the state in turn has significant symbolic valence and its use threatens to break the carefully constructed image of Korea's new democratic era. 5 Over the course of 42 years, from the end of colonialism to the move towards direct presidential elections, Korea grew to become both a strong state while simultaneously having a powerful, contentious society. 6 In the late 1980s the once fragmented forces of students, labor, the intelligentsia, religious organizations, and importantly, the middle-class, galvanized into a single force with a common interest in the removal of authoritarian rule. What they got was political liberalization. This largely placated the middle class which de-mobilized, leaving the more radical elements to battle for reform on their own. Since that time and the time this study was conducted, the state has attempted to keep the middle class on the side-lines. Violence by specifically state actors however, threatens to awake and unite those forces. One of the observable implications of Korea's history then, is collaboration between state and non-state specialists in violence in the market for forced evictions and labor suppression. Why forced evictions and labor suppression? The answer to this is that both are related with the socio-economic well-being of the middle class. Forced evictions are first and foremost part of large redevelopment and beautification projects which not only increase the housing stock, but additionally improve other areas of infrastructure which are important in maintaining a strong, growing economy. Labor unrest in turn threatens the economic vitality of the state. State actions of violence in such projects however, act as a politicizing agent. In the instances where the state has been forced to intervene, the middle class has mobilized.

State builders have utilized a myriad of ways in which to establish their authority including the implementation of mixed strategies of buying, subjecting, or out rightly eliminating private powers. 11 It is the "buying" aspect that this which the study is interested in. The utilization of bandits, pirates, mercenaries and other specialists in violence by states and aspiring state seekers in Europe, Asia, Latin American and elsewhere is historically well documented. For instance, in Europe large-scale private armies dominated the market by force during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, hired mercenaries and other privateers then became the norm for state development during the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Such institutional practices however, were not unproblematic. Thomson (1994) for example explains that privateers generated organized piracy, mercenaries threatened to drag their governments into war, and mercantile firms were not unknown for turning their own guns on their home states. 12 Still, while European governments greatly reduced their reliance on private sources of coercion following the French Revolution, Tilly (1985) points out that the institutional practices mentioned above continued "as the occasions presented themselves." 13
Similar to the European experience, government officials beginning as early as the Tokugawa period (1603-1887) in Japan began to utilize organized 'ruffians' for maintaining order in areas where the state's reach was weakest or most ambiguous. Sineware (2008) explains that a policy of cooperation and toleration for their use of violence and other nefarious activities was maintained as long as they did not challenge the state. Such groups continued to play similar roles throughout subsequent periods of Japan's tumultuous history, including the transition to democracy. 14
Studies of violence throughout Latin America as well illuminate patterns of cooperation between state actors and private forces. Beginning in 1950s Columbia for example, Mazzei's (2009) study explains how state actors mobilized both paramilitary groups as well as private citizens into defense against leftist insurgents. Similar institutional arrangements are furthermore well documented in Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico and Peru. 15
Finally, though non-exhaustively, collusion between loyalist paramilitary groups (mainly the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the Ulster Volunteer Forces (UVF)) and the police and military forces in Northern Ireland is well accounted for-with the latter routinely having provided intelligence information (e.g. the names of confirmed or suspected Irish Republican Army (IRA) members or supporters) and other material support to the former. 16
...Examples of cooperative/symbiotic criminal-political nexuses are not difficult to find. For instance, Hill (2003), in his study on organized crime in Japan provides evidence to suggest a symbiotic relationship between the organized criminal groups and police, in which such groups were utilized to "police" their own territories in addition to numerous instances of them being deputized as semi-official suppressors of various antigovernment movements. 37 With respect to pre-revolutionary China, Booth (1999) explains that the Kuomintang government utilized various mafia-type groups in order to suppress communist uprisings such as the infamous White Terror uprising of 1927 in which thousands of people were slaughtered throughout Shanghai. 38 Similar accounts and evidence of cooperative criminal-state arrangements can be found in Bloc's (1974) influential study of mafia-state relations in Sicily in which he argues that state actors in effect harnessed mafia organizations in the suppression of banditry and other types of dissent. 39

The distinctions between mercenaries, paramilitaries and private security companies as well can be confusing. Avant (2005) explains that "The term 'mercenary' has been used to describe everything from individuals killing for hire, to troops raised by one country working for another, to private security companies (PSC's) providing military services to their own country." 24 The case of paramilitaries, militias and gangsters as well can cause confusion. In the period of early state development in Korea for example (as will be explained in detail in the following chapters), both state seekers and state actors were more than willing to collaborate with gangsters, effectively turning them into the coercive forces of 'patriots' and 'nationalists.' Furthermore, in contemporary Korea, one of the main income earning activities for mafia groups from a category of the Supreme Prosecutor's Office has designated as "Hired Thugs." Mafiosi in Korea will register their 'companies' as legal, private security firms. Such firms then engage in both legal and extra-legal protection.

The history of the Korean justice system, composed of the Judicial Branch, the Ministry of Justice and the Korean National Police, has been one in which the neutrality from successive governments, most authoritarian in nature, was virtually non-existent. Lacking legitimacy and public support through free and fair elections the military regimes under Park Chung-hee, Chun Do-hwan, and to a certain extent, Rho Tae-woo utilized the justice system in much the same manner as it had been used during the Japanese colonial period and subsequent US Military and Rhee Syngman interludes. The police and paramilitary units, backed by the court system and prosecutors, were routinely mobilized to suppress demonstrations to control or otherwise neutralize 'disloyal' citizens and political opposition alike. 55 Indeed, from the earliest phases of the republic through the 1990s the justice system was used less for public security and more for securing the dominance of political powers with the police forces having a well-earned reputation for human rights violations and other 'gangster-like' activities, all under the twin legitimizing banners of state development and preservation of a polity which was, and remains to be technically at war with its northern neighbor. With the move towards democratic elections in 1987, calls for reform of the justice system became politically more salient and costly to ignore.
...Next in line is the Prosecutor-General, also presidentially appointed, who supervises all lower-level prosecutors through the "principle of uniformity of prosecutors," which stipulates that lower-level prosecutors shall obey higher prosecutors. This principle in part has been subject to much criticism, especially in cases involving powerful politicians, high ranking bureaucrats or influential members of society, where prosecutors in charge have had to unwillingly quit their investigations due to pressure from the Supreme Prosecutor's Office or from the ruling political party. 58 In conjunction with the principle of uniformity, the prosecutors have discretionary power over whether or not to prosecute, giving them wide discretion. Because of this prosecutors have often been criticized for their reluctance or outright refusal or otherwise biased investigations of crimes related to influential people. 59 As a result of pressures in the aftermath of the 1987 transition to democracy, a number of measures have been instituted to address the issue of undue influence, including the creation of the special investigation unit, a branch within the Prosecutor's Office but not directly under the command of the Prosecutor General, and one which was established for the investigation of corruption cases involving high-ranking bureaucrats, politicians and private-sector elites. 60 This reform along with others will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.
...In addition to the regular civilian force is a combat police section that includes both military combat and auxiliary police units. The combat police system was established in 1967, made up of military conscripts, tasked with the role of combating against North Korean spies and armies. The auxiliary police system, created in 1982 is made up of volunteers of people as an alternative to traditional military service. Despite the premise upon which they were created, both units have been routinely employed for suppressions of demonstrations and other anti-government activities. Similar to the regular police, both units had a penchant for aggressive tactics, with numerous accounts of violent confrontations with Korean society. 65
...Originally established to supervise both domestic and international intelligence operations, as well as high profile criminal investigations, the KCIA quickly became the most powerful repressive and coercive force in Korean political and economic environments. 69 Numerous high profile cases including the 1973 kidnapping and near murder of Kim Dae Jung, as well as frequent detainments and subsequent torture and other human rights abuses, the KCIA rapidly gained a reputation as being the most despised and feared institution during the successive authoritarian regimes, with such actions being justified as necessary under the on-going North Korean and Communist threats. 70
The KCIA operated under secretive and vague parameters, predominately outside of any formal control and being accountable only to Park. 71 Of the KCIA, Henderson (1968) commented:
    "The CIA replaced ancient vagueness with modern secrecy and added investigation, arrest, terror, censorship, massive files, and thousands of agents, stool pigeons, and spies both at home and abroad to its council powers...In history's most sensational expansion of council formation, it broadly advised and inspected the government, did much of its planning, generated most of its legal ideas and a large section of the study on which they were based, recruited for government agencies, encouraged relations with Japan, sponsored business companies, shook down millionaires, watched over and organized students, netted over $40 million by manipulating the Korean stock market through cover brokers, and supported theaters, dance groups, an orchestra, and a great tourist center." 72
If the KCIA was at all restrained during the 1960s due to the façade of democratic rule, all restraints were lifted following Park's institution of formalized authoritarianism in 1972. 73 The KCIA would furthermore go onto play a major role in labor control and suppression as will be discussed in chapter four.

