Profile cover photo
Profile photo
advocatemmmohan Mandagaddi murali mohan
453 followers -
ADVOCATEMMMOHAN
ADVOCATEMMMOHAN

453 followers
About
advocatemmmohan's posts

Post has attachment
The Court Fee payable thereon for the relief of declaration of title with consequential relief of possession as per the Section 24(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fee and Suit Valuation Act, 1956(for short, the Act) is on 3/4th market value of the property. The market value of the property referred supra, on its face is beyond three lakhs as on the date of filing of the suit. The contention is 3/4th market value amount of Rs.2,72,250/- of which Court fee payable comes to Rs.5226/-. Undisputedly, it is the same 3/4th market value of plaintiffs share to adopt for purpose of Court fee payable and for jurisdiction to determine on pecuniary limitations that what the Full Bench of the A.P.High Court in Kalla Yadagiri Vs. Kotha Bal Reddy stated referring to civil Courts Act Section 16 and A.P.Court Fees Act Section 50; in answering value for jurisdiction how to take is not the total value or total extent but of share of the plaintiffs claim or relief i.e. the relief plaintiff claims or the benefit the plaintiff derives or the loss the plaintiff averts as the case may be and for that purpose what first determine is the Court fee and then adopt the same for jurisdiction. In Yadagiri(supra) the Full Bench placed reliance on the expression of the Apex Court in S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp.Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm.Ramanathan Chettiar that ----The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and to vice versa. No doubt the Full Bench of Honble Kerala High Court in Pamban Kayakkar Valsalan Vs. Pamban Kayakkal Koumudi laid down that even fixed Court Fees paid of Rs.200/- paid from plea of joint possession is a suit for partition, the value for purpose of jurisdiction is the market value of the share claimed by the plaintiff/s out of the plaint schedule property. Thus it is neither on entire plaint schedule property value nor even on 3/4th market value of plaintiffs share. Even in Devabhaktuni Venkatasubbamma Vs. Chadalavada Ramasheshamma -it was held that in a suit for partition not based on joint possession the Court Fees payable is on 3/4th of market value of plaintiffs share u/sec.34 of the Act, whereas for purpose of jurisdiction u/sec.50(2) of the Act, it is based on market value of the plaintiffs share. However, once the Full Bench of this Court answered the issue in Yadagiri(supra) in the year 1999 and same is following by all Courts in the two States, there is nothing to unsettle the same much less to consider any request for reference to Full Bench, though the Kerala High Court Full Bench expression in Pamber(supra) speaks, value for purpose of jurisdiction is total value of plaintiff(s) property claimed and not 3/4th value of such immovable property, but for to determine separately the value for Court Fees is either fixed or on half or 3/4th value of such property, as the case may be, for one is different to other on Court Fee value and jurisdiction value.
The Court Fee payable thereon for the relief of declaration of title with consequential relief of possession as per the Section 24(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fee and Suit Valuation Act, 1956(for short, the Act) is on 3/4th market value of the property. The market value of the property referred supra, on its face is beyond three lakhs as on the date of filing of the suit. The contention is 3/4th market value amount of Rs.2,72,250/- of which Court fee payable comes to Rs.5226/-. Undisputedly, it is the same 3/4th market value of plaintiffs share to adopt for purpose of Court fee payable and for jurisdiction to determine on pecuniary limitations that what the Full Bench of the A.P.High Court in Kalla Yadagiri Vs. Kotha Bal Reddy stated referring to civil Courts Act Section 16 and A.P.Court Fees Act Section 50; in answering value for jurisdiction how to take is not the total value or total extent but of share of the plaintiffs claim or relief i.e. the relief plaintiff claims or the benefit the plaintiff derives or the loss the plaintiff averts as the case may be and for that purpose what first determine is the Court fee and then adopt the same for jurisdiction. In Yadagiri(supra) the Full Bench placed reliance on the expression of the Apex Court in S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp.Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm.Ramanathan Chettiar that ----The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and to vice versa. No doubt the Full Bench of Honble Kerala High Court in Pamban Kayakkar Valsalan Vs. Pamban Kayakkal Koumudi laid down that even fixed Court Fees paid of Rs.200/- paid from plea of joint possession is a suit for partition, the value for purpose of jurisdiction is the market value of the share claimed by the plaintiff/s out of the plaint schedule property. Thus it is neither on entire plaint schedule property value nor even on 3/4th market value of plaintiffs share. Even in Devabhaktuni Venkatasubbamma Vs. Chadalavada Ramasheshamma -it was held that in a suit for partition not based on joint possession the Court Fees payable is on 3/4th of market value of plaintiffs share u/sec.34 of the Act, whereas for purpose of jurisdiction u/sec.50(2) of the Act, it is based on market value of the plaintiffs share. However, once the Full Bench of this Court answered the issue in Yadagiri(supra) in the year 1999 and same is following by all Courts in the two States, there is nothing to unsettle the same much less to consider any request for reference to Full Bench, though the Kerala High Court Full Bench expression in Pamber(supra) speaks, value for purpose of jurisdiction is total value of plaintiff(s) property claimed and not 3/4th value of such immovable property, but for to determine separately the value for Court Fees is either fixed or on half or 3/4th value of such property, as the case may be, for one is different to other on Court Fee value and jurisdiction value.
advocatemmmohanlaw.blogspot.in

