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Richard Chappell
Works at University of York
Attended Princeton University
Lives in York, UK
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Education
  • Princeton University
    philosophy, 2007 - 2012
  • Australian National University
    philosophy, 2006 - 2006
  • University of Canterbury
    philosophy, 2003 - 2005
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Gender
Male
Other names
Richard Yetter Chappell
Work
Occupation
Philosopher
Employment
  • University of York
    Lecturer, 2014 - present
  • Bowling Green State University
    Assistant Professor, 2013 - 2014
  • University of Pennsylvania
    Lecturer, 2012 - 2013
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Currently
York, UK
Previously
Ann Arbor, MI - Christchurch, NZ - Canberra, Australia - Princeton, NJ

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Richard Chappell

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Moral Priorities
Robin Hanson notes that people generally don't like " ranking the sacred " (his example: "fighting cancer" vs. "working for racial justice").  This is a big part of what Effective Altruism is all about -- not just aiming to do some good, but seriously takin...
Robin Hanson notes that people generally don't like "ranking the sacred" (his example: "fighting cancer" vs. "working for racial justice"). This is a big part of what Effective Altruism is all about -- not just aiming to do some good, but seriously taking an evidence-based approach to doing the ...
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Richard Chappell

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Valuing Unnecessary Causal Contributions
In ' Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responsibility Approach ', Alvin Goldman argues that (i) there's a sense in which each vote for the winning party causally contributes to their victory, even if they receive many more votes than are necessary for vict...
In 'Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responsibility Approach', Alvin Goldman argues that (i) there's a sense in which each vote for the winning party causally contributes to their victory, even if they receive many more votes than are necessary for victory (and similarly each vote against the ...
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Richard Chappell

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Questioning Moral Equality
[Warning: the post below raises questions that may be morally corrupting.  Engage with them at your own peril!] If there's one thing that pretty much all moral theorists these days agree on, it's that all persons are moral equals in some important sense.  N...
[Warning: the post below raises questions that may be morally corrupting. Engage with them at your own peril!] If there's one thing that pretty much all moral theorists these days agree on, it's that all persons are moral equals in some important sense. Not that all people are equally morally ...
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Cancelling Schroeder's "Implicature" Response to Parfit's Trivality Objection
According to Parfit's Triviality Objection , metaethical naturalism can't adequately capture our ability to make substantive positive normative claims .  For example, suppose a subjectivist naturalist wants to hold both: Normative Subjectivism:  You have re...
According to Parfit's Triviality Objection, metaethical naturalism can't adequately capture our ability to make substantive positive normative claims. For example, suppose a subjectivist naturalist wants to hold both: Normative Subjectivism: You have reasons for action just when that act would ...
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Information and Parfit's Fact Stating Argument
In Chapter 26 of On What Matters  (vol 2), Parfit sets out his (comparatively neglected) 'Fact-Stating Argument' against non-analytical moral naturalism.  This begins by distinguishing the referential  and informational  senses of "same fact".  Consider the...
In Chapter 26 of On What Matters (vol 2), Parfit sets out his (comparatively neglected) 'Fact-Stating Argument' against non-analytical moral naturalism. This begins by distinguishing the referential and informational senses of "same fact". Consider the following three claims: ...
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Waiving Rights and "Second-class citizens"
There's a curious pattern of reasoning one sometimes comes across (especially from the anti-Cosmopolitan Left) that one does better -- morally speaking -- to ignore destitute outsiders than to engage with them on mutually beneficial but unequal or potential...
There's a curious pattern of reasoning one sometimes comes across (especially from the anti-Cosmopolitan Left) that one does better -- morally speaking -- to ignore destitute outsiders than to engage with them on mutually beneficial but unequal or potentially "exploitative" terms.
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Richard Chappell

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The Best Case for Voting
To follow up on my last post , let's consider a Regan-esque  case for voting. The set-up:  Suppose there are two candidates, Good and Bad, and a large population (e.g. several million voters).  90% of the population are unreasoning voters, and suppose that ...
To follow up on my last post, let's consider a Regan-esque case for voting. The set-up: Suppose there are two candidates, Good and Bad, and a large population (e.g. several million voters). 90% of the population are unreasoning voters, and suppose that each such voter is (independently) 0.55 ...
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Must Research Talks present Work in Progress?
I gather the norm is that research talks (colloquia, etc.) are meant for presenting unpublished work; work that is, at least nominally, "in progress".  But is there a good reason for this norm?  Just off the top of my head, I would have thought that researc...
I gather the norm is that research talks (colloquia, etc.) are meant for presenting unpublished work; work that is, at least nominally, "in progress". But is there a good reason for this norm? Just off the top of my head, I would have thought that research talks served two main purposes: (i) ...
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Forthcoming in <i>Bioethics</i>
... is my paper, ' Against "Saving Lives": Equal Concern and Differential Impact ' [ pdf ]. It draws on many of my previous blog posts on the ethics of allocation, especially: * Are QALYs Discriminatory?  -- The basic argument against Harris's "discriminati...
Are QALYs Discriminatory? -- The basic argument against Harris's "discrimination" objection: It isn't objectionably discriminatory to prioritize greater harms/benefits over lesser ones, and that's all that QALYs are about. * The associated mistake of conflating the worth of and to a person.
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Thoughts on 'Non-Consequentialism Demystified'
' Non-Consequentialism Demystified ' is a really interesting new paper in Phil Imprint  by Nye, Plunkett & Ku.  It makes two moves, in particular, that I want to focus on in this post. First, it proposes an interesting analysis of distinctively moral  norma...
First, it proposes an interesting analysis of distinctively moral normativity (something that has puzzled me before) in terms of the fittingness of feelings of obligation. While there's clearly an intimate connection here, it's natural to wonder about the direction of explanation: If you are ...
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Are "Internal Reasons" Normative?
Bernard Williams, in his 'Internal and External Reasons', introduces the internal interpretation  of 'A has a reason to ϕ' as "impl[ying], very roughly, that A has some motive which will be served or furthered by his ϕ-ing, and if this turns out not to be s...
Bernard Williams, in his 'Internal and External Reasons', introduces the internal interpretation of 'A has a reason to ϕ' as "impl[ying], very roughly, that A has some motive which will be served or furthered by his ϕ-ing, and if this turns out not to be so then sentence is false: there is a ...
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Wellman's Implicit Defense of Near-Open Borders
Kit Wellman's ' Immigration and Freedom of Assocation ' begins with the following set-up: Without denying that those of us in wealthy societies may have extremely demanding duties of global distributive justice, I ultimately reach the stark conclusion that ...
Without denying that those of us in wealthy societies may have extremely demanding duties of global distributive justice, I ultimately reach the stark conclusion that every legitimate state has the right to close its doors to all potential immigrants, even refugees desperately seeking asylum ...
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