Although accounts of state-non-state cooperation in the area of policing goes back as far as the Ko-ryo Dynasty (A.D. 918-1392), the regularized practice of collaboration has its origins during the last century of the Joeson Period (1392 -1910). Similar to the tekiya, in part the predecessors to the Yakuza, itinerant peddlers in Korea, referred as 'pubosang,' banded together in close knit communities for mutual aid. 84 Peddlers were the lowest among the social classes and were looked down upon by the larger Korean society as "low-born, homeless outcasts," and were very much treated as such. Peddlers, especially itinerant peddlers, were often vulnerable to predation by higher classes. As explained by Pak (1965) "During the closing years of the Wang Dynasty in Koryo, in order to guard against the extortion of the local officials and the attacks the mountain robbers, the Peddlers who had scattered all over the country gathered in large groups and organized merchant guilds to protect their own interests under a united front." 85 In other words, demand for private protection stemmed from insufficient publically provided enforcement of the Peddler's property rights and safety.
In the nineteenth century, the peddlers formed an important relationship with the Joseon Government with the state calling upon them as semi-official tax collectors (collection of sales taxes from the markets), spies, information gathers and scouts, as well as recruiting them as auxiliary forces in times of armed conflict. Their close relationship and multiple roles made them one of the most important and powerful non-governmental organizations.
In return for their loyalty to the state, the government provided them with monopoly control of commodities and other commercial rights as supervisors of such markets. 86

the historical origins of modern day criminal, violence wielding groups is virtually indistinguishable from the history of paramilitary 'youth groups' which dominated the political and economic scene in the post-liberation period. Much of their history will be described in the following chapter, but suffice to say, such gangs did the 'dirty work' and loyally carried out the autocratic demands of their political bosses and power brokers all the while running protection and extortion rackets along the way. Moreover, connections between these groups and the society at large, were, and remain to be necessarily extensive and far reaching. For instance, following the arrest and killing of one gang leader, Ko Hui-du, General "Snake" Kim Ch'ang-yong of the a report by the US Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) wrote:
"Ko Hui-du was the Chairman of the Wonnam-dong Association, the Chairman of the Tondaemun Branch of the Civil Defense Corps, the Chairman of the Supporting Society for the Tongdaemun Police Station and the Chairman of the Judicial Protection Committee. Such were the titles he had on his name card. Jo was the representative of the stall keepings operating along the bank of the Ch'onggyech'on streamlet under the jurisdiction of the Tongdaemun Police Station. He was the virtual leader of thousands of young men. In some respects, the man who holds the control of Tongdaemun and Ch'onggyech'on can be regarded as the practical dominator of Seoul." 89
Through such extensive networks, non-state criminal groups played a tremendously influential role in the development of the state prior to the 1961 military coup d'état by Park Chung Hee. Through a number of campaigns carried out between 1961 and 1963 however, the police under Park Chung Hee arrested over 13,000 members of criminal groups. The official reason for such campaigns was to rid society from the groups blamed for social disorder. 90 The South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Report (2004) (hereinafter 'TRR') further notes on the rationale that in general such campaigns often prove successful in winning citizen approval. 91 Public support would undoubtedly be useful, if not necessary in Park's subsequent presidential bids in 1963, 67 and 71. 92 It also didn't hurt that such criminal organizations often formed the bases of Park's opposition. 93 Following the assassination of Park Chung Hee in 1979, Chun Doo Hwan came to power on the heels of the brutal suppression of the Kwangju Democracy Movement which had garnered the publics' outrage and 'spontaneous resistance.' 94 In response to such outrage, the TRR noted that"...in consolidating their power, the new military group used the dual tactic of striking terror into the hearts of the citizens, while at the same time currying public favor." 95

Despite the hardline measures outlined above, the 1970s and 80s brought about easing social controls and a society with an increasing capacity for consumption and new opportunities for both licit and illicit profits to be earned. For example, ostensibly in response to the well documented 1980 Kwangju Rebellion, referred to by Cumings (1997) as Korea's "Tiananmen nightmare," 101 Chun Do Hwan sought to placate public unrest and discontent by instituting his '3 S' (sex, sports, screen). 102 This policy included gradually removing restrictions on entertainment, censorship of lewd cinema and promotion of sports. As part of this policy was the removal of the midnight to 4 am curfew which had been in place for some 36 years. While various entertainment districts existed before this in some form or other, the removal of the curfew was key to expansion of the industry. Although it is unclear whether or not Chun's '3 S' policy benefited his regime in the way it was intended, the policy undoubtedly led to an explosion of nightlife and the entertainment industry that fed it, leading to windfall profits for organized crime groups. The entertainment industry then, as it remains to today is the number one source of income for organized crime groups. [While not all profits are obtained from illicit activities, a 2002 Korean Institute for Criminal Justice Policy (KICJP) report found that 79% of Korea's entertainment industry provided illegal sex services. Cited in Kim, J. (2007). 498]
In addition to the expansion of the entertainment industry, in 1981 the bids for the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Summer Olympics were awarded to Korea which in turn led to a massive boom to the construction, redevelopment and private security industries which organized crime groups were effectively able to infiltrate into and contract out their violent services to both state and business interests. 104
Notorious organizations which dominated the market for criminal violence within Seoul during the 1980s and 90s-considered to be the 'heyday' of organized crime, included the Shin Sangsa Pa and the three groups which once comprised the larger Honam 105 faction-the Sǒ Pang P'a, the OB Dong Chae P'a and the Yang Un Yi P'a, groups which still exist in some form or other today. 106 The leader of the Sǒ Pang P'a, Kim, Tae-chon, was made famous in part by popularizing the use of sashimi knives in violent altercations beginning in the 1970s. 107 I was able to see his legacy firsthand through the numerous stabbing and slashing scars I saw displayed proudly by many of those who participated in the study. In addition to long knives, Korean gangsters typically employ iron rods, baseball bats, axes, swords and fire extinguishers as their weapons of choice, arguably the result of some of the strictest gun controls in the developed world. [In one interesting occurrence for example, I was invited to one of the gangster's apartments (not his primary residence) in the Kangnam area of Seoul to see the final work completed on his full body tattoo. In the laundry room of his residence were two large buckets of short swords. It was explained to me that such stockpiles of weapons were often in the residences and offices of low to midlevel gangsters throughout their territory. Although violence between and amongst rival factions greatly decreased from the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and 90s, gangsters still required convenient access to such tools in case it was deemed necessary.]