Post has attachment
The Court Fee payable thereon for the relief of declaration of title with consequential relief of possession as per the Section 24(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fee and Suit Valuation Act, 1956(for short, the Act) is on 3/4th market value of the property. The market value of the property referred supra, on its face is beyond three lakhs as on the date of filing of the suit. The contention is 3/4th market value amount of Rs.2,72,250/- of which Court fee payable comes to Rs.5226/. Undisputedly, it is the same 3/4th market value of plaintiffs share to adopt for purpose of Court fee payable and for jurisdiction to determine on pecuniary limitations that what the Full Bench of the A.P.High Court in Kalla Yadagiri Vs. Kotha Bal Reddy stated referring to civil Courts Act Section 16 and A.P.Court Fees Act Section 50; in answering value for jurisdiction how to take is not the total value or total extent but of share of the plaintiffs claim or relief i.e. the relief plaintiff claims or the benefit the plaintiff derives or the loss the plaintiff averts as the case may be and for that purpose what first determine is the Court fee and then adopt the same for jurisdiction. In Yadagiri(supra) the Full Bench placed reliance on the expression of the Apex Court in S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp.Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm.Ramanathan Chettiar that ----The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and to vice versa. No doubt the Full Bench of Honble Kerala High Court in Pamban Kayakkar Valsalan Vs. Pamban Kayakkal Koumudi laid down that even fixed Court Fees paid of Rs.200/ paid from plea of joint possession is a suit for partition, the value for purpose of jurisdiction is the market value of the share claimed by the plaintiff/s out of the plaint schedule property. Thus it is neither on entire plaint schedule property value nor even on 3/4th market value of plaintiffs share. Even in Devabhaktuni Venkatasubbamma Vs. Chadalavada Ramasheshamma -it was held that in a suit for partition not based on joint possession the Court Fees payable is on 3/4th of market value of plaintiffs share u/sec.34 of the Act, whereas for purpose of jurisdiction u/sec.50(2) of the Act, it is based on market value of the plaintiffs share. However, once the Full Bench of this Court answered the issue in Yadagiri(supra) in the year 1999 and same is following by all Courts in the two States, there is nothing to unsettle the same much less to consider any request for reference to Full Bench, though the Kerala High Court Full Bench expression in Pamber(supra) speaks, value for purpose of jurisdiction is total value of plaintiff(s) property claimed and not 3/4th value of such immovable property, but for to determine separately the value for Court Fees is either fixed or on half or 3/4th value of such property, as the case may be, for one is different to other on Court Fee value and jurisdiction value.
HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO           CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.5306 of 2015   08-12-2015 Syed Nazinnunnisa ...Petitioner/Plaintiff Syed Azmathullah .Respondent   Counsel for the petitioner: Sri P.S.P.Suresh Counsel for respondent: None <GIST...
The Court Fee payable thereon for the relief of declaration of title with consequential relief of possession as per the Section 24(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fee and Suit Valuation Act, 1956(for short, the Act) is on 3/4th market value of the property. The market value of the property referred supra, on its face is beyond three lakhs as on the date of filing of the suit. The contention is 3/4th market value amount of Rs.2,72,250/- of which Court fee payable comes to Rs.5226/-. Undisputedly, it is the same 3/4th market value of plaintiffs share to adopt for purpose of Court fee payable and for jurisdiction to determine on pecuniary limitations that what the Full Bench of the A.P.High Court in Kalla Yadagiri Vs. Kotha Bal Reddy stated referring to civil Courts Act Section 16 and A.P.Court Fees Act Section 50; in answering value for jurisdiction how to take is not the total value or total extent but of share of the plaintiffs claim or relief i.e. the relief plaintiff claims or the benefit the plaintiff derives or the loss the plaintiff averts as the case may be and for that purpose what first determine is the Court fee and then adopt the same for jurisdiction. In Yadagiri(supra) the Full Bench placed reliance on the expression of the Apex Court in S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp.Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm.Ramanathan Chettiar that ----The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and to vice versa. No doubt the Full Bench of Honble Kerala High Court in Pamban Kayakkar Valsalan Vs. Pamban Kayakkal Koumudi laid down that even fixed Court Fees paid of Rs.200/- paid from plea of joint possession is a suit for partition, the value for purpose of jurisdiction is the market value of the share claimed by the plaintiff/s out of the plaint schedule property. Thus it is neither on entire plaint schedule property value nor even on 3/4th market value of plaintiffs share. Even in Devabhaktuni Venkatasubbamma Vs. Chadalavada Ramasheshamma -it was held that in a suit for partition not based on joint possession the Court Fees payable is on 3/4th of market value of plaintiffs share u/sec.34 of the Act, whereas for purpose of jurisdiction u/sec.50(2) of the Act, it is based on market value of the plaintiffs share. However, once the Full Bench of this Court answered the issue in Yadagiri(supra) in the year 1999 and same is following by all Courts in the two States, there is nothing to unsettle the same much less to consider any request for reference to Full Bench, though the Kerala High Court Full Bench expression in Pamber(supra) speaks, value for purpose of jurisdiction is total value of plaintiff(s) property claimed and not 3/4th value of such immovable property, but for to determine separately the value for Court Fees is either fixed or on half or 3/4th value of such property, as the case may be, for one is different to other on Court Fee value and jurisdiction value.
The Court Fee payable thereon for the relief of declaration of title with consequential relief of possession as per the Section 24(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fee and Suit Valuation Act, 1956(for short, the Act) is on 3/4th market value of the property. The market value of the property referred supra, on its face is beyond three lakhs as on the date of filing of the suit. The contention is 3/4th market value amount of Rs.2,72,250/- of which Court fee payable comes to Rs.5226/-. Undisputedly, it is the same 3/4th market value of plaintiffs share to adopt for purpose of Court fee payable and for jurisdiction to determine on pecuniary limitations that what the Full Bench of the A.P.High Court in Kalla Yadagiri Vs. Kotha Bal Reddy stated referring to civil Courts Act Section 16 and A.P.Court Fees Act Section 50; in answering value for jurisdiction how to take is not the total value or total extent but of share of the plaintiffs claim or relief i.e. the relief plaintiff claims or the benefit the plaintiff derives or the loss the plaintiff averts as the case may be and for that purpose what first determine is the Court fee and then adopt the same for jurisdiction. In Yadagiri(supra) the Full Bench placed reliance on the expression of the Apex Court in S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp.Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm.Ramanathan Chettiar that ----The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and to vice versa. No doubt the Full Bench of Honble Kerala High Court in Pamban Kayakkar Valsalan Vs. Pamban Kayakkal Koumudi laid down that even fixed Court Fees paid of Rs.200/- paid from plea of joint possession is a suit for partition, the value for purpose of jurisdiction is the market value of the share claimed by the plaintiff/s out of the plaint schedule property. Thus it is neither on entire plaint schedule property value nor even on 3/4th market value of plaintiffs share. Even in Devabhaktuni Venkatasubbamma Vs. Chadalavada Ramasheshamma -it was held that in a suit for partition not based on joint possession the Court Fees payable is on 3/4th of market value of plaintiffs share u/sec.34 of the Act, whereas for purpose of jurisdiction u/sec.50(2) of the Act, it is based on market value of the plaintiffs share. However, once the Full Bench of this Court answered the issue in Yadagiri(supra) in the year 1999 and same is following by all Courts in the two States, there is nothing to unsettle the same much less to consider any request for reference to Full Bench, though the Kerala High Court Full Bench expression in Pamber(supra) speaks, value for purpose of jurisdiction is total value of plaintiff(s) property claimed and not 3/4th value of such immovable property, but for to determine separately the value for Court Fees is either fixed or on half or 3/4th value of such property, as the case may be, for one is different to other on Court Fee value and jurisdiction value.
advocatemmmohanlaw.blogspot.in

