: kudos, this was NOT
what I was expecting to read this morning. If you can change your mind, there's hope. This was very much a "holy f*ck!" moment for me
Of your suggestions:
1: "Verified" works for some, but +Xeni Jardin
was apparently verified against her will, by mocking the concept of verification. Verification should be electable by users. The current process has also been shown to be at best weak: http://gewalker.blogspot.com/2011/08/firsthand-examination-of-google-profile.html
2: You've got an interest in seeing verified users first. I don't. I've gone out of my way to track down pseudonymous accounts, and have found more than a few interesting characters among same. I prefer blue highways to Interstates as well, at least for pleasure travel.
3: Block should mean block
: agree. It should also be far easier to block/mute users and posts.
4: I need to look at Quora's model, I'm not familiar with it.
5: User-oriented control is much of what this argument is about. You want a more sanitized interaction, I prefer one that's more uncensored. There's no reason we can't both have what we want within our own circles and accounts.
6: Klout or other reputation scores are something that could have value, though that's a multi-edged sword. One of my criticisms of Klout is that it's explicitly used by vendor CRMs to triage support. I'd rather have companies be kept guessing as to whether or not I'm "somebody", and provide consistently excellent (or at least uniform) service, despite the name on the credit card / purchase request. As +Ian Wall
notes, "quality" is a famously slippery and multi-dimensional attribute that's long defied easy measure (itself another large part of what the #nymwars argument is about).
The biggest impact of the G+ #nymwars on myself: my trust in Google as a company, and as an entity that hews to "don't be evil" has been shattered. I've started and continued to take steps to pull my true data out
of Google's systems.+Martin Post
: you're expressing yourself better than I could without a ton of effort, very well said and thanks.+Lyndon Bredenkamp
: a technologist who refuses to correct an obvious error is no technologist. I "cave" a hundred times a day.+Ernie Hartley
, +Susanna Söderström
: repudiation and non-repudiation are key components of systems, each with a significant role and value, in the right place. Some may want non-repudiation (strong verification), some may prefer repudiation. Mandetory identification is, as has been pointed out many times in the #nymwars debate, a control issue. I'd like to be able to establish known but repudiable identities in specific cases. Why should I, for example, provide unlimited
access to my financial accounts when what I really want is a one-time or limited time-and-scope financial allowance?+Ian Wall
: TOR is good, but by no means perfect. There are a very limited number of TOR exit points (slightly more than 200 in the US, low single digits in many countries), throughput is low, and configuration non-trivial for ordinary users. If your threat model includes well-resourced, technically capable entities, TOR is hardly sufficient.+Douglas Grubbs
: you've formed your use-case and model for this system, but who are you to dictate how all others should interact with it?+Vic Gundotra +Natalie Villalobos +Larry Page +Sergey Brin +Marissa Mayer
: get on the ball already.