3.3.1: Numbers and activities
Although estimates on the number of groups and members vary widely, according to an internal Supreme Prosecutor's study in 2006, there was an estimated 383 crime groups operating throughout Korea, with 47, 251 active numbers evenly spread out throughout the peninsula-a figure which translates into roughly 1 out of every 1000 Korean citizens in the same year. 109 According to the same prosecutor's study, the main activities and sources of income of these groups are the following, listed from highest to lowest:
1. Entertainment Industry
2. Hired Thugs
3. Illegal Speculation
4. Operation of Lewd Businesses
5. Illegal Sex Trade 111
6. Public Auction manipulation
7. Evasion of taxes
8. Narcotics production and distribution
9. Human trafficking
10. Real estate speculation
11. Others
...In addition to the operation of illegal activities organized crime groups engage in a number of legal businesses as well. A part from the usual suspects (for example operation of legal bars, karaoke establishments, restaurants, etc.) the growth of the private security industry has provided a niche market for those with specialties in coercion. Legalized in 1976 through the legislation of the Security Service Contract Act, the private security industry experienced rapid growth following the state's move in the mid 1980s towards privatization of tasks such as forced evictions-once under the purview of public sources of coercion. 112 Such groups which focus on the specific use of coercion (as opposed to those which focus primarily on site protection or escort security) are referred to as 'yongyeok-hwaesa,'literally 'service companies,' more but more widely translated as 'construction thugs.' While the companies utilized for the most part are officially registered and as such claim legal legitimacy, the tactics utilized are often criminal in nature. As recently noted by one journalist:
"In South Korea, they're known as "errand men": hired street muscle who play often-violent mercenary roles in property disputes that law enforcement agencies refuse to handle. Their ranks are filled by physically fit young men who, critics allege, lurk in the gray area of the law, using violence and fear to uphold the will of people like landlords, businessmen and even the government." 113
In addition to forced evictions, 'Yongyǒk-hoesa' are heavily involved in strike breaking and labor issues. As will be explained in chapter four, the emergence of Yongyǒk-hoesa and their expanded involvement in both forced evictions and strike breaking corresponded to South Korea's increasingly contentious society and democracy movements during the early 1980s.

Korean mafia type groups are in fact quite similar to their more famous criminal cousins in that they tend to be small in size, with their power stemming from a number of fragmented and sprawling horizontal linkages. In the case of Korean groups, this organizational formation is in particular the result of strict laws which prohibit the formation of groups and severe penalties for those that join. For instance, Article 4 of the Act on Punishment of Violence stipulates that: (a) the bosses of criminal groups shall be punished by death, imprisoned for life or ten or more years; (b) Its principle members shall be punished by imprisonment for life or seven or more years, and; (c) other members than the aforementioned shall be punished by imprisonment for a definite term of two or more years. 114
Further complicating the investigation of these groups is their ephemeral nature, with groups forming, splitting, disbanding, and coming together again as opportunities arise. As is the tradition of Korean political parties, the names of the groups frequently change which often signify leadership shifts.
...The organizational structure of individual Korean criminal groups resembles quite closely that of other criminal organizations such as the Japanese Yakuza or Russian Vory v zakone ("thieves-in-law"). At the top of each organization sits the boss, or "tumok." While there are exceptions, money in Korean criminal organizations typically flow from top to bottom-with bosses providing money making opportunities to lower ranked members. 115 The more money-making opportunities the boss has at his disposal, the more members he can recruit. The more members within his ranks, the more power he has to influence both political and economic markets in his favor. Often times the names of the true bosses themselves are unknown to even the captains and lower ranking members- and especially important-unknown to public authorities unless otherwise associated. The prosecutor's office refers to them as 'maghu-saeyǒk-ch'a,' literally translated as a "power behind the curtain." They can be considered as a sponsor of sorts and although many have risen through the socio-economic ranks through early criminal behavior, typically engage in purely legitimate businesses-though with the backing of their criminal ties. 116 Bosses and sponsors alike in turn often hold legitimate positions of influence, either as businessmen, politicians, or those within other government or nongovernmental organizations, a favorite being as leaders of various national athletic associations from which they recruit new members from. Sitting next to the boss are a number of advisers, or councilors, referred to as 'ko-mun.' Such advisers are often trusted business people, political actors or otherwise members of the private elite. While not being officially part of the organization, they can hold significant influence over the group's functioning.
The case of President Chun Doo Hwan's younger brother, Chun Kyung Hwan (referred to as "Little Chun") for instance, illustrates the complexity of locating the predominate power behind certain criminal organizations. Little Chun had graduated from the Seoul Judo School, the army adjunct school and the Commerce College of Yongnam University, eventually going on to earn an MA in physical education teaching in the US. 117 Upon returning to Korea, Little Chun worked as a bodyguard for Samsung Company and then within the palace security force during the Park Chung Hee regime. Following the power ascension of his brother, Little Chun rapidly became the man to see regarding issues such as receiving favorable tax decisions or breaks, or obtaining import licenses and government contracts. He was furthermore appointed the head of the scandal ridden rural works project 'Sae-maŭl-untong,' a program with an annual $115 million dollar budget and one which had been charged with shaking down rural citizens for 'contributions.' As part of the program, Little Chun had reportedly awarded a land reclamation contract to a company headed by Chong Yu Sop, the tumok of the Mokpo Pa. After a bloody nightclub incident in which four rival gang members were killed in Seoul, newspapers reported that it had been carried out by Chong's politically connected gang. After a list of suspects came to light it was found out that one of the leaders of the hit squad was the former body guard of Little Chun. Some of the other suspects as well had ties to Little Chung-having both graduated from the Seoul Judo School as well as attending overseas events with him as part of his entourage. 118
Below the tumok sits the underbosses, or 'pu-tumok.' The underbosses are often mistaken for being the actual boss, which is convenient for the true leader of the group. Underbosses typically direct and delegate the day-to-day operations with two or more captains under their leadership. Captains-referred to as "haengdong daechang" or "conduct leaders," as their name implies, are in charge of discipline, training, recruitment, and on the ground activities. Below each individual captain sit the soldiers which can number typically anywhere from between 10 to 30 members. Members typically are recruited from junior high or high schools, athletic organizations, or the unemployed, often starting out as errand boys. To be sure, there is a high supply of potential recruits given Korea's notoriously competitive society with few second chances for those that fail to succeed either in their academic or athletic pursuits.