Post has attachment
APEX COURT DIGEST - Jan.2017 [9],
Sections 406, 409 read with Section 120(B) of IPC- for quashing of FIR on the ground that it is purely civil in nature - entered  into  a conspiracy, pursuant to which fabricated documents  were  created  and  in  land acquisition proceedings concerning lan...

Post has attachment

Post has attachment
APEX COURT DIGEST - Jan.2017 [8]
Sections 148, 302 read with  Section  149  and 201 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 (for short ‘IPC’).-  where  the  Trial  Court  and  the  High  Court,  on  appreciating the  entire  oral  evidence,  recorded  categorical  concurrent findings of fact against...

Post has attachment
whether a post-acquisition allottee of land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the matter of determination of compensation under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act). If not, whether the impugned order permitting additional evidence and directing remand is sustainable.= Accordingly, we hold that the post-acquisition allottee has no locus to be heard in the matter and is neither a necessary nor a proper party. 19. The other part of the impugned order permitting additional evidence and remanding the case for fresh decision is uncalled for. No case was made out for permitting additional evidence on settled principles under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC. The provision is reproduced below:- “27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if – (a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, The Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” 20. It is clear that neither the Trial Court has refused to receive the evidence nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be held to necessary to pronounce the judgment. Additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill-in the lacunae or to patch-up the weak points in the case[17]. There was no ground for remand in these circumstances.
                                 REPORTABLE                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                      CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 1587-1636 OF 2017 SATISH KUMAR GUPTA ETC. ETC.                 …APP...
whether a post-acquisition allottee of land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the matter of determination of compensation under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act). If not, whether the impugned order permitting additional evidence and directing remand is sustainable.= Accordingly, we hold that the post-acquisition allottee has no locus to be heard in the matter and is neither a necessary nor a proper party. 19. The other part of the impugned order permitting additional evidence and remanding the case for fresh decision is uncalled for. No case was made out for permitting additional evidence on settled principles under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC. The provision is reproduced below:- “27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if – (a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, The Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” 20. It is clear that neither the Trial Court has refused to receive the evidence nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be held to necessary to pronounce the judgment. Additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill-in the lacunae or to patch-up the weak points in the case[17]. There was no ground for remand in these circumstances.
whether a post-acquisition allottee of land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the matter of determination of compensation under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act). If not, whether the impugned order permitting additional evidence and directing remand is sustainable.= Accordingly, we hold that the post-acquisition allottee has no locus to be heard in the matter and is neither a necessary nor a proper party. 19. The other part of the impugned order permitting additional evidence and remanding the case for fresh decision is uncalled for. No case was made out for permitting additional evidence on settled principles under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC. The provision is reproduced below:- “27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if – (a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, The Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” 20. It is clear that neither the Trial Court has refused to receive the evidence nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be held to necessary to pronounce the judgment. Additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill-in the lacunae or to patch-up the weak points in the case[17]. There was no ground for remand in these circumstances.
freelegalconsultancy.blogspot.in

Post has attachment
When the Court is called upon to interpret the documents and examine its effect, it involves questions of law. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the High Court to decide such questions on merits. = whether the suit property is self-acquired property of late Sk. Noor Mohammad and, if so, whether respondent No.1 was entitled to inherit the same as his legal representative in accordance with the shares defined in the Mohammedan Law and secondly, whether the suit property is self-acquired property of the appellant (defendant No.1) on the strength of documents filed by him and, if so, whether it has resulted in excluding respondent No.1 to claim any share in such property as an heir of Sk. Noor Mohammad, was required to be decided by framing substantial questions of law in the light of proved documents filed by defendant No.1 because it was his case that the suit property was his self-acquired property. The High Court unfortunately did not examine any document for deciding the ownership issue in relation to the suit property.
           REPORTABLE                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                        CIVIL APPEAL No.  3048  OF 2017                    (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.27887/2010) Sk. Bhikan S/o ...
When the Court is called upon to interpret the documents and examine its effect, it involves questions of law. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the High Court to decide such questions on merits. = whether the suit property is self-acquired property of late Sk. Noor Mohammad and, if so, whether respondent No.1 was entitled to inherit the same as his legal representative in accordance with the shares defined in the Mohammedan Law and secondly, whether the suit property is self-acquired property of the appellant (defendant No.1) on the strength of documents filed by him and, if so, whether it has resulted in excluding respondent No.1 to claim any share in such property as an heir of Sk. Noor Mohammad, was required to be decided by framing substantial questions of law in the light of proved documents filed by defendant No.1 because it was his case that the suit property was his self-acquired property. The High Court unfortunately did not examine any document for deciding the ownership issue in relation to the suit property.
When the Court is called upon to interpret the documents and examine its effect, it involves questions of law. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the High Court to decide such questions on merits. = whether the suit property is self-acquired property of late Sk. Noor Mohammad and, if so, whether respondent No.1 was entitled to inherit the same as his legal representative in accordance with the shares defined in the Mohammedan Law and secondly, whether the suit property is self-acquired property of the appellant (defendant No.1) on the strength of documents filed by him and, if so, whether it has resulted in excluding respondent No.1 to claim any share in such property as an heir of Sk. Noor Mohammad, was required to be decided by framing substantial questions of law in the light of proved documents filed by defendant No.1 because it was his case that the suit property was his self-acquired property. The High Court unfortunately did not examine any document for deciding the ownership issue in relation to the suit property.
freelegalconsultancy.blogspot.in

