Right, but my point is that MSFT had no real viable mobile technology (esp. tablets), and had always tried to extend the Windows brand to every device.
Line extension had got them here. Microsoft never had the technical re-invention that Apple had when Jobs brought NextStep back. Even the 1995 internet re-alignment was re-papering of Windows.
But now, MSFT didn't have a viable tablet OS.
So what to do in the face of secular technology revolution (mobile/tablet)?
For MSFT, the best viable strategy was Metro design unification across phones / tablets / Xbox and Windows since the cupboard was otherwise bare and Windows was the unifying brand.
So I reject the post-mortems that say if they had "just kept Windows more familiar" things would be better. Microsoft was right that they needed a big change, and the Metro one was a better bet than the incremental Windows model, because at least it gave them a re-alignment chance on tablets.
It does seem crazy to try to force the tablet model on the PC, and they definitely didn't execute Windows 8 well, but at the MBA level, most of the decisions made sense. It's those damned engineering feature details that they didn't have the patience to figure out, isn't it?
Years of being run by P&G packaged goods line extension MBAs and not having strategic technical leadership left MSFT in that situation, I think.
In the end, if it leads to the exit of Ballmer, it at least precipitated the necessary condition for a relevant Microsoft in the future.