Official meetings between elite bosses are referred to as 'dumok haengsa' (Boss Events). Such meetings occur frequently, typically taking place one to two times a month or more when needed. These meetings occur in various luxury hotel banquet halls for roughly two to three hours at a time. While other meetings occur at weddings, special anniversaries or similar type events, 'tumok haengsa' are devoted strictly to the syndicate's business. 119 Of the three events I attended, the first hour was devoted to handing out event invitations and engaging in other, typically non-business related pleasantries. It was explained to me that both the invitations and events were critically important to the functioning of the organization. For one, if you're provided with an invitation, you're considered part of the group. Second, according to custom, when one attends the event, the member is expected to pay an honorarium-these fees are essentially the syndicate dues. The higher amount one pays, the more respect is shown. When I asked one of the bosses how much on average he spends on such events, he explained that it was roughly the equivalent of US $4,000 to $5,000 per month. He also explained that if he did not attend the events, he would be considered outside of the syndicate-and thus in conflict with it. Less frequent high-level meetings occur with bosses in other regions.
The second halves of the meetings were devoted to settling disputes and/or organizing/coordinating activities. For instance, in one such meeting (the only one where I was allowed to stay during the second half), a member of one group had engaged in gambling and loan sharking activities in an area which was in another group's territory, and did so without prior approval. The dispute was resolved by both a formal apology from the offending member and his boss, and the paying of a significant monetary fine. In addition to the settling of disputes, the bosses discussed their plans to begin collectively assisting different districts throughout Seoul, following the example of Yakuza groups who had helped during the then recent Fukushima disaster as well as other instances. The plans included providing scholarships, rent assistance, or other financially related activities. I was informed that this plan was in part intended to better relations and thus garner support from the community, and most importantly, from the local police, and politicians. 120

The second relationship focuses on the political-business linkage. In general, similar to other political-business nexuses, businesses of all types seek to associate with politicians in order to better their interests and seek to win favor through campaign contributions and/or other actions beneficial to politicians. Politicians in turn can provide 64legal and/or extra legal support, for example, favoritism in government project bids. Many of these business themselves are, on the face of them, legally enfranchised but run by criminal elements. With respect to violent entrepreneurs, such actors are often found as previously mentioned, in the forced evictions industry. Similarly, relationship 3 depicts the tripartite political-business-criminal nexus. In general, businesses will provide money-making opportunities (both legal and illegal in nature) to criminal groups. When politicians seek out the services of violent entrepreneurs, it is done predominately indirectly, through the use of business intermediaries. For example, in times of elections, politicians will contact their business connections who in turn mobilize their criminal contacts. Activities include intimidation of voters and political competition, protection of campaign events, and the organization of grassroots campaigns. Businesses not directly run by gangsters themselves can find relationships with illicit organizations beneficial for their organizations. Businesses with such relationships can for example utilize them for protection, mediation, competition suppression and labor-related issues. In similar ways, businesses often seek relationships directly with public sources of protection. Similar to extra-legal protection provided to businesses from politicians, protection can be provided through this route as well.

It is more often than not quite difficult to explicitly see the influence. For example, two gangsters I had come into contact had committed virtually the same crime under the same circumstances-the ordered murder of an underboss, both of which had in some manner, significantly displeased one of the higher ranking members or affiliates. Both gangsters were in fact successfully prosecuted. However, one of gangsters received 5 years, while the other had received 15 years in prison. The one that received 5 years, it was stated, had the backing of his organization's powerful judicial support. Because of so many mitigating factors, it would be quite easy for the prosecutor to simply deny undue influence in his or her decision. Murder it should be noted is quite an infrequent occurrence, but it can and does happen as the occasions present themselves.

With the end of the colonial period in 1945, both Kim and Chung hired out their services to political parties and power brokers-Kim taking his group to the Rightists and Chung working for the leftist South Korean Labor Party (SKLP). As will be explained in the following section, the two would eventually clash. 127 In a similar fashion, politically oriented youth and student groups, not immune to the revolutionary atmosphere, quickly formed and became ubiquitous-tying themselves (as had Kim Duhwan and Chung Chin-yung) to power brokers and political factions which afforded them the opportunity to not only earn rents but perhaps as importantly if not more, to do so while taking an active role in shaping the direction of the peninsula. Indeed, these groups played a critical role in political socialization and the recruitment of political and military leadership-with many future leaders rising from their ranks. Such groups would then eventually form the basis of power for each political boss and factionalist grouping-to the point where a US Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) report noted that "Violence and terrorism on the part of political groups was an accepted technique for getting things done. Any political party which lacked a strong-arm youth group, fiercely loyal to the cause, to do its dirty work really could not be expected to worry any other political organization." 128 In addition to 'dirty work' in the form of violent political activities, such groups, largely dependent upon illegal funds, relied upon forced or 'voluntary contributions'-contributions which surprisingly amounted to roughly half of national revenues in 1949. Leftists initially dominated the scene which in turn led to the formation of Rightists groups with their own state seeking ambitions. 129
To be sure the Leftist-Rightist divide in the peninsula was principally the consequence of the colonial period in which the Rightists (made up of elitists with land, other forms of capital, and education) were the clear minority, having at least partially collaborated with the colonial power in order to enjoy their privileged status. 130 That the elites, the basis for the Rightists (both during and following colonialism) were the minority and suffered from legitimacy concerns-both in terms of public support and initially, coercive capability-is somewhat of an understatement. The vast majority of Koreans were naturally left- leaning (politically that is), being poor, rural, and uneducated-having 95% of employed men and 99% of employed women working as laborers as late as 1944 and as little as 11.5% living in urban settings. 131 Similar to the privileged class, the police force (staffed by and managed largely by those who had been trained by, served under, prospered and otherwise cooperated with the Japanese) was overwhelmingly viewed as illegitimate. 132 Indeed, police power had infiltrated and permeated throughout the lives of everyday Koreans during the colonial period and the utilization of brutal tactics, torture, and summary punishments, on the spot executions included, proved immeasurable to Japan's successful rule of more than 30 years. 133

In the wake of such turmoil, a number of both formal and informal protective institutions emerged-many of which were organized prior to and in preparation for the arrival of the Americans in the South. The most conspicuous was established by the politically inclusive Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI)- headed by moderate Yo Un Hyung and anchored by left leaning People's Committees. 134 The CPKI (later changing its name to the Korean People's Republic)-formed the first de-facto government in the post-colonial era and had done so with surprising success. Paramount on the to-do list was restoring order. Untrusting of the then existing police the Committee harnessed existing youth groups (and recruited more from the vast supply of the unemployed) for security purposes, with the intended policy of utilizing the Corps as the main enforcement agency and the police as adjuncts. 135 By August 25 th , 1945, (just two weeks after the day of liberation), some 2,000 youths had been organized in Seoul, with over 140 branches in areas outside the capital-exercising de-facto sovereignty over the peninsula. 136 Despite the organization's effort to obtain official recognition, US officials openly opposed the Korean People's Republic and opted instead to cooperate with the conservative and unpopular Korean Democratic Party (KDP)-a group which was led by exiled nationalists and conservatives and one which was aligned with the tainted Korean National Police (KNP). 137 Whatever order had been obtained by the CPKI was lost with the US Military's refusal of recognition-a move which in no small part exacerbated the already tense relations between the Rightists and Leftists. 138
Presumably bolstered by the presence and support of American forces, the Rightists began to mobilize and consolidate their own paramilitary youth wings in order to compete with the more numerous and better organized Leftist groups. Compete is the key word there. Up to that point there were no real state actors, rather, a plethora of state seekers all vying for supremacy. Although the Rightists had the police at their disposal, they were significantly outnumbered. The Leftists in turn, without a ready-made police force at hand, had to recruit anyone ready and willing to join. By December of 1945, the umbrella organization referred to as the General Alliance of Young Men for Korean Association of Independence (GAYMKAI), comprised of 43 linked factions was formed. This was a group which posed a direct challenge to the Leftist's own consolidated General Alliance of Joeson Youth (GAJY)-with staunch anti-communist, Rhee Syngman, and nationalist Kim Ku (leader of the Korean Provisional Government), as the president and vice president respectively. 139 By 1947, 34 young men's associations - of Leftist and Rightist political orientations - had officially registered before the Joint Commission. 140