Post has attachment
executability of decree for permanent injunction against the legal representatives of judgment- debtor. = Resultantly, we allow the appeals, set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and hold that the direction issued by the executing court that an undertaking be furnished by the legal representatives to abide by the decree is proper, failing which the executing court would proceed in a permissible mode in accordance with law to enforce the decree under the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32 CPC.
                                                                  Reportable                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3007-3008  OF 2017                [...

Post has attachment
The case of the applicant is that they are carrying on business in manufacture and sale of salt since the year 1976 in the name and style as “AKAR Enterprises”. The trade mark “AKAR” with a particular artistic work, 2 design and get up and fonts for marketing of salt adopted by the applicant and has become distinctive on the ground of long and continuous use and acquired reputation and goodwill. The applicant had obtained the registration of the trade mark “AKAR” under No.556425 and 556426 in class 30. =there is enormous delay of 10 years in filing their present application in spite of knowing very well that the first respondent is continuously using the impugned trade mark “AKASH” right from the year 1999 and even as per their admission to the effect that they came to know about it from 14/03/2009 but they have not raised their little finger to file the present application and to take any action. It is seen that even the Civil Suit was filed only in the year 2009 in OS No.4431/2009 on the file of Additional City Civil Court, Bengaluru and the present application is filed only after nine years. It is pertinent to note that both the applicant and first respondent are having their business place in Bengaluru and also in the same area at New Tharagupet and such being the position it is unimaginable to state that the applicant came to know the use of impugned trade mark only in the year 2009. Considering all these aspects we are of the firm view that the first respondent is entitled to invoke the provision under section 33 in respect of the effect of acquiescence though the learned counsel for the applicant took pain to contend the present facts would not make out the case of acquiescence. In view of the above said reasons we are unable to countenance such contention. In view of the aforesaid reasons the ORA/82/2014/TM/CH is hereby dismissed.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex, Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai,
Teynampet, Chennai – 600 018

ORA/82/2014/TM/CH
TUESDAY THIS THE 1
st DAY OF MARCH, 2016. Hon’ble Shri Justice K.N. Basha …Chairman Hon'ble Shri Sanjeev Kumar C...
The case of the applicant is that they are carrying on business in manufacture and sale of salt since the year 1976 in the name and style as “AKAR Enterprises”. The trade mark “AKAR” with a particular artistic work, 2 design and get up and fonts for marketing of salt adopted by the applicant and has become distinctive on the ground of long and continuous use and acquired reputation and goodwill. The applicant had obtained the registration of the trade mark “AKAR” under No.556425 and 556426 in class 30. =there is enormous delay of 10 years in filing their present application in spite of knowing very well that the first respondent is continuously using the impugned trade mark “AKASH” right from the year 1999 and even as per their admission to the effect that they came to know about it from 14/03/2009 but they have not raised their little finger to file the present application and to take any action. It is seen that even the Civil Suit was filed only in the year 2009 in OS No.4431/2009 on the file of Additional City Civil Court, Bengaluru and the present application is filed only after nine years. It is pertinent to note that both the applicant and first respondent are having their business place in Bengaluru and also in the same area at New Tharagupet and such being the position it is unimaginable to state that the applicant came to know the use of impugned trade mark only in the year 2009. Considering all these aspects we are of the firm view that the first respondent is entitled to invoke the provision under section 33 in respect of the effect of acquiescence though the learned counsel for the applicant took pain to contend the present facts would not make out the case of acquiescence. In view of the above said reasons we are unable to countenance such contention. In view of the aforesaid reasons the ORA/82/2014/TM/CH is hereby dismissed.
The case of the applicant is that they are carrying on business in manufacture and sale of salt since the year 1976 in the name and style as “AKAR Enterprises”. The trade mark “AKAR” with a particular artistic work, 2 design and get up and fonts for marketing of salt adopted by the applicant and has become distinctive on the ground of long and continuous use and acquired reputation and goodwill. The applicant had obtained the registration of the trade mark “AKAR” under No.556425 and 556426 in class 30. =there is enormous delay of 10 years in filing their present application in spite of knowing very well that the first respondent is continuously using the impugned trade mark “AKASH” right from the year 1999 and even as per their admission to the effect that they came to know about it from 14/03/2009 but they have not raised their little finger to file the present application and to take any action. It is seen that even the Civil Suit was filed only in the year 2009 in OS No.4431/2009 on the file of Additional City Civil Court, Bengaluru and the present application is filed only after nine years. It is pertinent to note that both the applicant and first respondent are having their business place in Bengaluru and also in the same area at New Tharagupet and such being the position it is unimaginable to state that the applicant came to know the use of impugned trade mark only in the year 2009. Considering all these aspects we are of the firm view that the first respondent is entitled to invoke the provision under section 33 in respect of the effect of acquiescence though the learned counsel for the applicant took pain to contend the present facts would not make out the case of acquiescence. In view of the above said reasons we are unable to countenance such contention. In view of the aforesaid reasons the ORA/82/2014/TM/CH is hereby dismissed.
freelegalconsultancy.blogspot.in

