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Richard Chappell
Works at University of York
Attended Princeton University
Lives in York, UK
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Education
  • Princeton University
    philosophy, 2007 - 2012
  • Australian National University
    philosophy, 2006 - 2006
  • University of Canterbury
    philosophy, 2003 - 2005
Basic Information
Gender
Male
Other names
Richard Yetter Chappell
Work
Occupation
Philosopher
Employment
  • University of York
    Lecturer, 2014 - present
  • Bowling Green State University
    Assistant Professor, 2013 - 2014
  • University of Pennsylvania
    Lecturer, 2012 - 2013
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Map of the places this user has livedMap of the places this user has livedMap of the places this user has lived
Currently
York, UK
Previously
Ann Arbor, MI - Christchurch, NZ - Canberra, Australia - Princeton, NJ

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Cancelling Schroeder's "Implicature" Response to Parfit's Trivality Objection
According to Parfit's Triviality Objection , metaethical naturalism can't adequately capture our ability to make substantive positive normative claims .  For example, suppose a subjectivist naturalist wants to hold both: Normative Subjectivism:  You have re...
According to Parfit's Triviality Objection, metaethical naturalism can't adequately capture our ability to make substantive positive normative claims. For example, suppose a subjectivist naturalist wants to hold both: Normative Subjectivism: You have reasons for action just when that act would ...
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Are "Internal Reasons" Normative?
Bernard Williams, in his 'Internal and External Reasons', introduces the internal interpretation  of 'A has a reason to ϕ' as "impl[ying], very roughly, that A has some motive which will be served or furthered by his ϕ-ing, and if this turns out not to be s...
Bernard Williams, in his 'Internal and External Reasons', introduces the internal interpretation of 'A has a reason to ϕ' as "impl[ying], very roughly, that A has some motive which will be served or furthered by his ϕ-ing, and if this turns out not to be so then sentence is false: there is a ...
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Wellman's Implicit Defense of Near-Open Borders
Kit Wellman's ' Immigration and Freedom of Assocation ' begins with the following set-up: Without denying that those of us in wealthy societies may have extremely demanding duties of global distributive justice, I ultimately reach the stark conclusion that ...
Without denying that those of us in wealthy societies may have extremely demanding duties of global distributive justice, I ultimately reach the stark conclusion that every legitimate state has the right to close its doors to all potential immigrants, even refugees desperately seeking asylum ...
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2014 in review
(Past annual reviews: 2013 ,  2012 , 2011 , 2010 , 2009 , 2008 , 2007 , 2006 , 2005 , and 2004 .) On the blog: Metaethics *  The Argument from Intelligibility for Moral Realism *  The Moral Relevance of Non-Natural Properties * Normative Concepts  -- what m...
Good Lives and Procreative Duties argues that we needn't deny that it's good to bring additional excellent lives into existence in order to deny the demanding deontic claim that (appropriately situated) people are morally obligated to reproduce. * Review of Bostrom's Superintelligence.
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Blogs and Articles
There's a cool paper by Thomas Kroedel on ' Dualist Mental Causation and the Exclusion Problem ', forthcoming in Nous .  The central idea is very much akin to that discussed in my 2011 blog post ' Epiphenomenal Explanations '.  As with the previously noted ...
There's a cool paper by Thomas Kroedel on 'Dualist Mental Causation and the Exclusion Problem', forthcoming in Nous. The central idea is very much akin to that discussed in my 2011 blog post 'Epiphenomenal Explanations'. As with the previously noted case of Kagan on Consequentialism and ...
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December Donations
Happily, I was in a position this year to make donations worth around 8 kidneys , mostly split between SCI (deworming: most cost-effective "quality of life"-improving intervention) and GWWC (growing the effective altruism community, so more money is donated...
Happily, I was in a position this year to make donations worth around 8 kidneys, mostly split between SCI (deworming: most cost-effective "quality of life"-improving intervention) and GWWC (growing the effective altruism community, so more money is donated wisely in future).
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E.J. Lowe on the Inescapability of Metaphysics
"How is it possible for creatures like us to chart the realm of possibilities? Of course, this is a curious question, to the extent that it is, itself, a question -- addressed to ourselves -- about the very realm of possibilities, access to which, by us, is...
"How is it possible for creatures like us to chart the realm of possibilities? Of course, this is a curious question, to the extent that it is, itself, a question -- addressed to ourselves -- about the very realm of possibilities, access to which, by us, is being put in question.
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Have him in circles
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Information and Parfit's Fact Stating Argument
In Chapter 26 of On What Matters  (vol 2), Parfit sets out his (comparatively neglected) 'Fact-Stating Argument' against non-analytical moral naturalism.  This begins by distinguishing the referential  and informational  senses of "same fact".  Consider the...
In Chapter 26 of On What Matters (vol 2), Parfit sets out his (comparatively neglected) 'Fact-Stating Argument' against non-analytical moral naturalism. This begins by distinguishing the referential and informational senses of "same fact". Consider the following three claims: ...
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Waiving Rights and "Second-class citizens"
There's a curious pattern of reasoning one sometimes comes across (especially from the anti-Cosmopolitan Left) that one does better -- morally speaking -- to ignore destitute outsiders than to engage with them on mutually beneficial but unequal or potential...
There's a curious pattern of reasoning one sometimes comes across (especially from the anti-Cosmopolitan Left) that one does better -- morally speaking -- to ignore destitute outsiders than to engage with them on mutually beneficial but unequal or potentially "exploitative" terms.
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National embarrassment Scott Lively finally lost his last appeal and will now face crimes against humanity charges.
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Questioning Political Dogmas
There's an interesting thread over at Daily Nous asking whether there's a problematic lack of political diversity in academic philosophy .  I don't think this is something that can be answered in a value-neutral way. In particular, one cannot just assume th...
There's an interesting thread over at Daily Nous asking whether there's a problematic lack of political diversity in academic philosophy. I don't think this is something that can be answered in a value-neutral way. In particular, one cannot just assume that the spectrum of views in the general ...
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Philosophers' Carnival #170
Welcome to the 170th Philosophers' Carnival , a round-up of recent philosophical blog posts from around the web. First up: PEA Soup hosts a discussion of Elizabeth Barnes' paper "Valuing Disability, Causing Disability" -- defending a "mere difference" view ...
Welcome to the 170th Philosophers' Carnival, a round-up of recent philosophical blog posts from around the web. First up: PEA Soup hosts a discussion of Elizabeth Barnes' paper "Valuing Disability, Causing Disability" -- defending a "mere difference" view of disability -- with critical précis by ...
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