Rightist youth bands were largely free to utilize brutal tactics against the leftists and suspected communists. For example, the gangster turned nationalist, Kim Du-Han, unleashed his youth faction on April of 1947 and captured, beat and tortured 13 leftists who had been distributing anti-Rhee Syngman literature (working on behalf of the South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) and under the direction of Chung Chin Yung). With one member eventually escaping and notifying the Seoul District Offices, officials soon arrived in order to investigate-finding two leftists dead-with Kim Du-Hwan and his followers readily admitting the murder. So great was the public outcry that the police were forced to act and arrest those deemed responsible. However, despite Kim Du-Hwan's own confession as well as the accounts of the surviving victims, the Seoul District Court found insufficient evidence for a murder conviction, and instead fined Kim Du-Hwan 200,000 yen-the equivalent of two cartons of cigarettes on the black market. 144 Although Kim was eventually re-tried by the US Military Government and handed out a death sentence in March of 1948 (commuted to life in prison), by August of 1948, after the end of the US occupation, Kim was given amnesty by the newly elected President Rhee. 145
Following the Korean War, Kim would eventually go on to serve as the Chief of the Investigation Section of the Korean Youth Corps, Rhee's personal body guard and as a member of the National Assembly in the 1960s. 146

Cases that illustrate the collaborative relationships between the Rightists paramilitary youth squads, the KNP, and the USAMGIK are numerous. This was especially so following the 1946 Fall Riots in which, initially, railway laborers (voicing opposition to the daily wage system), followed by electric, printing, postal, and those working in other industries, went on strike. Students as well as a number of government workers soon joined the protests that occurred throughout the South. In response, the Military Government (initially believing the riots to have been agitated by Leftists and Communists groups) ordered the suppression of the strike by force-in which members of the KNP and Rightist paramilitary squads worked side by side. For instance, in Yongsan Railway Station in Seoul, 3,000 armed policemen and 1,000 members of youth squads were deployed to suppress the activities of the strikers and protect right-wing union members returning to work-ultimately arresting 2,000 strikers while injuring 60 through the use of gunfire, clubs, and rocks. For example, Robinson (1960) noted that Yongsan and the surrounding areas had the appearance of a battlefield-with armed gangs of hired thugs (operating with the complicity of the KNP) roaming the streets and industrial areas with the "announced purpose of breaking up any Leftist agitation" 152 . Among the hired thugs was Kim Du-hwan's KDYA group, with rifles and hand grenades supplied by the KNP. Besides suppressing strikers, they led attacks against various Leftist organizations-such as ransacking the headquarters of the Joseon Communist Party, the executive offices of the Central People's Committee, and the Jayu Shinmun (Free News) building, while beating the staff and destroying (as well as confiscating) property and documents along the way. Moreover, 3,000 KDYA members, again supplied with weapons and other materials by the KNP and the US Army, were dispatched to locations outside of Seoul-helping to recapture and suppress further riots in areas such as Goryeong, Seognju, Waegon, Yecheon and Yeongcheon. 153
Arguably the most violent, or at least most notorious of paramilitary youth groups was the anticommunist Northwest Young Men's Association (NWYMA)-a group established officially (though with earlier roots) in November of 1946 and one which the CIC established liaison with (among other established rightist organizations) in order to capitalize on their unique comparative advantages. Indeed, the links between the US Military and the NWYMA are quite clear, with the CIC going so far as stating:
"The CIC could not perform its counterespionage mission alone, for reasons attributed in part to language hurdles and absence of professional agents. Of particular value to CIC were members of the North West Young Men's Association, NWYMA, a youth organization composed of men who had fled from North Korea. All members had had to have suffered personally at the hands of the Communists. Unfortunately this organization was heavily inclined towards brutality in its attempts to even the score with its enemies; but the members knew enough about the top North Korean Reds to make it imperative that they be utilized in counterespionage operations under strict CIC supervision." 154
...In one instance which highlights the types of activities carried out under the auspices of the Military Government, the CIC reported that:
"When WOJG Browing was in charge of the Special Squad, an informant came to him with the news that he could pick up some SKLP (South Korean Labor Party) documents if Browning was interested. The Korean was given enthusiastic approval and went on his way. A few hours later he backed up a truck to CIC offices and deposited two safes, still locked and full of documents. The Korean had rounded up an untold number of strong-arm specialists from the North West Young Men's Association and barged into the SKLP Headquarters to seize the documents. Of course, the SKLP had much to say about American police tactics, but the documents and the safes were never returned." 156

With conditions apt for rebellion, full-scale insurgency was ignited shortly following the March 1 st , 1948 announcement of unpopular separate elections in the South and subsequent rightist crackdowns on demonstrations. Violence on the part of both the Rightists and Leftists was extreme. For instance, Cumings (2010) for notes that "In Hagui village, for example, right-wing youths captured Mun, a pregnant woman aged twenty one and who faced allegations of being married to an insurgent, took her away from her house where they stabbed her severally, an act that made her lose her pregnancy in the end. She was left to die with her baby half-delivered. Other women were serially raped, often in front of villagers, and then blown up with a grenade in the vagina." 161 In one instance, four American advisers witnessed the execution of seventy-six villagers- among them five women and numerous children-by the NWYA and supervised by the police. 162 The guerrillas perpetrated their own anomic retribution through the raiding of villages and the capturing and killing (at times by hanging or beheading) of Rightist youth members, police and suspected collaborators. 163
Insurgent forces alone were estimated to be anywhere between 3,000 to 4,000 members in strength, and were more so bolstered by popular support. Government forces, at the outset ineffective, consisting of roughly 450 KNP, hundreds of Rightist youth members, and an 'understrength'of sporadically unreliable constabulary. Reinforcements from all southern provinces were quickly mobilized and sent to bolster the weak government forces-with as many as 1,700 police and 800 constabulary troops being sent. 164 As the insurrection ensued, the recruitment of mainland forces for the counterinsurgency proved in part disastrous-with the well-documented Yosu Rebellion being sparked by the violent refusal of the elements of the 6 th and 14 th Regiments to participate in the suppression campaign-a rebellion which quickly spread throughout the South. 165 By April 1949, resistance forces were curtailed and order essentially restored- with estimated causalities across the island being anywhere between 30,000 to 80,000 people-substantial by any measure but especially so when you consider the total population to have been as low as 300,000 in the late 1940s. 166

In carrying out the first and third pledges, within days following the coup the police arrested the 'highest profile' gangsters and leaders of criminal groups, 167 of which were paraded down Seoul's main avenues under military escort, wearing nametags and carrying signs stating "I am a gangster, I will accept the people's judgment." 194 Within weeks nearly 14,000 gangsters and other types of criminals were arrested. The official reasons given for the campaigns were to rid society from groups blamed of social disorder. 195 The South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Report (2004) (hereinafter 'TRR') notes in general that such anti-criminal campaigns have often proven successful in winning citizen approval. 196 Public support would undoubtedly be useful, if not necessary in Park's subsequent presidential bids in 1963, 67 and 71 given the façade of democratic