Post has attachment
“Revocation of the patent is sought on the grounds of lack of novelty, obviousness and insufficiency. The patentees have not filed a Counterstatement, and by their Agenmts’ letter dated 5 March 1981 indicated that they do not intend to contest the application and furthermore propose to allow the patent to lapse by non-payment of the renewal fee due on 27 July, 1981. Subsequently, the patentees have formally offered to surrender their patent, and no opposition to the surrender has been entered. Under the provisions of Section 29 of the Patents Act, 1977, the acceptance by the Comproller of an offer to surrender a patent does not result in the automatic termination of any revocation proceedings that may be in being, although it is clear that the rights existing prior to the date of acceptance of the offer are considerably impaired by the surrender. In the present case, it is manifest that the revocation is to be treated as undefended and accordingly, in dealing with the issues raised, I must assume that the truth of every statement made by the applicants in their statement of cases has been conceded, unless it is contradicted by facts elsewhere in the documents filed. Having reviewed the matter, I am satisfied that the applicants’ case at least in respect of prior publication and obviousness is of undoubted substance, and since in the circumstances the question of amendment does not arise, I therefore direct that the patent be revoked. It follows that no further action is necessary in relation to the offer to surrender the patent.” -Consequently the Controller of Patents, Patent Office, Chennai is directed to remove the impugned patent standing in the name of the first respondent “ICOS Corporation” under patent No.224314 within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the order copy of this Bench. Consequently the surrender proceedings pending before the Controller of Patents becomes infructuous
“Revocation of the patent is sought on the grounds of lack of novelty, obviousness and insufficiency. The patentees have not filed a Counterstatement, and by their Agenmts’ letter dated 5 March 1981 indicated that they do not intend to contest the application and furthermore propose to allow the patent to lapse by non-payment of the renewal fee due on 27 July, 1981. Subsequently, the patentees have formally offered to surrender their patent, and no opposition to the surrender has been entered. Under the provisions of Section 29 of the Patents Act, 1977, the acceptance by the Comproller of an offer to surrender a patent does not result in the automatic termination of any revocation proceedings that may be in being, although it is clear that the rights existing prior to the date of acceptance of the offer are considerably impaired by the surrender. In the present case, it is manifest that the revocation is to be treated as undefended and accordingly, in dealing with the issues raised, I must assume that the truth of every statement made by the applicants in their statement of cases has been conceded, unless it is contradicted by facts elsewhere in the documents filed. Having reviewed the matter, I am satisfied that the applicants’ case at least in respect of prior publication and obviousness is of undoubted substance, and since in the circumstances the question of amendment does not arise, I therefore direct that the patent be revoked. It follows that no further action is necessary in relation to the offer to surrender the patent.” -Consequently the Controller of Patents, Patent Office, Chennai is directed to remove the impugned patent standing in the name of the first respondent “ICOS Corporation” under patent No.224314 within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the order copy of this Bench. Consequently the surrender proceedings pending before the Controller of Patents becomes infructuous
freelegalconsultancy.blogspot.in
Wait while more posts are being loaded