Steven Weinberg, To Explain the World: The Discovery of Modern Science
Steven Weinberg is a professional physicist, one of the best (he's done important work in cosmology, and he shared the Nobel Prize for his work on what's now called the Standard Model of elementary particle theory, a.k.a. SU(3)xSU(2)xU(1) or the Weinberg-Glashow-Salam model), and an amateur historian of science. He's taught a few courses on the subject, and it's at least implicit in a few of his other books.
Weinberg knows enough about history to know what “the Whig interpretation of history” means and to know that it's not usually taken to be a flattering description, but nevertheless argues that it's an appropriate way to write about the development of science (pointing out that the person who coined that phrase, Herbert Butterfield, didn't hesitate to judge the past by the standards of the present when writing about the history of science) and that it's an especially useful perspective starting with the Scientific Revolution, when we start seeing something that looks like modern science to a modern scientist like Weinberg. It's a fairly convincing argument; if you're trying to explain why one point of view largely replaced another, surely you shouldn't neglect correspondence with actual physical reality. Not every history needs to be written with that point of view, but some should be. That's especially true if the author understands the science well enough to explain what some scholar from an earlier era was trying to do, what their argument meant in quantitative terms using notation that's understandable today, and why their approach worked, to the extent that it did.
If you've studied science of any kind then you'll undoubtedly know some of this story, since a class on any technical field usually includes at least a little bit on how our present understanding developed. You probably won't know all of the story, though, in part because those introductions we all get are always radically simplified for pedagogical purposes. One thing I learned that was new to me, for example, was that the Ptolemaic model of the universe was not universally accepted in the pre-Copernican era — far from it. Aristotle had a quite different model, also geocentric but different in many other ways, and there was serious argument between the two up through Galileo's day. What's even more interesting is that everyone agreed that Ptolemy's model agreed better with observational data, but that didn't stop a lot of people from preferring Aristotle's model anyway. For many scholars quantitative agreement with observed data wasn't the only criterion by which to evaluate a model, and not necessarily even the most valued. A model was also judged by the extent to which it could be arrived at deductively from a priori justification, the extent to which it embodied moral or teleological description, the extent to which it explained essence rather than merely appearance. Part of this story is about how we arrived at our present understanding of the world and part of it is about a change in the idea of what, in broad terms, an explanation of the world should look like.