The schism between the middle-class and more radical, contentious elements of Korean society is evidenced by protests in the wake of economic decline beginning in 1989. As a result of increasing international competition (partly due to rising wage prices in the domestic market) and productivity drops, Rho's government was hit with, what Oh (1999) terms as a "double-whammy" of both economic and political crises. In 1991, students began to demonstrate yet again after a fellow student had been killed by plainclothed police officers. Roh responded quickly by sacking his Minister of the Interior who assumed responsibility, but the protests ensued, with estimates of roughly 200,000 students and works in eighty-seven cities demonstrating. The middle-class however, as reported in both domestic and international news sources, were conspicuously absent. 278 One report by the New York Times noted that "the middle classes appear fed up with unyielding attitudes of students and militant workers." 279 A number of the students, well cognizant of their need to bring in the middle class into their cause, went so far as to douse themselves with paint thinner and immolate themselves in order to shock the middle class into action. The students died, the middle class did not react. 280

Chapter 7
The Politics and Processes of Forced Evictions
6.1: Introduction
Over the course of 20 years, from roughly 1960 to 1980, Korea transformed from a largely rural, agrarian society to one that was predominantly urban and educated. Rapid growth of the metropolis's population in turn brought demand for cheap housing and redevelopment. If private security firms (more specifically, those specialized in forced evictions), otherwise termed yongyǒk-hoesa, had always taken care of forced evictions, locating the rationale for such state-non-state collaboration in this niche market would be made undeniably more difficult. There is however variance across time and space with respect to this phenomenon, with state forces initially taking point in coercive action in the early 1950s through the 1980s. The point of this discussion is to explain the changed tactics, from state to non-state sourced coercion. The case of forced evictions thus presents us with a situation in which the state is faced with the difficult task of providing public goods in the form of redevelopment, yet challenged by being punished for the means in which those goods are brought about.

Not only were shantytowns prone to various hazards, they were ascetically unpleasing and presented a challenge to the government's drive towards modernization and at the least the perception of a prosperous state. They were furthermore illegal and posed an affront to the government's ability to control social forces. From its inception in 1961, the regime under Park Chung Hee viewed unlicensed housing as a problem for social order and sought to limit if not out rightly eliminating the squatter settlements. While Seoul's City Hall, under the direction of the presidentially appointed mayor took the lead in formulating and implementing housing policies the central government played a heavy handed role, often providing resources to city projects. 283
The standard procedure for clearing shantytowns in the early 1960s was to demolish them and if need be, forcefully remove the residents to locations outside the city. In response evictees would build the same or other forms of substandard housing, or simply return to the city to rebuild. The same removal policies occurred as a result of frequent natural disasters, to which, as mentioned above, such shantytowns were particularly susceptible to. The government then attempted to rectify the problem by providing low income housing, but with over 50,000 illegal shacks throughout the city in 1964, simply demolishing the slums and building new subsidized apartments was viewed as increasingly unrealistic-especially so given that public housing was still too costly for many of the squatter residents. By July of 1969, 407 so called "Citizens' Apartments" with 16,000 units were completed which had been designated for evictees, more were to be completed throughout the year. Only the most economically successful shack dwellers were able to afford the deposit and rent. The remainder of the units was often occupied by Seoul's urban middle-class who had illegally bought the rights to the apartments. ...In May 1968, 44 city officials and police were fired for taking bribes from over 300 households so that their homes would not be targeted. 285 More common was outright physical resistance. Police and district administrators were charged with the work of carrying out the demolitions and forced evictions. Scenes of bulldozers, water cannons and tear gas utilized by police against residents, reminiscent of the civil rights era in the US South, were common. Kim Hyon-ok, the mayor of Seoul between 1966 and 1970 was known as 'Mayor Buldozer'. Thugs were intermittently utilized, especially during times in which they had difficulty handling large numbers on their own, but police were unquestionably at the forefront. 286

Still, labor issues were intrinsically linked to the issues of housing. Korea's rapid push towards development for example, relied upon, at least in the early phases, a huge supply of cheap, unskilled labor to produce the goods necessary for Park's export-oriented industrialization. This in turn spurred massive urbanization, of which a large number of migrants settled in the shantytowns described above.

While numerous redevelopment projects were carried out in the years leading up to both international sporting events, the most significant project in terms of the scope of this study (as it marked a shift towards privatization of the process) took place in Mokdong in 1983. Prior delving into this case, a brief note on the timing and political environment in which this project took place is warranted. To remind ourselves, the start of this project began only 3 years following the Kwangju Uprising. Subsequent to massive suppression of the uprising, civil society had largely gone underground. The Chun regime furthermore, through a gross miscalculation of the status quo, began to liberalize some of the draconian controls they had utilized in order to instill order. With the mega sporting events rapidly approaching, increased international scrutiny was an additional issue that Chun's regime had to consider. Thus, Chun's administration faced the challenge to prepare for the Olympics, maintain economic development, increase the housing stock for Seoul's growing middle-income strata, increase the popularity of his party, and do so all the while being cognizant of presenting a favorable international reputation.
...With the fast approaching 1986 Asian Games, a growing size of both general anti-eviction and anti-regime protests, in conjunction with increased international attention and media coverage, in March 1986, the government finally capitulated and awarded both the squatter-owner and squatter-tenants concessions and compensation. 301 The major affect of the Mok-dong project however went beyond squatter concessions in that it represented the last major project in which the government took the lead. In the place of the Public Management Redevelopment Model, which had been implemented in Mok-dong, the Joint Redevelopment Project (JRP) system was developed. Under this scheme the redevelopment process was for all intents and purpose privatized. The plan went as followings: a redevelopment co-operative, a group consisting of at least two-thirds of pro-redevelopment owners, was organized. The construction company was then selected by the co-operative. The construction company was then tasked with providing compensation to the homeowners, either through some form of monetary payment, buying or leasing rights to the new homes, or some combination thereof, as well as ensuring the vacating of the land (the last of which was in reality the duty of the home owners). Whatever profits were leftover after redevelopment was left to the companies. Non-owner tenants were not guaranteed compensation under the scheme. 302 The system proved effective. A fact finding report carried out by the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR) notes that between 1983 and the time of the Olympics, an estimated 48,000 buildings which had housed 720,000 people had been destroyed. 303 The same study cites that between 1982 and 1988, 250 sites had been designated as "redevelopment areas," and by 1989 at the time of the study, 100 had been carried out. While different studies cite slightly varying statistics, the fact that Seoul underwent a massive and violent transition during the period leading up to the Olympics is clear.
The JRP did a number of important things. First, it expanded the amount of recognized squatter-owners, which had previously been restricted which further led to breaks in solidarity between existing squatter-owners and tenants-this in turn effectively reduced in part the level of potential resistance. Second, and importantly, it removed the financial burden which had previously been placed squarely on the government. Not only was the government removed from the financial burden, they additionally stood to gain from the increased property taxes, while at the same time expanding the market for the domestic business sector which at that time had been hit hard due to reduced overseas construction in the wake of the 1970s oil crisis. 304 Third, it reduced the role of the government to one which was responsible for merely indirectly managing the process and selling parts of unutilized government properties-effectively removing city officials from directly carrying out unpopular actions such as forced removals. 305 On this last point, Kim (1998) notes that "The government could also [in addition to providing the least amount of financial support] minimize the political costs of discordance with the residents, because, with the new plan, the conflict was between the cooperative and the residents." 306 This point was further emphasized by Davis (2007) who commented that privatization of the process "paved the way for increased extralegal hiring of private eviction companies who employed thugs and criminal elements to assist with getting rid of existing residents." 307
That the hired thugs, replacing the police, became the unofficial strong arm in the government's push towards redevelopment is virtually undeniable. Where there are accounts of hundreds of tenant activists who have been detained, arrested, or otherwise harassed by government authorities, the same is not true for the construction companies or their hired specialists in violence. This fact was not lost on same ACHR report cited above which noted that because the main actors are the private home owners and construction companies, both local and central governments are afforded the ability to deny responsibility and thus, culpability. The violence surrounding Korea's redevelopment projects was furthermore noted and condemned by the UN sponsored Habitat International Coalition (HIC) which in 1991 listed Korea's housing policies second only to South Africa's township system in its physical violence and brutality. 308

