There is neither endless nor recurring cycles of different ages as in ancient eastern and classic philosophies.
According to the Biblical view, Time is countable, numerable, measurable: we can understand and comprehend time.
Every thing that exists today has a preceding event that constitutes a precise cause of its existence.
Only in such a cultural environment and "weltanshauung" - nowhere else - what is now known as 'modern science' would have found early on so much fertile, friendly, and favourable ground.
Quid est enim tempus?
Quis hoc facile breuiterque explicauerit?
Quis hoc ad uerbum de illo proferendum uel cogitatione comprehenderit? Quid autem familiarius et notius in loquendo commemoramus quam tempus?
Et intellegimus utique cum id loquimur, intellegimus etiam cum alio loquente id audimus. Quid est ergo tempus?
Si nemo ex me quærat, scio; si quærenti explicare uelim, nescio. Fidenter tamen dico scire me quod, si nihil præteriret, non esset præteritum tempus, et si nihil adueniret, non esset futurum tempus, et si nihil esset, non esset præsens tempus.
Duo ergo illa tempora, præteritum et futurum, quomodo sunt, quando et præteritum iam non est et futurum nondum est?
Præsens autem si semper esset præsens nec in præteritum transiret, non iam esset tempus, sed æternitas.
Si ergo præsens, ut tempus sit, ideo fit, quia in præteritum transit, quomodo et hoc esse dicimus, cui causa, ut sit, illa est, quia non erit, ut scilicet non uere dicamus tempus esse, nisi quia tendit non esse?
For what is time?
Who can easily and briefly explain it?
Who even in thought can comprehend it, even to the pronouncing of a word concerning it?
But what in speaking do we refer to more familiarly and knowingly than time? And certainly we understand when we speak of it; we understand also when we hear it spoken of by another.
What, then, is time? If no one ask of me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not. Yet I say with confidence, that I know that if nothing passed away, there would not be past time; and if nothing were coming, there would not be future time; and if nothing were, there would not be present time.
Those two times, therefore, past and future, how are they, when even the past now is not; and the future is not as yet?
But should the present be always present, and should it not pass into time past, time truly it could not be, but eternity.
If, then, time present — if it be time — only comes into existence because it passes into time past, how do we say that even this is, whose cause of being is that it shall not be — namely, so that we cannot truly say that time is, unless because it tends not to be?
–Augustine of Hippo, Confessiones lib xi, cap xiv, sec 17 (ca. 400 CE)