What has come to be referred to widely as the "Yongsan Tragedy" (Yongsan Chamsa) in which five protestors and one police officer died, along with 23 others injured, occurred on January 20 th 2009. 312 The events on January 20 th however followed months of harassment and violent tactics by hired thugs against the recalcitrant merchanttenants who refused to vacate due to protests over low levels of compensation and vaguely defined rights. Some of these tactics and issues were explained to me by a former tenant involved with the Yongsan development project. This tenant had operated a small bar in one of the buildings which was scheduled for demolition. After refusing what she believed to be an unfair level of compensation, she stated that the thugs started showing up in her bar. They (usually about 4 of them) would arrive as soon as they opened, order one bottle of beer or soju in between them (so as not to avoid "breaking the law") and intimidate customers to the point where they would either not enter, or if they already had, promptly leave. Other tactics such as starting fires, breaking windows, blocking pathways to the business, throwing dead cats other animal carcasses in the vents (in order to create strong odors) and, sexual harassment were common place. When she went to the district office and police she was informed she needed proof, of which she then provided them with her CCTV coverage. Nothing on the matter was done.
...One journalist who works for a prominent media group with close ties to the then current ruling party under Lee Myung Bak, noted that such occurrences are so common place that only in extreme cases will the top news services cover such events. In her words "people don't want to hear about it." She further explained that the majority of Seoul citizens stand to gain from city-wide redevelopment projects and that most people view the protestors as overly militant and greedy (R1). When I asked my police contacts about this case, they informed me that even if they had wanted to do something about it, they would not have had the support of their superiors or the prosecutor's office. They explained that the reason why the Yongsan case was so highly covered was that violence between the protestor-merchants and those charged with evicting them was so great that there had to be police intervention (P1, P3, P8). Similar to other cases, the protestors rather than those involved in the forced evictions bore the force of the legal system. On June 1 st , 2010 the Seoul High Court sentenced 9 of the protestors involved to 4 to 5 years in prison on the charges of killing one police officer and injuring citizens who had been nearby. 15 Police officers however, accused of excessive force were acquitted. 313

The street vendors are, in the words of both police and business owners in the districts they occupy, a nuisance. Business owners specifically complained that they were paying high rents and taxes, while the street vendors were there illegally, not paying rent, nor taxes. Furthermore, they were often selling the same or similar goods for lower prices. Police in turn argued that they often crowd the streets and sidewalks, making for an unsafe environment (P1, P4).
Of the street vendors I was able to interview, the main argument was that vendors in this district was a long established institution in of itself-street vendors they argue, have been there since the nascent days of this district, with such stalls often passing from family member to family member. For most of the street vendors, the operation of these small businesses represents the only source of income. While they freely admit that what they are doing is illegal, they argue that it is the only way in which they can survive. And, while the district office offered to move them to designated locations, they explained that those locations were away from tourists and that those who had already moved in the previous year from different locations throughout the same district had suffered substantial financial losses. They further complained that while the Jongno-gu District office had promised to provide them with financial aid, the aid had not materialized. Because of these conditions, in one respondent's words "they were ready to fight until they received better conditions." They further explained, and this was confirmed by district sources, that they were fully prepared to start paying taxes if they were allowed to remain in the location (SV1, SV2, and SV3). The district office however remained recalcitrant.
Protests by the street vendors have been occurring frequently since the Jongno-gu district office announced their intent to remove them in 2009. Between then and May of 2011, there had been over 30 minor and major altercations, many of which involved physical violence. 316 On May 24 th and the 25 th of the same year I was able to witness two such protest and subsequent street vendor "sweeps." 317 Prior to the protest I was given a call by a member of Jongno-gu's Street Vendor Association who informed me that the district office was going to take action on that day. After hearing this, I promptly arrived to find police in riot gear, on each side of the street, and a street full of locals and tourists. Two ambulances were on standby as well, situated at the opposing entrances to the roughly 700 meter long street. The street vendors themselves, identifiable by red headbands were prepared and well organized, having locked their carts with chains so as to prevent removal. Then came the thugs, 150 of them as I was later informed, both young men and women clad in yellow vests so as to identify them. The "street sweepers" as one business owner referred to them as, started going from one street vendor stall to the next, destroying carts, taking the goods, and beating the street vendors, regardless of their age or gender, if they confronted them, which they did. The police simply looked on, with seemingly little interest. One elderly street vendor approached what appeared to be a ranking police officer, with blood streaming down her face asking him why they were not protecting them-stating that "they were citizens as well." She was ignored. On that day, two street vendors were taken to the hospital for serious injuries. The violence I directly witnessed that day and others, while tame compared to what they and others go through when myself or the public isn't watching, was disturbing. Similar actions in Insadong continued to occur on and off for months, and as of August of 2011, only 16 out of the original 76 stall operating have agreed to move to designated spots. The remaining street vendors continue to be harassed.

...Although I was unable to interview officials from the Jongno-gu District Office, the rationale for the use of private security as opposed to the police was explained to me over the course of a number of interviews with both current and retired police officials. The police, it was explained to me, were there to ensure that violence did not get out of hand, did not spill over into the shops or affect those beyond the street vendors. Although the street vendors were in fact breaking the law, the logistics of obtaining arrest warrants or handing out citations was not only overwhelming, but counter-productive in that they had in the past failed to work. The use of Yongyǒk-hoesa was in fact, more efficient and socially acceptable (P1, P4). A different officer at the same meeting explained that in the past, the police were the "kkanp'ae," (thugs) and as such their threats were much more credible then, but since democratization the same methods once utilized during the authoritarian period were no longer available to them. Seoul citizens wanted the same things now as they did in the past (development and progress), but didn't understand or accept the methods necessary to bring them about. The use of private companies allowed them to get the job done without having to deal with accusations of police brutality (P1).

In 1971 Park instituted the Yushin Constitution and with it, created the Special Law in Labor and Foreign Invested Firms which made it illegal for the overwhelming majority of union activity to occur. 327 Furthermore, in 1973 through emergency decree, Park made all work stoppages illegal. 328 Such was the legal situation until 1981, when Chun Doo-hwan, while lifting the Emergency decrees, created laws which further made unionization difficult-laws such as requiring at least 30 workers or 20 percent of the work force agreeing in order to being even allowed to apply for recognition. Additionally, the Chun regime made it illegal for any outside, third party to interfere in negotiations- thus, collective bargaining was restricted to the local union and the firm. 329 Furthermore, legally, only one union per firm was allowed. 330
Setting aside the legal system, members of management were the ones on the front lines of controlling labor. Managers oversaw the day-to-day actions, gathered information on suspect employees and had the ability to lay-off or outright fire individuals, 'educate' them or otherwise persuade those under them. Management in turn worked closely with the unions, which were furthermore utilized for controlling workers. Because there was only one union per firm allowed, companies often surreptitiously had a union formed by hand-picked representatives. If other workers sought to organize their own union, they would often be denied because one already existed. 331

lthough the state was able to effectively suppress the strikes, initial inaction by the state prompted Chung Ju Yong (of Hyundai Group) to add two additional layers of protection. First, the kusadae squads were formed as noted before. Second, Chung recruited thugs to be utilized as needed against unruly labor and strikes. Other firms would follow suit, making kusadae and hired 'security' the main coercive elements on the front lines of labor suppression. 358 One early case which exemplifies the business-state-criminal nexus involves yet again the Hyundai Group. At least one executive within Hyundai Heavy Chemicals (headed by Chung Ju Yong's son) learned about a meeting among nineteen union chiefs within several of Hyundai's companies. Having learned of this information, the executive (Han Yu Dong) contacted James Lee (a Korean-American) to act as a 'union-buster.' Lee planned the raid while Han contacted the police superintendent to inform him of Lee's planned attack, of which the superintendent agreed not to intervene. 359
Lee had amassed and trained a group of one hundred 'company' men, obtained communication equipment, iron rods and three company busses. They then proceeded to the location. After being stopped by a police road block which would not allow them to pass, a call was made to the superintendent who informed the sergeant in-charge to allow them to pass. Once reaching their destination they started to 'educate' the union men by beating them badly. Once through with the union members, they then drove to the city and broke into offices of the 'Association of Dismissed Hyundai Employees' and destroyed whatever they could find while beating five more people in the office, and dragging them outside-reportedly forcing them to chant, "Our father is Kim Il Sung." 360 Although it was intended for the raid to remain a secret, when word was leaked that a foreigner was involved in organizing the incident, the press reported the incident which prompted members of the National Assembly to go to Ulsan to investigate. 361 The investigation in turn led to the arrest of James Lee and others. Lee and Han Yu Dong both received light punishment with one year sentences, while one other received a one year and 6 month sentence. Thirty one other assailants received suspended sentences and were released. 362 Although some of the perpetrators of violence in this case were prosecuted, the vast majority of instances fail to reach the news and/or generate significant interest. The fact that James Lee was a foreigner most assuredly influenced the publicity of the case, and thus, the response by the state.

In place of tear-gas was the implementation of an ingenious tactic-referred to as the "lip-stick" line. Unarmed policewomen in their pressed uniforms with white gloves were sent to protest venues. They would stand at the front lines of the protest, effectively creating a cordoning-off barrier between the protesters and the civilian line. Ahn Pong Sul, international director of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, was cited in the same International Tribune article listed above, as stating that: "They've placed these female police officers on the front lines...of course, they are unarmed. How can we attack females?" 367

Although having started earlier, between 1882 and 1930, following the end of Reconstruction, roughly 2,800 citizens died as a result of lynching, of which almost 2,500 were African Americans and 94 percent of those having been victims of white lynch mobs. 384

On May 4th, 1961 13 Freedom Riders boarded their buses bound for the Alabama in opposition to and in demonstration of locally, though 'informally' enforced segregation. Upon hearing about the Freedom Rider's intent to break the 'color line' in Alabama, Birmingham police Sgt. Tom Cook and detective W.W. "Red" Self summoned Gary Rowe, a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) member (and unknowing to either Cook or Self, an FBI informant), to a meeting. Reportedly, Cook stated "I don't give a damn if you beat them, bomb them, murder or kill them. We don't ever want to see another nigger ride on the bus into Birmingham again." 395 A group of 60 KKK members were then chosen to attack the riders on May 14th when they arrived. The Knights would have a 15 minute 'grace period' granted by Eugene "Bull" O'Connor, the Commissioner of Public Safety. Connor specifically instructed: "By God, if you are going to do this, do it right," and further stated that the demonstrators should be beaten until they "looked like a bulldog got hold of them," stripped of their clothes and chased from the bus depot whereby the police would arrest them for indecent exposure. Furthermore, "if any Klansman overstayed their welcome and wound up in jail were guaranteed light sentences." 396

Prior to shogunate-bakuto collaboration however in the mid to late 1800s, local law enforcement and officials would cooperate with such groups in order to enlist their help not only as informants but also in harnessing them to act as quasi-bounty hunters in return for leniency or release from jail for their own crimes. Unimpeded by official boundaries, bakuto could travel freely to other jurisdictions, capture criminals and bring them back without a formal appeal to officials in the other territories, which was required if the daimyo (lord) sent his warrior retainers. 409 Constrained by such horizontal and vertical procedures then, daimyu were presumably forced to resort to non-official, private means and mechanisms in order to enforce their will while at the same time avoiding the repercussions for doing so.
In addition to the above instances of collaboration, during various struggles between the Tokugawa regime and pro-imperial forces the bakuto, with their reserves of fighting forces became important in determining many of outcomes of the battles, much as the pubosang and later criminal gangs had in early Korean history and the run up to the 1953 war, though again we can assume that this was largely under a logic of capacity. 410 During the 1920s, an economically prosperous period referred as the "Taisho" democracy era, saw the introduction of universal suffrage, an expansion of the middle class and an upsurge in labor unions. 411 This period also saw the growth of Rightists and ultranationalists which enlisted the ranks of gangsters. 412 Formed in 1919, in part of the brainchild of Takejiro Tokunami (the then minister of home affairs), the Dai Nippon Kokusui-kai (Great Japan National Essence Society) for example, an organization of more 60,000 gangsters, laborers, was extensively used as strike-breakers. Among many other instances, the Kokusui-kai force was used to violently attack 28,000 men who had walked out in the 1920 Yawata Iron Works strike. 413 When the original president of the Kokusui-kai died in 1926, the long time politician and former minister of foreign affairs, civilian governor of Taiwan and mayor of Tokyo (among other high level positions), Goto Shinpei, reportedly lobbied for the top position of the organization but was passed over for not having sufficiently anti-communist qualifications. 414 Three years later Suzuki Kisaburo, former home minister and minister of Justice assumed the president of the organization, as well as the head of the rightist Seiyuikai political party. 415 Of the criminal-political alliance, Siniawer (2012) notes that: "Ultimately, the violence of the Kokusui-kai did inspire probing questions about the organization, but the murkiness of the state-yakuza relationship helped shield the state from the brunt of criticism." 416 Seiyuikai's principle opposition, the Minseito Party, among other political powers organized their own paramilitary forces which were also staffed by gangsters. 417 Such direct political-gangster collaboration would continue throughout the end of WWII. 418 The above description of political-criminal ties through the end of World War II by no means covers the entire extent of such relationships. Indeed, following surrender in 1945 US occupying forces as well found thugs and gangsters particularly useful in going after leftists and suspected or self-acknowledge communists as had occurred during the US military occupation of Korea (1945-1948). 419"

#southkorea #organizedcrime #politics